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ABSTRACT
In the 1930's, Americans struggled with a problem that
still haunts the United States todays
poverty.

the problem of chronic

Thirty years ago, the nation focused its attention

on rural poverty, not the poverty of urban ghettos.

The

people of rural America had known hard times in the 1920's,
but the worst came after 1929.

No economic group suffered
i

more in the Depression than the nation's farmers, and no
farmers were more poverty-stricken than Southern farm ten
ants, sharecroppers, and migrant farm workers.

In reality,

too many people were trying to earn a living from the land.,
Over a half million farm families— or two million to five
million individuals— were no longer needed as cotton tenants.
In the lower Mississippi River Valley, over two out of every
three farmers did not own land of their own.

When Franklin

D. Roosevelt took the oath of office in 1933, the Southern
farm tenancy system had virtually reached the point of col
lapse .
Initially, the Agricultural Adjustment Administra
tion's crop reduction and acreage restriction programs hurt
rather than helped tenants and croppers in the Southern
cotton belt, but President Roosevelt soon embarked on a bold
approach for alleviating the plight of low-income farmers.

The New Deal resettlement program took submarginal land out
of cultivation, resettled farm families on land that would
support a decent living, and gave them the best technical
assistance available.

Beginning in 1933, the Subsistence

Homesteads Division of the Department of the Interior was
the first New Deal agency to resettle low-income families on
subsistence plots.

Soon afterward, the Federal Emergency

Relief Administration (FERA), under Harry L. Hopkins,
launched a number of community projects as part of its rural
rehabilitation program.

More important, the Resettlement

Administration (RA), created by executive order in April,
1935, not only absorbed the subsistence homesteads and most
FERA rural rehabilitation projects, but initiated a whole
new series of communities located mostly in the South.
Resettlement Administrator Rexford G. Tugwell set up a
complex national organization with twelve regional offices
and hundreds of state, district, and county offices.

Two

years later, operating under authority granted in the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, the Farm Security
Administration (FSA) replaced the RA, inherited its organi
zation and most of its personnel, and completed the resettle
ment program.
In Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi

(Region Six),

the Division of Subsistence Homesteads, the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration, and the Resettlement Administration
together established a total of thirty resettlement projects.
Some of the projects formed separate communities, others were

scattered farms, a few experimented with cooperative farming,
but the vast majority operated on the familiar principle of
every farmer owning his own plot and farmstead.

The New

Deal's ultimate solution of the problems of farm tenancy was
to make independent farm owners out of tenant families.

Thus

the resettlement program evoked an old tenet of American
agrarianism:

the belief that the small independent land

holder was the nation's backbone.

When the resettlement

program was liquidated during World War II, most of the
projects were operating far in the red.

Yet the resettlement

agencies did succeed in giving thousands of farm families in
Region Six a new start, a sense of hope, and a higher
standard of living.

The New Deal provided other kinds of

help for farm tenants and sharecroppers, but it never came
to grips with the total problem of, rural poverty.

CHAPTER I
FARM TENANCY AND THE NEW DEAL
The Great Depression struck hard at tenant fanners
and sharecroppers, the chronic victims of rural distress in
the South.

During the 1930's, the activities of the

Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, the popularity of Tobacco
Road and The Grapes of Wrath. studies made by such men as
Charles S. Johnson and Arthur Raper— all helped to focus
national attention on the southern tenant problem.-*-

In

1937, the President's Special Committee on Farm Tenancy
reported that sixty-four per cent of All American farm
tenants lived in the South.3

The Southern tenancy rate had

increased from more than a third of all farmers in 1880 to
more than half in 1930.3

In 1935, there were 1,831,475

-*-David Eugene Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers; The
Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana, 111., 1965) ,
Chapters V, IX? Erskine Caldwell, Tobacco Road (New York,
1932) ? John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (New York, 1939) ;
Charles S. Johnson, The Shadow of the Plantation (Chicago,
1934); Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry (Chapel Hill,
1938). See also Charles S. Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and
Will Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill,
1935).
^National Resources Board, Farm Tenancy: Report of
the President's Committee (Washington, 1937), 35, 96.
3Ibid., 39.
1

tenant farmers in the South; this meant that tenancy had
trapped more than eight and a half million people, or about
one of every four Southerners.^

After 1900, the rate of

tenancy among white farmers in the South increased rapidly
while holding fairly steady among Negro farmers.

By 1935,

over forty-six per cent of all Southern white farmers were
tenants compared to over seventy-nine per cent of Negro
farmers, but white tenants outnumbered blacks by two to one.^
Tenancy rates were highest where cotton production was most
intensive, notably in the Southern Black Belt.

In 1930,

Mississippi had the highest rate of farm tenancy in the
nation; 72.2 per cent of all farmers in the state did not
own the land they farmed.

Georgia was second highest with

55.5 per cent, followed closely by Alabama
(63.7), South Carolina

(62.2), and Arkansas

(64.5), Louisiana
(60.0).6

In all

six states, nearly three out of every four cotton farms were
operated with

tenant labor.^

"The agricultural ladder,for

^U. S.
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1939 (Washington, 1940), 621; U. S. Bureau
of the Census, United States Census of Agriculture: 1935;
The Southern States, II (Washington, 1935), 108.
5Farm Tenancy: Report of the President1s Committee.
99; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939, p. 621.
6Farm Tenancy: Report of the President1s Committee.
96; U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1934 (Washington, 1934), 553.
I
^W. A.
Turner, A Graphic Summary of Farm Tenure.
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No. 261
(Washington, 1936), 1-3.

these Americans," Franklin D. Roosevelt said in 1937, "has
become a treadmill."8
The rural South had been sinking into the morass of
tenancy since the Civil War.

After 1865, military defeat

and post-war adjustment presented Southern agriculture with
a series of problems:

the breakdown of the labor supply, a

scarcity of money, and lack of credit.

Since former slaves

had no property and no credit, they needed land without
having to buy it or pay cash rent.
not enough cash to hire laborers.

Landlords had land but
Together owners and

tenants evolved a form of tenancy peculiar to the South in
which they substituted produce and labor for money by sharing
the crop, the only thing either had of value.

A few tenants

were able to pay cash rent for the use of land, but most
were either sharecroppers or share tenants.
was the most disadvantaged and least secure.

The sharecropper
He had

110

live

stock or farm equipment or any semblance of capital; all he
had was his own labor and that of his wife and children to
produce and harvest the crop.

The landlord furnished him

with land, house, mule, tools, seed, and other supplies, and
in return the cropper agreed to pay as rent half of the crop
he produced.

The share tenant was somewhat better off since

he was able to furnish more of his own needs for his share of

^Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress of the Uhited
States, February 16, 1937, in Farm Tenancy: Report of the
President's Committee. 25, 26.
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the crop.

He supplied all of his own workstock and equipment

as well as labor; consequently his rent was less, usually a
fourth to a third of the crop.

What further tightened the

grip of poverty on the rural South was the crop-lien system.
Because of the lack of agricultural credit, landlords
depended on a local "furnish" merchant to advance supplies
to the tenant and his family until the crop was harvested,
and the storekeeper protected his investment by taking a
mortgage or "lien" on the tenant's share of the future crop.
Since merchants would risk supplies only on staples like
cotton and tobacco, the one-crop system, overproduction, and
/ soil exhaustion were more characteristic of the New South
f

' ■

than the slave South.0
The life of tenants and sharecroppers, both Negro and
white, was a miserable existence in dirt, poverty, ignorance,
and disease.10

They lived in the worst houses, usually two-

or three-room unpainted shacks with cotton planted right up
to the front door.

The monotony of their basic diet— salt

pork or fatback, corn bread, molasses, and sweet potatoes—
explains the high rate of pellagra among tenants; malaria

^Rupert Vance. Human Factors in Cotton Culture
Hill, 1929), Chapter III.

(Chapel

10ln addition to the books cited in Footnote No.. .1,
see Agee and Walker Evans, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men
(Boston, 1960)? Howard Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers
(New York, 1936); Herman Clarence Nixon, Forty Acres and
Steel Mules (Chapel Hill, 1941). For an Arkansas reaction,
see Arkansas State Policy Committee, Agricultural Labor
Problems in Arkansas. Published Paper No. 1 (n.p., October
31, 1936).

and hookworm were also common.

The children went to school,

if at all, three to four months a year because they were
needed in the fields.

Tenant wives all aged prematurely,

showing up in photographs as gaunt, frightened creatures.
Tenant income was below subsistence levels, even by depres
sion standards.

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration

and the University of Arkansas, in a 1934 survey, revealed
that the cash income of tenants on three Arkansas plantations
was about $300 for that year. ^

In a study in 1936, the Farm

Security Administration found that 287 cotton tenants in the
hill section of Arkansas had a total average cash income of
$134.71 per year.'1’2

Despite lack of income, many croppers

moved every two or three years? some were evicted, but
others were looking for a better life that few ever found.
Everyone who traveled through the South in the 1930's
to peer into tenant shacks and talk with croppers sitting on
front porches was appalled by what he saw and heard.
Tenants lived in such extreme poverty that many observers
sensed something un-American about it.

Frazier Hunt, New

York World-Telegram reporter, saw groups of cotton pickers
working their way across cotton fields.

"In some strange

way, they reminded me," he said, "of Chinese coolies working

•^Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers, 12, 13.

■^Paul v. Maris, "Farm Tenancy," in U. S. Department
of Agriculture, Farmers in a. Changing World? The Yearbook of
Agriculture, 1940 (Washington, 1940), 889.

in the soya beans along the Southern Manchurian Railroad."
"They seemed to belong to another land than the America I
knew and loved.

"it is in Arkansas that one finds the

situation of the sharecroppers really tragic," wrote free
lance author and traveler Fred Kelly.

"I have never seen

living conditions on lower standards, even in backward
sections of E u r o p e . N a o m i

Mitchison, an English novelist,

made a visit to Arkansas in 1935.

"I have traveled over

most of Europe and part of Africa," she said, "but I have
never seen such terrible sights as I saw yesterday among the
sharecroppers of A r k a n s a s . c o n d i t i o n s among tenants on
Arkansas plantations may have'been typical, but they were
probably no worse than elsewhere in the cotton belt.
Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace decided to take a
look for himself in 1936.

"I have never seen among the

peasantry of Europe, " he said,

"poverty so abject as that

which exists in this favorable cotton year in the great
cotton states from Arkansas on to the East Coast.

. .

Most tenants, sharecroppers, and submarginal farmers
found it impossible to move out of this abject poverty and

13New York World-Telegram. July 30, 1935.
l^Quoted in "A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Sub
mitted to the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the
Executive Council, Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union," c. 1936,
Socialist Party of America Papers, Duke university Library.
l5Quoted in Kester, Revolt Among the Sharecroppers. 51.

16flxthur M. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal
(Boston, 1959), 375, 376.

up the agricultural ladder toward ownership.

They were

caught in a squeeze between depression problems and certain
long-range trends in cotton farming.

In 1935, Charles S.

Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and Will W. Alexander published a
hard-hitting little book entitled The Collapse of Cotton
Tenancy predicting an early doom for the South1s plantation
type of farm organization, the one-crop pattern, and the
farm tenancy system.

Indeed, if it had not been for federal

subsidies, they implied, cotton tenancy would have already
collapsed from a series of causes:

soil depletion, an

abundant supply of ch&ap foreign cotton (and a consequent
loss of world markets), competition of synthetic fabrics
like rayon, and the mmBchanization of agriculture.

What

will become, they were asking, of the millions of destitute
tenants and croppers and small farmers whose livelihood
17

depend on cotton?x/

When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office on March 4,
1933, he moved quickly to carry out the New Deal that he had
proclaimed during the campaign.

But early New Deal spending

barely trickled down to the chief victims of rural distress.
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration

(AAA), a corner

stone of the First New Deal, grew out of a conception of
agricultural policy in which the central issues were prices
and credit, not the relief of rural poverty.

The purpose of

. 17Johnson, Embree, and Alexander, The Collapse of
Cotton Tenancy. Chapter III.

the AAA was to raise prices by curtailing production.

Farmers

voluntarily agreed to take acreage out of production in
return for "benefit payments" to replace lost income.

Thus

the AAA sought to restore farmers to "parity," a ratio of
what fanners paid to what they received, based on farm pur
chasing power and prices in the prosperous period of 19091914.

But the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's

cotton plow up and acreage reduction program worked directly
against tenant farmers and sharecroppers.

The AAA quite

obviously reflected the interests of large farmers and land
lords; tenants, for example, had no place on the AAA county
committees which supervised the program locally, nor did AAA
cotton contracts contain adequate safeguards for the protec
tion of their interests.

As a result, many landlords

accepted benefit payments for taking acreage out of produc
tion, while either cheating tenants and sharecroppers out of
their rightful share of the subsidies or evicting those

]p

whose labor was no longer needed. °

In response to the landlords1 highland tactics and AAA

^®See Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers. Chapter IV? Fred
C. Frey and T. Lynn Smith, "The Influence of the AAA Cotton
Program upon the Tenant, Cropper, and Laborer.” Rural Soci
ology, I (May, 1936), 495-98? Harold Hoffsommer, "The AAA
and the Sharecropper>11 Social Forces, XIII (May, 1935), 494502?. Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. Black,
Three Years of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(Washington, 1937)? Henry I. Richards, Cotton and the Agri
cultural Adjustment Administration (Washington, 1936) ?. and
T. J.. Woof ter, Jr., et al.. Landlord and Tenant on the
Cotton Plantation. WPA Research Monograph No. V (Washington,
1936).

policies, sharecroppers in Arkansas began to organize.

What

aroused Arkansas croppers was the action of one man, Hiram
Norcross.

In 1934, Norcross issued eviction notices to

about forty families on his 4,500-acre plantation near
Tyronza, Poinsett County, Arkansas.

In July, a group of

eighteen sharecroppers, white and Negro, meeting in a school
building near Tyronza, organized the Southern Tenant Farmers'
Union.

They turned for leadership to H. L. Mitchell, former

sharecropper and currently owner of a small dry cleaning
shop; H. Clay East, service station operator; and J. R.
Butler, saw mill hand and school teacher.

The reason for

forming a union was both to give sharecroppers and tenants
some bargaining power with planters and to stop evictions
and landlord chiseling under A A A contracts.

Within a few

months, the STFU had about 1,400 members in four or five
northeastern Arkansas counties; by 1936, it had 50,000 mem
bers in Arkansas and parts of Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri,
Mississippi, and Tennessee.

After watching union membership

climb, landlords retaliated with a campaign of violence which
dramatized the plight of Southern tenants.

Planters and

their allies arrested, jailed, flogged, and murdered union
organizers and members; they broke up meetings by burning or
shooting into homes, churches and other known union meeting
places.

STFU leaders adopted a policy of passive resistance,

endured the attacks, and moved their headquarters across the

10
Mississippi River to Memphis, Tennessee.19
With the help of Socialist party leader Norman Thomas
and a few quick-triggered landlords, the STFU put the tenant
problem in the headlines and helped awaken the nation's con
science.

Even in Arkansas there was evidence of growing

concern.

Arkansas Governor J. Marion Futrell declared that

farm tenancy was "eating at the vitals of the South's economic
structure and, whether exaggerated or not, is of such serious
character as to call for immediate and exhaustive study and
examination with a view to its definite settlement."20

On

August 15, 1936, Futrell announced that he would appoint a
special commission composed of impartial and fair-minded
citizens to investigate conditions among tenants and share
croppers in the state and to recommend a solution to the
problem.^1

On the commission's recommendations, the Arkansas

legislature in 1939 passed legislation designed to reform
some of the system's inequities.22

l^Conrad, The Forgotten Farmer. Chapters V, IX? M. S.
Venkataramani, " N o m a n Thomas, Arkansas Sharecroppers, and
the Roosevelt Agricultural Policies, 1933-1937," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review. XLVII (September, 1960), 225-46?
John Gould Fletcher. Arkansas (Chapel Hill), 335-53.

20Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), August 16, 1936.
21ibid., August 27, 1936.
22rphig-was the Arkansas Land Policy Act (Act 331).,
approved March 16, 1939.
See Acts . ... . oj£ the Fifty-Second
General Assembly of the State of Arkansas . . . (Little Rock,
1939), 863-71.

11
More important, Thomas and the STFU put pressure on
the Roosevelt Administration to offer a positive program to
relieve tenant suffering.

At first, however, Secretary of

Agriculture Henry A. Wallace defended AAA policies.

He was

not blind to the plight of tenants and sharecroppers; but
farm tenancy had existed for a long time, Wallace maintained,
and their low standard of living was not due to the new crop
reduction program.

The AAA's 1934-35 cotton contract, he

argued, contained protection for sharecroppers in paragraph
7, a provision that required landlords to keep the same
number of tenants they had the previous year.

Wallace

v'•*7

believed that the AAA could not do any'more to protect the
rights of tenants.
One group within the AAA, the urban liberals under
Jerome Frank, did favor positive action to relieve the dis
tress of tenants and sharecroppers.

In February, 1934, with

AAA director Chester Davis out of town, Frank circulated a
directive which interpreted paragraph 7 to require that
planters not only retain the same number of tenants but the
same individuals as tenants.

But Davis canceled the direc

tive and, with the backing of Roosevelt and Wallace, fired
Frank and most of his

allies.

^4

President Roosevelt himself

was sympathetic to the plight of sharecroppers, but he

23see Venkataramani, "Norman Thomas, Arkansas Share
croppers, and the Roosevelt Agricultural Policies," 230-32,
238.
24
...
.....
Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers, 141-49.

12
approached the problem with caution.
said to Norman Thomas,

"I know the South," he

"and there is arising a new genera

tion of leaders in the South and we've got to be patient."^5
By 1935, the New Deal, while continuing acreage reduction
schemes, had already started moving in the opposite direction,
with programs that in effect boosted farm production by
increasing the number of farmers and by making farm tenure
more secure.

Theinmost controversial New Deal experiment in

helping farm tenants, sharecroppers, and submarginal farmers
was the rural resettlement or community program.2®
Since the New Deal launched its resettlement program
before the Southern tenant problem exploded in 1934, the
earliest community projects showed little concern with dis
advantaged and dispossessed farmers.

Instead, these com

munities drew inspiration from the back-to-the-land movement
popular during the Great Depression.27

Following the 1929

crash, many Americans despaired of the city and began to talk

25Quoted

in Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal,

378.
26'The best secondary account is Paul K. Conkin, To
morrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca,
N. Y . , 1959); Select Committee of the House Committee on
Agriculture, Hearings on the Farm Security Administration,
78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943-1944, part III, contains a
factual summary
f the resettlement projects.
27Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 11, 12, 27-36, 79-89;
see Pascal K. Whelpton, "The Extent, Character, and Future
of the New Landward Movement,” Journal of Farm Economics. XV
(January, 1933), 57-72.

13

nostalgically of the land and of subsistence farming.

A few

sought escape into a pastoral utopia where men and women
could get away from the materialism of industrial society
and live a more fulfilling life close to the soil? but for
most, subsistence f a m i n g was a means of temporary, relief.
Even Franklin D. Roosevelt possessed a mild form of back-tothe-landism.

The President, wrote Rexford G. Tugwell,

"always did, and always would think people better off in the
Op

country and would regard the cities as rather hopeless." °
While governor of New York, Roosevelt experimented with pro
jects designed as a marriage of agriculture and industry in
what he called "rural industrial groups"— a broad program
for decentralizing industry and giving families a chance to
combine the advantages of factory employment and rural
living.3®

"Suppose," asked Roosevelt in 1931,

"one were to

offer these [unemployed] men opportunity to go on the land,
to provide a house and a few acres in the country and a little
money and tools to put in a small food crop?"3®

Thus after

his inauguration he was more than receptive to plans for
setting up subsistence homesteads and rural communities.
The Subsistence Homesteads Division of the Department

28
. R e x f o r d G. Tugwell, "The Sources of New Deal Reform'
ism," Ethdcs, LXIV (July, 1954), 226.
3®Conkiri, Tomorrow a New World, 83.

...... 39F.ranklin D. Roosevelt, "Back to the Land, " Review
of Reviews. LXXXIV (October, 1931), 64.

14
of the Interior was the first New Deal agency to work in the
field of community building.

During the Hundred Days,

Senator John H. Bankhead of Alabama attached a $25,000,000
appropriation to the National Industrial Recovery Act pro
viding a "blank check" for a program of subsistence home
steads.

Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes assumed

responsibility for the appropriation, set up a Division of
Subsistence Homesteads in August, 1933, and appointed M. L.
Wilson as director.

A farm economist from Montana State

Agricultural College with both farming experience and aca
demic credentials, Wilson envisioned subsistence farming as
a means of realizing a "better life" away from the material
ism and shallowness of what he called "the jazz-industrial
age."

Since he possessed broad authority, he experimented

with communities for stranded mine workers and full-time farm
colonies to take farm families off submarginal land, but
most homestead projects were for part-time industrial
workers.

Generally, the industrial homesteads consisted of

a cluster of twenty-five to one hundred homes located near
the outskirts of a city or small town; each family raised
much of their own food on a five- to ten-acre tract of land,
while earning cash income in nearby factories or "in indus
tries established within the communities.^
In 1934, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration

.. 3l.conkin,..Tomorrow a New WorId, 86-96; Schlesinger,
The Coming of the New Deal. 363, 364.

(FERA), under Harry L. Hopkins, began experimenting with
community projects as part of its rural relief program.
Hopkins combined all FERA rural relief programs as well as
those of the Civil Works Administration into the Division of
Rural Rehabilitation and Stranded Populations, turning it
over to Lawrence Westbrook.

As relief administrator in

Texas, Westbrook had taken a hundred farm families off relief
rolls and resettled them on the Woodlake cooperative com
munity near Houston.

In the case of destitute farmers, both

Hopkins and Westbrook desired to shift emphasis from immedi
ate relief to long-term rehabilitation.

The Rural Rehabilita

tion Division made loans and grants to needy farmers but also
built a series of rural communities designed to take farmers
off relief and put them back on farms full time.

The FERA

community program was slow to get off the ground; during the
FERA's lifetime, Westbrook completed only two of the twentyeight projects he initiated.

Although the FERA communities

were more relevant to the problems of the rural poor than
those of the Subsistence Homesteads Division, the New Deal
by 1935 had accomplished little toward relieving the distress
of farm tenants, sharecroppers, and submarginal farmers.32
On April 30, 1935, soon after the end of the "reign
of terror” against the STFU in eastern Arkansas, Roosevelt

32Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 131-34; Lawrence
Westbrook, "The Program of the Rural Rehabilitation Division
of the FERA," Journal of Farm Economics. XVII (February,
1935), 89-100.

created the Resettlement Administration

(RA) to take over

both rural rehabilitation and the subsistence homesteads.33
Rexford G. Tugwell, the new Resettlement Administrator, had
long been a spokesman for the disadvantaged farmer in the AAA,
and he had persuaded Roosevelt to bring together all rural
poverty programs in a new, independent agency. 3^

The Re

settlement Administration functioned through a balanced and
coherent program aimed at stopping the waste of both human
resources and natural resources.33

Rural rehabilitation was

the emergency phase of the RA program and, though less
spectacular, involved more money and more people than the
better-known community projects.

The Rural Rehabilitation

Division made loans and grants to individual families to
help them become self-supporting farm owners, sponsored rural
cooperatives for purchasing farm machinery and equipment,
and helped work out satisfactory debt adjustments between dis
tressed farmers and their creditors.

In the Land Utilization

program, Tugwell sought to improve submarginal land through
soil conservation, reforestation, and flood control and to
convert it to nonagricultural uses.

The Resettlement

...... 3.3.U. S.. Civil Service Commission,. Civil Service Acts
and Rules, Statutes. Executive Orders and Regulations,
amended to June 30. 1935 (Washington. 1936), 80-89.
...... 3^See Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Resettlement Idea,"
Agricultural History. XXXIII (October, 1959), 159.
......35Will W. Alexander, "Rural Resettlement," The
Southern Review, I (Winter, 1936), 528-39.
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Division, Tugwell's special concern, completed most of the
old subsistence homesteads and the FERA projects, and
initiated a new series of communities located largely in the
South.

Tugwell favored the suburban or greenbelt towns near

major cities, but he also approved infiltration or scattered
farm projects and distinct farm communities for low-income
farmers.3®
In 1936, a presidential election year, the landlordtenant controversy continued to be a source of embarrassment
to the Roosevelt Administration.

During May and June, the

Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union organized a general strike
which idled 5>000 sharecroppers in northeast Arkansas, and
violence again broke

out.3^

Strikers were harassed, beaten,

arrested on vagrancy charges, and some were forced at gun
point to return to work in the fields.

When five or six

unidentified men seized Little Rock, clergyman Claude
Williams and Willie Sue Elagden, both STFU members, and
flogged them, the incident appeared in national publications
OO

(this was "true Arkansas hospitality" implied Time).

A

"March of Time” newsreel flashed the story of the strike

36conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 153-60.
...... 37see Stuart N. Jamieson, Labor Unionism in American
Agriculture, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 836
(Washington, 1945), 309-13.
3®"Farmers:
'True Arkansas Hospitality,'"Time,
XXVII (June 29, 1936), 12-14? Oren Stephens, "Revolt in the
Deltas What Happened to the Sharecroppers' Union. ” Harper's
"Magazine. CLXXXIII (November, 194L), 658.
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across the nation's theatre screens.

But President Roosevelt,

even though in Little Rock on June 10 to celebrate the cen
tennial of Arkansas' statehood, made no public mention of
the strike.^9
Yet sharecropper unrest in Arkansas and STFU agitation
apparently had some effect on the Roosevelt Administration1s
decision to take additional steps to attack the tenant prob
lem, although the President himself made no public move until
after his reelection.

On November 16, 1936, he appointed a

special presidential commission to study farm tenancy.^0
Under Henry Wallace's chairmanship, it turned out a report
in February, 1937, recommending that Congress set up a new
agency to continue Resettlement Administration programs and
to implement an expanded loan program to assist tenants
toward landownership.^1

Senator Bankhead and Representative

Marvin Jones of Texas, who had sponsored an unsuccessful
farm tenancy bill in 1935, now introduced a new bill which
followed the committee's recommendations.

In July, 1937,

Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act placing
the entire New Deal rural poverty program for the first time

% o r his speech see Samuel I. Roseman (ed..) ,. The
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (12
vols.; New York, 1939-1850), V, 195-202.
40Farm Tenancy:
25.
41ibid.. 17, 18.

Report of the President's Committee,
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on a firm legislative foundation.^

On September 1, acting

under authority granted by the Bankhead-Jones Act, Wallace
abolished the Resettlement Administration (Tugwell had
resigned in December, 1936), created the Farm Security
Administration (FSA) , and assigned it the task of carrying
out the new tenancy program.
"The FSA," writes William E. Leuchtenburg, "was the
first agency to do anything substantial for the tenant, the
sharecropper, and the migrant farmer.

The Farm Security

Administration embodied the final phase of the New Deal
attack on rural poverty; in reality it was the Resettlement
Administration under a new name with the same personnel
(including Tugwell's successor, Will W. Alexander, as
administrator).

As a result Farm Security was the depository

for a diversified collection of rural welfare programs.
Alexander assumed responsibility for the RA's land utiliza
tion, resettlement, and rural rehabilitation activities; but
the latter, as in the RA, was his chief concern.

He also

administered the Bankhead-Jones tenant purchase program, a
loan program enabling qualified tenant families to purchase
family-size farms on forty-year notes at three per cent

^ u n i t e d States, Statutes at Large. L, pt. I, pp.
522-33.
^3Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 185.
^^William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
The New Deal (New York, 1963), 141.

interest.

As evidence of its receptivity to new approaches,

the FSA experimented with migratory labor camps, medicalcare cooperatives, and prefabricated housing.

Yet nothing

the FSA or RA did stirred up more controversy and suspicion
than the community program.

The resettlement projects of

fered a dynamic approach to rural poverty with their use of
cooperative enterprises, long-term leases rather than fee
simple ownership, and detailed social planning.

In 1937,

however, Congress directed the FSA to complete the projects
already underway or for which the RA had purchased land but
to make no effort to add new communities.^
In Tomorrow

New World, Paul K. Conkin argues that

the development of the New Deal community program was "one
of the most open breaks with the individualistic tradition
in American history."

The term "community," he says,

"became

a synonym for a form of collectivism and an antonym of indi
vidualism.

These communities were to be examples of a new,

organic society, with new values and institutions.^® What
should also be emphasized about the overall community program
is its debt to traditional agrarian values.

The Farm Security

Administration was eventually responsible for more than 150
resettlement projects, but only a handful of these operated
as actual collective farms or otherwise attempted to form a

45Qrant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953), 88-96.
46conkin. Tomorrow a New World, 6.

'

new society with collectivist values and institutions.

The

majority drew their inspiration from the individualism of
the family-size farm.

Quite obviously, as Conkin points out,

not all resettlement projects were organized asccommunities,
but neither did every community make a "conscious break with
individualism. 1,47
The most important question is how many resettlement
projects were based on the family-farm type of agriculture.
In 1943, Joseph W. Eaton, head of the Rural Settlement
Institute of Chicago, published a study of the PSA's "co
operative group farms," which he defined as "an association
of members of farm families who operate jointly a large
scale farming enterprise and who equitably share the returns
of their group effort."

According to Eaton, there were

twenty-seven such communities; for the remaining projects,
"the traditional family farm pattern" was the predominant
type of o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e same year, C. B. Baldwin,
Alexander's successor as Earm Security Administrator, speak
ing before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, stated
that his agency had managed 195 projects, including only

47Ibid., 17.
48Joseph W. Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture
(New York and London, 1943), 66, 67, 62. Eaton wrote, "All
except about 750 full-time farm families resettled by the
FSA are on family farm units. The 750, or 2 per cent, who
do not conform to this traditional pattern are settled on
co-operative corporation farms. . . . " P a g e 42.
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thirteen cooperative farm communities.

“Over 97 per cent of

the project units," he said, "are operated on an individual,
family-farm b a s i s . A .

Whitney Griswold, in 1948, placed

the number of "cooperative cooperation farms” at fifteen.
“The great majority of the projects," he said, “consisted of
groups of small, individually leased and operated family
farms on government-owned tracts of

land.

"50

As generally defined, the family farm was a farm of
forty to sixty acres on which one family, without hired help,
could do all the work and earn an adequate income.

The

family farm began with the earliest settlements in North
America; the sturdy yeoman, whose independence and individual
ism had supposedly helped make America great, had his roots
in a small homestead.

In the nineteenth century, Jefferson*s

dream of a republic of small independent freeholders became
part of the Garden of the World myth.

The Ordinance of 1785,

the Premption Act of 1841, the Homestead Law of 1862, and
the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 all favored individual
ownership of small farms.

In the 1930*s, unemployed urban

workers, hoping for a better life in pastoral surroundings

^ 9U. s. Senate, Agricultural Subcommittee on .the..
Committee on Appropriations. Hearings on the Agricultural
Appropriations Bill for 1944. 78th Cong., IstSess., 1943,
pp. 624, 630.
5 ° A . Whitney Griswold. Farming and Democracy (New
York, .1948),, ,167;. see Richard S. Kirkendall,. Social
Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt
(Columbia, Mo., 1966), 129.

than in dirty cities, drifted "back to the land" to look for
subsistence plots.

Most of all, farm tenants and share

croppers were obsessed with the idea of owning their own
land.51
Nothing was deeper rooted in the minds of American
farmers than the mystique of private ownership of small
family farms.

With few exceptions, farm leaders in the

Roosevelt Administration shared the enthusiasm, and they
evoked it instinctively when discussing solutions for
tenancy.5^

Perhaps the strongest voice for the family farm

within the New Deal was that of Secretary of Agriculture
Henry A. Wallace.

"I know of no better means of reconstruc

ting our agriculture on a thoroughly sound and permanently
desirable basis," wrote Wallace in 1935, "than to make as
its foundation the family-size, owner-operated farm."

51S e e .Charles S. Hoffman, "Do You Mean Family Type
Farm?" Land Policy Review, V (June, 1942), 25.-27.;. Farm
Security. Administration, Report of the Administrator of the
Farm Security Administration. 1940 (Washington, 1940), 11;
Griswold, Farmincr and Democracy, 163-72; Maris, "Farm
Tenancy," Farmers in a Changing World, 887-88; Paul V.. Maris
The Land is Mine; From Tenancy to Family Farm Ownership,
U. S. Department of Agriculture Monograph No. 8 (Washington,
1950), 118-22.
52gee Raymond C. Smith, "New Conditions Demand New
Opportunities," 810-26; W. W. Alexander, "Overcrowded Farms,
870-86; Paul V. Maris, "Farm Tenancy, " 887-906; and M. L.
Wilson,. "Beyond Economics," 922-37, all in Farmers in a.
Changing World.
53Henry A.. .Wallace,, "Wallace Points to the Danger of
Tenancy," New York Times Magazine. LXXXIV (March 31, 1935),
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M. L. Wilson, who after service in Subsistence Homesteads
replaced Tugwell as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, was
another "deep believer in farm ownership by the family who
operates the farm."

"The rapid increase of tenant farmers

during the past half century," said President Roosevelt him
self in 1936, "is significant evidence that we have fallen
far short of achieving the traditional American ideal of
owner-operated farms."55

The reports of the President's

Special Committee on Farm Tenancy and the Arkansas Farm
Tenancy Commission, while aware of the complexity of rural
poverty and the limitations of any one solution, both assumed
that ownership of family farms was the basic answer to the
problem of tenancy.56

The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of

1937 primarily sought to reestablish a Jeffersonian pattern
of small farms tilled by their owners.

Finally, the Farm

Security Administration stressed cooperative enterprises
and long-term leases, not because of any philosophical dis
taste for competitive individualism or traditional land
tenure policy, but to help groups of small farmers operate
with the efficiency and security of large commercial farmers.

5,4m . L. Wilson, "The Problems of Poverty in Agricul
ture," Journal of Farm Economics. XXII (February, 1940), 12.
55

Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry A. Wallace,. November
16, 1936, in Farm Tenancy; Report of the President's Committee, 25.
>
56ibid., 12, 13; Arkansas Gazette, December 13, 1936.
57Aiexander, "Rural Resettlement," 536 r Conkin,
Tomorrow a New World, 189.

On the other hand, the cooperative projects differed
radically from the traditional family farm.

The cooperative

farming movement in the New Deal centered around Rexford G.
Tugwell, Wallace's Under Secretary of Agriculture and Resettlement Administrator.

A critic of competition and individualism

in American economic life, Tugwell questioned the agrarian
devotion to the family farm.

In an economy based on large-

scale units, he argued, the independent family farm was an
anachronism.

The rise of commercial agriculture employing

tractors and other farm technology on hundreds of acres had
outdated the forty-acre, one-horse farm.

Above all, Tugwell

envisioned a future based on economic planning and coopera
tion, and the depression gave him an opportunity to put his
ideas to work.

As RA chief, his job was primarily resettle

ment— taking farmers off worn out land and resettling them
on good land where with the proper help they could make a new
start.

But Tugwell believed that rural resettlement would

work best on large community-type projects stressing
mechanized farming and cooperative organization.58
While Resettlement Administrator, Tugwell approached
the problem of rural poverty with the conviction that security
was a better goal for tenants than ownership.

Anxious to

58Conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 149, 159, 160;
S chles inger. The Coming of the New D e a l , 309-71? Kirkendall,
Social Scientists and Farm Politics,. .112, 113? Bernard
Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (New Brunswick,
N. J., 1964), 265-68.
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attack poverty as its sources, he argued that ownership
could be just as bad as tenancy.

"One trouble with tenancy

is landlordism,” wrote Tugwell in 1937, and "one trouble
with ownership is the m o r t g a g e . s m a l l

owners were no

better off than tenants, he contended, if they carry the
weight of mortgage, high interest rates, and face foreclosure.
What they needed more than immediate ownership was health
care, better diets, clothes, livestock, seed, fertilizer,
and competent supervision.
Like Tugwell, the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union dis
agreed with the "farms for tenants” slogan.

The union com

plained that the Bankhead-Jones Act pointed backward and not
forward, leading toward a subsidized peasantry in America.
Representing the union's views, W. L. Blackstone, member of
the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy, filed a minority
report urging that the Federal Government stress cooperative
,i

famming communities as a realistic alternative to small home
steads.

Although the committee was sufficiently impressed

to suggest their initiation "on an experimental scale,” this
approach was well outside the framework of agricultural

59Rexford g . Tugwell, "Behind the Farm Problem: Rural
Poverty,” New York Times Magazine. LXXXVI (January 10, 1937),
5.
6°"A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to
the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the Executive
Council, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union,” c. 1936, Socialist
Party of America Papers, Duke university Library, Durham,
North Carolina.
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orthodoxy.®-1' The New Deal community program would never
fully satisfy STFU demands; instead, most resettlement pro
jects were based on the family farm ideal.

61Farm Tenancy:
22.

Report of the President’s Committee,

CHAPTER II
THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION'S REGION SIX
I
Rexford G. Tugwell set up eleven regional offices to
supervise the field activities of the Resettlement Adminis
tration.

He created Region Six out of Arkansas, Louisiana,

and Mississippi, three states with similarities that made
them a natural unit.

Covering 144,296 square miles of land

area, the region virtually dominated the lower Mississippi
River valley.

The alluvial delta soil and a favorable

climate made Region Six potentially one of the most wealthy
agricultural sections in the nation, but much of the rural
population in 1935 was living at or below poverty levels.
The three states of the region suffered from the character
istic agricultural problems of the South:

the prevalency of

tenancy, an excessive reliance on cotton, a large number of
Negroes at the bottom of the economic ladder, and extensive
absentee ownership of farm land.

Farm tenancy was perhaps

the most serious social and economic problem directly
affecting the region's farmers.

Mississippi, Louisiana, and

Arkansas ranked first, third, and sixth, respectively, in
the national farm tenancy rate.
28

By 1935, there were 477,700

29
farm tenants in the region compared to 255,206 farm owners;
almost two out of every three farms in the region were
tenants.^
Mississippi was the most agricultural state in Region
Six.

In 1930, almost sixty-eight per cent of the total

population lived on farms, and more people were gainfully
employed in agriculture than in all other occupations combined.

Cotton production was the state's major agricultural

enterprise, contributing from seventy-five to eighty per cent
of the gross farm income.

The Mississippi and Yazoo River

deltas were the most intensive cotton farming areas.

Where

cotton was secondary, farmers relied on fruit, vegetable, and
livestock production.

Mississippi had the highest rate of

farm tenancy not only in Region Six but in the nation.
About three out of every four Mississippi farmers did not
own the land they farmed, and nearly half were sharecroppers
who owned neither land nor equipment.

Out of a total of

311,683 farmers, Mississippi had only 93,224 farm owners in
1935.

Mississippi was the only state in the region with

more Negro farmers than white; in 1935, there were 169,006
Negro farmers in the state, and of these 147,693 were

•^Rupert B. Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture
(Chapel Hill, 1929), 18-22, 53-79; U. S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939 (Washington,
1940), 606, 616.
^u. s. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1934 (Washington, 1934), 8, 66, 67.
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tenants.

By contrast, only 69,871 out of 142,677 white

farmers were tenants.^
Economically, Louisiana was the most diversified of
the three states, possessing the largest non-farm population
and the only major metropolitan center (New Orleans) in
Region Six.

More Louisiana people worked at non-farm occupa

tions than did citizens of the other states.

In 1930, only

about forty per cent of the total population lived on farms;
about a third of the total land area of Louisiana was in
farms compared to two-thirds in Mississippi and a half in
Arkansas.

Except for New Orleans, however, Louisiana was

still largely rural in the 19301s .

Cotton was the principal

cash crop of Louisiana farmers, especially in the fertile
bottomlands along the Mississippi and Red rivers.
a feed crop, corn was second in importance.

Grown as

The sugar cane

industry centered in the south central part of the state and
rice in the southwest.

The fourteen parishes bordering the

Gulf of Mexico produced the major portion of the United
States sugar cane crop.

Farm tenancy in Louisiana was only

slightly less prevalent than in Mississippi? nearly two out
of three Louisiana farms were tenant-operated.

Negroes

accounted for more than half of the tenants and over threefifths of all sharecroppers in the state.

In most delta

^Resettlement Administration, Information for Prospec
tive New Farmers in the State of Mississippi. Resettlement
Information Sefvice Bulletin No. 10 (Washington, 1937), 1-3?
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939, p. 623.
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parishes, Negroes predominated in the farm population and,
in certain northeastern sections, comprised nearly fourfifths of the total.^
Unlike Mississippi and Louisiana, Arkansas possessed
large areas of mountainous country, the Ouachita and Ozark
ranges, that were poorly suited for farming.

Additionally,

much of the land in Arkansas was in forest, with lumber and
wood-products the major non-agricultural industries in the
state.

But like the other states, Arkansas agriculture was

primarily based on cotton production; cotton was the major
cash crop in sixty-two out of the seventy counties, although
farmers also engaged in commercial production of certain
grains, forage, and livestock.

In the Mississippi and

Arkansas river bottoms along the entire eastern side of the
state, cotton was the primary source of income on more than
ninety per cent of all farms.

The prevalence of tenancy was

characteristic of Arkansas cotton regions.

Tenants operated

about sixty per cent of all farms in Arkansas, and in some
delta counties farm tenancy was as high as seventy to ninety
per cent.

In the Red River delta and the southern part of

the Mississippi River delta, most of the croppers and tenants
were Negroes; however, in the delta north of the southern
boundary of Tennessee, there were many areas with a higher

^Resettlement Administration, Information for Prospec
tive New Farmers in the State of Louisiana, Resettlement
Information Service Bulletin No. 11 (Washington, 1937), 3-5;
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1939, p. 616, 619.
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proportion of white tenants.^
Although Region Six contained some of the richest farm
land in the United States, the high rate of tenancy was due
in part to a lack of opportunities for ownership.

Large

planters and absentee landlords held much of the more fertile
land in large units, and they were rarely willing to break
their large holdings into small farms to be sold to indi
vidual farmers.

The amount of land actually under cultiva

tion was relatively small in all three states, but the
presence of millions of acres of land not used for agricul
ture did not suggest many opportunities for new farmers.

In

Region Six, most of the vast acreage of undeveloped land was
not suitable for growing crops because of unproductive soil,
rough topography, erosion, poor drainage, or floodings.
About 22.4 million acres in Mississippi and two-thirds of
Louisiana were in cut-over land, forest, pasture, swamp; and
in Arkansas much of the land area consisted of forest or
mountainous terrain.®
In 1937, the Resettlement Administration published
three bulletins for "prospective new farmers ” in Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, stressing that ownership was

^Resettlement Administration, Information for Prospec
tive New Farmers in the State of Arkansas, Resettlement
Information Service Bulletin No. 9 (Washington, 1937), 7.
^Resettlement Administration, Region Six Annual Report
As of December 31, 1936, Record Group 96, Records of the
Farmers' Home Administration, National Archives (to be cited
hereafter as R.G. 96, National Archives).
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becoming more difficult for farmers of limited means.7

The

initial investment needed to set up a farm in Region Six was
prohibitive for most small farmers.

According to Resettle

ment Administration farm management studies, sixty acres was
the minimum size which should have been considered for a
family farm in the cotton areas of Region Six.

During the

mid-1930's, the current selling price for improved farm land
was between forty-five and seventy dollars per acre in
Mississippi and between thirty-five and fifty dollars in
Arkansas and Louisiana.

So for land alone, a sixty-acre farm

meant an investment of $3,000 to $4,000 in Mississippi and
$2,500 to $3,000 in Arkansas and Louisiana, dependent upon
location, productivity, and number of cleared acres.

In

Louisiana, sugar cane land was selling for forty to seventyfive dollars per acre; and since about thirty-five acres of
cane land was needed to support a family, there was no
substantial difference in cost between farms in sugar cane
and cotton areas.8

(A small farmer could buy undeveloped

land for twelve to fifteen dollars per acre, but it was less
productive, and the cost of clearing the land drove the price
back up to around fifty dollars per acre.)

To build a small

cottage and the minimum of farm buildings and to buy the
necessary livestock and equipment required an additional

7

See Footnotes 3, 4, and 5.

^Information for Prospective New Farmers in the State
of Louisiana, 18-21.
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investment of $1,500 to $2,000, probably more.

Thus RA

experts estimated that the total investment for a family
farm would run between $4,000 and $5,000.

This price was

far beyond the means of croppers and share tenants or even
Q
most cash tenants.
II
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads and the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration began resettling low-income
farmers in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi two years
before the three states became Region Six.

To carry on their

community building programs, both agencies set up relatively
simple administrative structures, compared to that used by
the Resettlement Administration.

Under M. S. Wilson, a

series of homestead corporations organized on each project
became the action arms of the Division or Subsistence Home
steads.

The local corporations possessed full authority to

own property, enter into contracts, borrow money, construct
the homesteads, and manage the completed project.-1-®

Shortly

before Wilson left Subsistence Homesteads in 1934, however,
a Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation assumed complete

9Ibid., 8. 9? Information for Prospective New Farmers
in the State of Mississippi, 6, 7; Information for Prospec
tive New Farmers in the State of Arkansas, 24-26.
lOpaui K. Conkin. Tomorrow a New Worlds The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), 106, 107.
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control over the local corporations.

The Rural Rehabilita

tion Division of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
distributed its funds through state rural rehabilitation
corporations.

Operating under the state Emergency Relief

Administration, each state corporation dealt directly with
distressed farmers and enjoyed a wide latitude in handling
its own rural relief work; some states, for example, chose
not to undertake a community building program at all.11
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads made plans to
establish industrial-type projects in all three Region Six
states.

The subsistence homesteads program in Louisiana

never got off the ground.

Although Bossier City was con

sidered, Morehouse Homesteads near Bastrop was the only
Louisiana project ever to receive approval.1^

By contrast,

the Arkansas program was more ambitious and seemed to have a
promising future.

Glenn E. Riddell, secretary of the

Arkansas State Housing Board, worked closely with Bruce
Melvin of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads to locate
homesteads in the state.

"In general," Melvin wrote Riddell

in 1933, "we are trying to establish projects near industrial

i:LIbid., 134-36.
^Resettlement Administration, First Annual Report
(Washington, 1936), 144? Riley J. Wilson to C. B. Baldwin,
October 14, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives? Riley J.
Wilson to Marvin H. McIntyre, August 13, 1935, Official File
1568, Bpx 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New
York (to be cited hereafter as FDRL).
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centers where people may receive part-time employment.
While touring Arkansas in February, 1934, Melvin showed
interest in the homestead possibilities of Fort Smith, West
Helena, Camden, Huttig, Warren, and Pine B l u f f . ^

In March,

the Division approved plans for Fort Smith, West Helena, and
Camden.

The Division of Subsistence Homesteads allotted

about $317,500 for the four Arkansas and Louisiana projects,
but spent a total of only $108 before transferring them to
the Resettlement Administration.-^
Mississippi was the only state in the region where
the subsistence homestead program paid off.

In December,

1933, the Division approved five industrial-type homestead
projects near McComb, Laurel, Tupelo, Meridian, and a full
time farming project near Richton, Mississippi; in January,
1934, it gave approval for another industrial-type project
at H a t t i e s b u r g . T h e industrial projects each contained

■^Bruce L. Melvin to Glenn E. Riddell, November 17,
1933, R. G. 96, National Archives.
•^Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), February 26, 1934;
Arkansas Democrat (Little Rock), February 22, 1934.
15Glenn E. Riddell to Bruce L. Melvin, March 1, 1934
(two letters), March 7, 1934, April 9, 1934, R. G. 96,
National Archives; U. S. Department of the Interior, Divi
sion of Subsistence Homesteads, Monthly Project Report,
April 26, 1935, ibid.; Resettlement Administration, First
Annual Report, 144. The abandonment of the Arkansas sub
sistence Homesteads was reported in Arkansas Gazette,
January 7, 1936.
l^Report of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads
and Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, June, 1934,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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twenty to twenty-five homesteads located on five-acre tracts;
they were designed to give families an opportunity to farm
and to work part time in factory jobs.

By the end of 1934,

construction had begun on all but Laurel and Richton.

When

the Resettlement Administration took over the subsistence
homesteads program in 1935, Tugwell reconsidered the Divi
sion's plans for Fort Smith, West Helena, Camden, Bossier
City, Bastrop, and Laurel.

The RA's Management Division took

over the projects near or actually under constructions
Tupelo, Meridian, McComb, Hattiesburg, and Richton.

The RA

completed the latter projects but dropped the others.^-7
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration did not
undertake a comprehensive program of community building in
any Region Six states. The Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation began construction work on only one project
during the lifetime of the FERA.

In 1934 W. R. DyesS,

Emergency Relief Administrator of Arkansas, conceived the
idea of building an agricultural community as a means of
getting relief clients "back to the soil."

Under his super

vision, the Arkansas RR Corporation acquired 17,500 acres of
wilderness and swamp land near Wilson in Mississippi County,
divided it into 500 units of about twenty acres each, and

^7The Resettlement Administration and Its Work,
September 10, 1935, Official File 1558, Box 1, FDRL; Thomas
H. Hibben, Memorandum to R. G. Tugwell, June 29, 1935, R. G.
96, National Archives; R. G. Tugwell, Memorandum to John S.
Lansill, July 10, 1935, ibid.; Tugwell, Memorandum to Harry
L. Hopkins, July 18, 1935 . ibid.; Conkin, Tomorrow a New
World. 111.
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built a community center complete with post office, cafe,
stores.',, school, hospital, and cotton gin.

Dyess colony, as

it was named after its founder's death in an air crash, was
IQ

the largest of all New Deal fatnming communities.
Under Resettlement Administration control after 1936,
the Arkansas RR Corporation went on to develop other large
tracts of land it held under lease or had purchased.with its
trust fund.

In 1935 and 1936, the corporation developed St.

_ Francis River Farms and Trumann Farms, both located in
Poinsett County, the home of the Southern Tenant Farmers'
Union.

The two projects together consisted of 6,195 acres

of land divided into 143 units to enable tenant farmers to
become owners of family-type farms.

The Arkansas corporation

owned two projects in the southeastern part of the state,
Chicot Farms in Chicot and Drew counties and Kelso Farms in
Desha County, which it leased to the War Relocation Authority
for use as a Japanese relocation center during World War I I .
Chicot, the second largest community project in the region,
covered 13,781 acres broken up into 241 family farm, units
and included the entire town of Jerome, Arkansas.

Kelso was

not developed as a farming project before being turned over
to the WRA.

Central Arkansas Valley Farms consisted of

^ A r k ansas Emergency Relief Administration, Traveling
Recovery Road: The Story of Relief.Work-Relief. and Rehababilitation in Arkansas. August 30, 1932 to November 15. 1936
(Little Rock, 1936), 153-57? Conkin, Tomorrow a New World.
137, 138.
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eighty-five individual farm units widely scattered through
out nine counties in northern Arkansas.

The Mississippi

Rural Rehabilitation Corporation purchased 5,404 acres of
land for Hinds Farms near Terry, Mississippi, but the RA and
FSA developed the project.

The Louisiana RR Corporation

operated the Terrebonne project near Schriever for two years
(1937-1938) but never initiated any resettlement projects of
■

,

19

its own.

^

Ill
In 1935, the Resettlement Administration brought new
enthusiasm and new direction to a New Deal resettlement pro
gram that was beginning to stall in Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi.

Under Tugwell, the RA set up a decentralized

administrative structure with major control of resettlement
and rural rehabilitation in the hands of regional offices.20
Tugwell originally planned to have two directors in each

19Resettlement Administration, Arkansas Rural Reha
bilitation Division, Annual Report 1936, December 30, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives? Resettlement Administration,
Nearly Report of the Custodian of Corporations Division
[December, 1936], ibid.? Select Committee of the House Com
mittee on Agriculture, Hearings on the Farm Security Adminis
tration. 78 Cong., 1 Sess., 1943-1944, pp. 1038-49, 1071-75?
U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration,
"Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of Acquisition, Also
Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acreage and Number of
Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region Six," January 1, 1941,
mimeographed, R. G. 96, National Archives? Philip B. Fleming,
Memorandum for Edwin G. Arnold, January 19, 1937, ibid.
^Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 155.
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region, each with complete authority over their respective
divisions, but together constituting the regional leadership.
For Region Six, he selected T. Roy Reid to direct rural
rehabilitation and resettlement, and Buford M. Gile to handle
the land utilization

program.

21

Reid assumed responsibility

for the rural relief work of the FERA, the state rural
rehabilitation corporations, and the subsistence homesteads
program in the three states.

Gile, who was already working

in the field of land use as head of the Land Policy Section
of the AAA's Division of

Planning,

22 merely transferred his

activities into the Resettlement Administration's regional
office.

But Tugwell dropped this dual arrangement in

November, 1935, and designated Reid as regional director in
charge of both land utilization and rural resettlement and
rehabilitation; Gile stayed on as assistant regional director.
From the beginning, Reid had had the primary task of setting
up the entire administrative organization of Region Six from
the regional office down through state, district, and

2^Rexford G. Tugwell to the President, July 10, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives; Arkansas Gazette. June 29, 1935,
July 2, 1935.
22l . C. Gray, Memorandum for Rexford G. Tugwell, May
22, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives. The sixth region of
the AAA's Land Policy Section covered Arkansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas. Julien N. Friant,, Memo
randum to Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., June 14, 1935, ibid.
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county offices.23
T. Roy Reid possessed a broad background of educa
tional and agricultural experience.

He was born on a farm

in Greenville County, South Carolina.

Deciding not tq become

a farmer himself, he attended Clemson College for his under
graduate education and went on to the University of Wisconsin
for a Master of Science in agriculture.

Reid started out as

a teacher; he gained experience teaching in rural schools
before and during his college years.

From 1912 to 1913, he

taught science and economics at Clinton College, Clinton,
Kentucky/? and from 1913 to 1917, he taught agriculture at
Arkansas A&M College at Monticello.

At the time of his

appointment as regional director of the Resettlement Adminis
tration, he was serving as assistant director of the
Arkansas Extension Service.

His connection with extension

work dated back to 1917, when he served a year as county
agent in Drew County.

In 1918, he joined the state extension

in Little Rock as assistant agent in 4-H Club work and later
became a specialist in livestock and marketing.
assistant director in 1923.

Reid became

Prior to 1935, he had taken

an

active part in New Deal programs by serving on the board

of

directors of the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation
and as AAA director in Arkansas.

In 1941, when he went to

23j^ex;£0ra G> Tugwell to B. M. Gile (telegram), November
15,, .1935, ibid.; Carl C. Taylor to Harry Wise, July 26, 1935,
ibid.
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Washington to serve as special assistant to the Secretary of
Agriculture, A. D. Stewart took his place as regional direc
tor.2^
Taking a year's leave of absence from the Arkansas
Extension Service

(he later resigned), Reid stepped into his

new job on July 1, 1935.

No announcement had been made,

however, about the location of the regional office.

The

Arkansas Gazette expected Fayetteville to be chosen.26
Fayetteville, after all, already claimed the regional office
of the AAA's Land Policy Section, the Extension Service, and
the College of Agriculture.

But on July 17, Carl C. Taylor,

head of the Resettlement Division in Washington, wired Reid
to establish in Little Rock both his own headquarters and
the offices of the three state directors for Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Arkansas.26

Lessie S. Read, editor of the

Fayetteville Daily Democrat (in his words,

"an original

Roosevelt and pro-administration [and] anti-Long newspaper"),
warned Tugwell that this decision would lose support for the

2^Tugwell to the President, July 10, 1935, ibid.;
T... Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, October 26, 1937, ibid. ;
Arkansas Gazette, June 29, 1935, December 13, 1936; C. B.
Baldwin to John E. Milles, February 13, 1941, R. G. 96,
National Archives. See Inez Hale MacDuff, "27 Years in
Rural Arkansas," Arkansas Gazette Sundayy Magazine Section,
March 30, 1941, p. 3.
26Arkansas Sazette. July 2, July 3, 1935.
26Carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid (telegram), July 17,
1935, R. G. 96, National Archives; Carl C. Taylor, to T.. Roy
Reid (telegram), July 19, 1935, ibid.; Arkansas Gazette,
July 20, 1935, July 22, 1935.

Roosevelt administration since it came at a time when W. H.
"Coin” Harvey was opening a Huey Long Headquarters near
Fayetteville.27

Dan T. Gray, dean of the College of Agricul

ture at the University of Arkansas and Director of the Exten
sion Service, also regretted the move to Little Rock? he
wanted the regional office located at his own institution.28
Probably the Resettlement Administration turned Fayetteville
down because northwestern Arkansas was rather inaccessible
from the rest of the state and from the entire region, and
because Little Rock would be closer to most resettlement
projects and other activities.28

Another reason may have

been that Reid made his home in Little Rock.
The regional office was a kaleidoscope of shifting
organization.

Following the pattern of the Washington office,

Reid divided his staff into a series of co-ordinate divi
sions:

rural resettlement, land utilization, management,

finance, personnel, information, business management, legal,
and labor relations.

The actions divisions, however, were

land utilization, rural resettlement, and management.

B. M.

Gile's Land Utilization Division consisted of a project
planning section, a land acquisition section, farm development,

27Lessie S. Read to Rexford Tugwell
16, 1935, R. G . ,96, National Archives.

(telegram), July

28Dan
Gray to C. C. Taylor, July 22, 1935, ibid.i
Horace Thompson, later project manager at Lake pick, inter
view with the author, January 19, 1968.
29ibid.
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and project development sections.3°

For regional chief of

rural resettlement, Reid chose E. B. Whitaker, formerly head
of the FERA's Rural Rehabilitation Division in Arkansas.
Whitaker's division, the largest in the region, not only had
the biggest budget, it was also the one about which the

__

general public knew most.3-*- Besides the resettlement program
itself, the Rural Resettlement Division originally included
all rural rehabilitation work, a community and cooperative
staff, and a farm debt adjustment section.

The Management

Division chief was James B. Lawson, a transfer from the
Mississippi subsistence homesteads program, where he had
developed Tupelo.
In 1936, Reid created three assistant directorships
to take charge of the growing resettlement, rehabilitation,
and management programs.

He gave rural rehabilitation full

divisional status in recognition of its importance, naming
T. P. Lee division chief.

Rehabilitation embodied the RA's

rural relief work with loans to individuals and cooperative
groups, farm debt adjustment, home and farm management work,
and later the FSA's new tenant purchase program.

Whitaker's

Resettlement Division now supervised all projects, both land

3^Warren Bruner to James H. Wells, October 30, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report Region
VI As of December 31, 1936, ibid.
32e . E. Agger, Memorandum to Will W. Alexander,
October 18, 1935, ibid.
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use and rural resettlement, and handled most of its own
development work, including architecture and engineering,
land analysis, surveys, and purchase, and project construc
tion.

In Management, Lawson was responsible to the regional

director for managing the completed projects, collecting rent,
maintaining the property, and for such social service func
tions as family selection.

This organization remained

essentially the same under the Farm Security Administra
tion.^
Next to Reid, E. B. Whitaker became the most important
man in the regional office.

He was a native of Mississippi

and a graduate of Mississippi State College at Starkville.
He did graduate work in agriculture at the University of
Wisconsin, but never earned a graduate degree.

Like Reid,

He was with the Arkansas Extension Service when he went into
federal employment.
of rural relief.

In 1934, W. R. Dyess made him director

In the Resettlement Administration,

Whitaker started out as state director of rural resettlement
for Arkansas and in rapid order became regional chief of the
Rural Rehabilitation Division and then assistant regional
director in charge of resettlement.*^

As the process of

33Resettlement Administration, Annual Report Region
Six As of December 31, 1936, ibid.; Region Organization
Chart, M . & . , ibid.; George S. Mitchell to T. Roy Reid, May 9,
1939, ibid.
3%I. b . Whitaker, interview with the author, January
19, 1968; James H. Wells to Warren Bruner, October 9, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives.

expansion, consolidation, and musical chairs continued in
the regional office, Reid tended to rely more and more on
Whitaker's ability as an administrator.

In 1937, he combined

the Resettlement and Management divisions under Whitaker; in
1938, Reid returned to Whitaker most of the responsibilities
he had had in his original Rural Resettlement Division.33
The purpose of these moves seems to have been for Whitaker to
take control of all phases of the regional resettlement pro
gram.

In May, 1940, Whitaker became assistant regional

director without special designation but in direct charge of
resettlement, farm management, home management, cooperative
services, and community and family services.3®

More than any

other one man, he was the resettlement program in Region Six.
In addition to regional headquarters at Little Rock,
the Resettlement Administration maintained offices on state,
district, county, and project levels.

When Carl Taylor

notified Reid of the Little Rock decision, he also issued
instructions for "completely regionalizing the three states
of region six."3^

Reid was to arrange office space at Little

35e . b . Whitaker, interview with the author, January
19, 1968; Reid to Will W. Alexander, February 17, 1937, R. G.
96, National Archives; Reid to Alexander, March 31, 1938,
ibid.; Lewis E. Long to E. R. Henson, August 7, 1937, ibid.
36t . Roy Reid to Will W. Alexander, May 25, 1940, ibid.
Resettlement Administration, Region Six, Quarterly Report,
July-September, 1940, ibid;.!.
37carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid (telegram), July 17,
1935, July 19, 1935, ibid.
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Rock, Arkansas.

”RRA KEPT OUT OP LONG'S CLUTCHES,” declared
OQ

the Gazette headline.

Throughout the summer of 1935,

Senator Huey P. Long had been engaged in a running battle
with the Roosevelt administration, including especially
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes.

Long wanted to

control all federal money spent in Louisiana and had rammed
bills through the state legislature at Baton Rouge to accom
plish this purpose.

In response, Ickes threatened to stop

all PWA work in Louisiana? and in July, about the time
Taylor informed Reid of the location of Region Six head
quarters, Ickes did so, ruling out any future projects unless
state laws regulating the expenditure of federal funds were
repealed.

39

When asked, Reid declined to comment on the

reason for establishing the state offices in Little Rock.^®
The Resettlement Administration's thorough organiza
tion at the grass roots existed mainly to conduct the reha
bilitation program, which involved extensive supervision of
loan clients and educational work in every rural county in
the region.

The state offices for Louisiana and Mississippi

were eventually moved out of Little Rock and located at New
Orleans

(later Alexandria) and Jackson.

Each state office

contained a rural rehabilitation director and his staff and

•
^ Arkansas Gazette. July 22, 1935.
39Ibid., July 6, 1935, July 19, 1935, July 20, 1935.
40Ibid., July 22, 1935.
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later a state farm debt adjustment committee and an FSA
advisory committee composed of important state leaders.

The

state directors and their offices were under close super
vision from Little Rock and possessed no authority to take
any initiative in policy matters.

In all three states, there

were four district offices, each covering a number of
*

counties or parishes; the typical district office combined a
district rehabilitation supervisor and a home management
supervisor and their staffs.

The county officers consisted

of rehabilitation and home management supervisors, a county
farm debt adjustment committee, a county rural rehabilitation
committee, and later a county tehant purchase committee.
Committee membership was made up of local citizens who helped
make decisions about who should get loans or whose debts
should be scaled down and by how much.
handled the resettlement projects.

The project officers

The community or project

manager reported directly to the regional office, skipping
the county, district, and state offices.
"The men placed at the head of these Resettlement
Programs," Wrote Mississippi State Senator James C. Rice in
1939, "are broken down Ford dealers, junk men, or airplane
builders— or just anybody but someone who has actually made

^ S t a n l e y W. Brown and Virgil E. Baugh (comp.).,
Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Farmers Home
Administration, National Archives and Records Service Pub.
No. 118 (Washington, 1959), 10, 11, 28-30.
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a living out of f a m i n g . "

42

He was complaining because too

many FSA employees, in his view, were book fanners with
college degrees; this much, at least, was accurate.

The most

essential qualification for all supervisory positions was a
degree in agriculture.

Reid recruited most of the top

personnel in both the regional and field offices from either
the Extension Service or federal agencies.

In 1935 and 1936,

the highest officials of the regional office were on leave
from the University of Arkansas' College of Agriculture.43
Many others came to the Resettlement Administration with the
AAA's Land Policy Section, the FERA's state rural rehabilita
tion divisions, or the Division of Subsistence Homesteads.
Regional information chief George Wolf wrote in 1939,
"We now have in the region 1,879 employees, making us by far
the largest agricultural agency in the three states."44
Located on the fourth floor of the Donaghey Trust Building,
the Little Rock office was the largest in the region.

At

first, the .Gazette reported plans for it to employ between
seventy-five and eighty persons.45

j\t the end of 1937, the

regional office contained 216 employees; by 1941, it had

42james C. Rice to Theodore G. Bilbo, April 7, 1939,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
43Dan
Gray to Raymond A. Pearson, April 20, 1936,
ibid.; Arkansas Gazette, November 20, 1936.

44personnel Report, Region VI, December 31, 1939,
R. G. 96, National Archives.

45Qeorge Wolf to John Fischer, April 10, 1939, ibid.
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AC

expanded to 559. °

Resettlement and Farm Security personnel

went into every nook and cranny of the three states.

In

1937, the FSA had 185 employees stationed in Louisiana, 285
in Mississippi, and 309 in Arkansas, based on the proportion
of farms in each state compared to the entire r e g i o n . ^

In

1939, there were twelve district offices and 201 county
offices with a combined total of 1,102 employees,* 709 were
rehabilitation and home management supervisors and 393 were
clerks.^8
Reid ran a large and complex bureaucratic structure
in Region Six, and he contended with the problems that
plague any such organization.
mundane:

Some of his problems were

acquiring more office space as his regional staff

grew, keeping new employees supplied with appropriate govern
ment procedure manuals, or setting up a badly needed steno
graphic pool to handle the flood of paper work.^8

A more

serious problem, however, was rivalry between the three
states.

In 1937, Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana

inquired about current charges that his state was being

46Arkansas Gazette, July 20, 1935.
47c. B. Baldwin to Overton Brooks, December 2, 1937,
R. G. 96, National Archives? A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin,
August 20, 1941, ibid.
48gai3win to Brooks, December 2, 1937, ibid.
49 j . Roy Reid to Division Heads and Section Chiefs,
April 30, 1940, ibid. ? James H. Wells to Warren Bruner,
August 30, 1935, ibid.
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discriminated against in favor of Mississippi and Arkansas.50
True, said assistant administrator C. B. Baldwin, Louisiana
had only 23.7 per cent of all Region Six employees head
quartered outside the Little Rock office; but the state, he
reasoned, had only twenty-three per cent of the total farms
in the region.5

In 1941, twenty per cent of the employees

in the regional office itself were natives of L o u i s i a n a . 5 ^
Yet, evidence did exist to indicate discrimination at least
in the resettlement program.

When all community building

stopped in 1941, Louisiana had only four resettlement pro
jects compared to ten for Mississippi

(including five sub

sistence homesteads) and sixteen for Arkansas.

The amount

of funds spent in Louisiana was similarly disproportioned.53
Reid's more serious administrative problems included
defining the authority of the regional office vis-a-vis
state, district, and county office, and wielding all parts of
the three-state organization into a smooth and efficient

50oVerton Brooks to Will W. Alexander, October 5,
1937, ibid.
51c. b . Baldwin to Overton Brooks, December 2, 1937,
ibid. See Brooks to Alexander, October 5, 1937, ibid.; A. D.
Stewart to C. B. Baldwin,.October 24, 1941, ibid.
5?a . D..Stewart■to C. B. Baldwin, August 20, 1941,
ibid.
53parm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro
jects, " ibid. Originally, there were a total of fifty-two
resettlement projects proposed for Arkansas alone. E. B.
Whitaker to T. Roy Reid, August 14, 1935, ibid.; see Rexford
G. Tugwell to William J. Driver, June 15, 1936, ibid.
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operation.

"There is a lack of coordination," wrote Missis

sippi director George M. Reynolds in 1935,

"both in the

region and the state offices, which is due to the fact that
there is no centralization of authority over the entire pro
gram, either in the region or the state.

His solution was

to abolish the dual regional directorship and to put the
entire resettlement program in charge of one general regional
director; however, he also favored giving state directors,
like himself, the same power in their states as the regional
director possessed in the region.

Region Six's early diffi

culties, wrote two Washington officials, were "attributable
in no small degree to the strong attitudes of state directors
who desired to operate programs with little control from the
regional office.”^5
From 1936 to 1939, Reid considerably strengthened
regional control; for example, he took the authority to
approve loans and grants out of the state offices and placed
it in the regional office.

At the same time, he reduced

state office functions to directing the work of district and
county supervisors and managing the work of the state rural
rehabilitation corporations

(the office of regional Custodian

of Corporations soon took away the latter function).

^George
15, 1935. ibid.

m

In

. Reynolds to Will W. Alexander, November

55c . B. Baldwin and Robert W. Hudgens to Will W.
Alexander, November 18, 1939, ibid.

53
addition, he concentrated in his assistant regional director
Whitaker almost every activity related to resettlement, again
preempting the authority of the state directors.56
were complaints of too much centralization.

Now there

In 1939, George

S. Mitchell, trouble shooter for the Administrator's office,
wrote Reid that "the extreme concentration of functions in
your Assistant Regional Director is thought unwise."

More

authority should be delegated to community managers.5^
Mercer G. Evans, another Washington representative, commented
on "a tendency on the part of the regional office not to
delegate authority and responsibility to subordinate field
offices."

This criticism applied especially "to the pro

grams under Whitaker."58

John Fischer, Washington Informa

tion director, complained about the resettlement program in
Region Six.

"...

[T]here is little written material avail

able for reference in the regional office and . . .

Mr.

Whitaker keeps most of the pertinent facts in his head."^9

5^Resettlement Administration, Region Six Annual
Report TVs of December 31, 1936, ibid. See A. D. Stewart to
C. B. Baldwin, August 18, 1941, ibid.
s. Mitchell to T. Roy Reid, May 9, 1939,
ibid.
58Mercer G. Evans, Memorandum for George S. Mitchell,
April 15, 1939, ibid.
59John Fischer, Memorandum to George S. Mitchell,
April 6, 1939, ibid.
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IV
Reid quickly threw his organization into action
against rural distress.

During the eighteen months from

July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, rural rehabilitation and
land utilization activities had the largest impact on the
region.

By July, 1936, Region Six was leading all other

eleven regions in rehabilitation loans with 45,497 low-income
farm families borrowing $6,186,442.

The Land Utilization

Division had optioned 590,630 acres of land unfit for agricul
ture at a total purchase cost of $3,248,268, and had employed
about 4,300 men to develop the land for forestry, pasture,
game refuges, and recreation.

This effort also led the

nation.60
During the same period, Reid launched the resettle
ment program, but none of the projects initiated by the
Resettlement Administration in Region Six were completed
until 1937.

By December, 1936, Whitaker had plans for

eighteen resettlement projects, sixteen active projects and
two on which activity had already been suspended.

According

to early estimates, these projects would ultimately resettle
2,574 farm families and cost about $ 4 , 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 . The

6°Times-Picayune (New Orleans), June 23, 1937; Madison
Journal (Tallulah, Louisiana), July 3, 1936; Rexford G.
Tugwell to T. Roy Reid, February 2, 1937, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement
[E. B. Whitaker], ibid.
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resettlement program involved months and months of detailed
planning on the part of most divisions and sections in the
regional office.

The Management Division, for example, took

over the unfinished work of the Division of Subsistence Home
steads and began preparations for transferring four Missis
sippi projects to local homestead associations
to be developed from scratch).

(Richton had

Management also began inves

tigating and selecting families for occupancy on both
inherited and new community projects.®2

(At this time,

family selection was the only function the R A assumed at
Dyess colony; the WPA managed the project until 1939 and
then turned it over to the Farm Security Administration.)
At the end of 1936, the Land Acquisition Unit of the Land
Utilization Division had appraised 419,225.76 acres in
Region Six for resettlement p u r p o s e s T h e

Architectural

and Engineering staff's field survey teams began marking out
boundaries and subdivisions at project sites and locating
future roads, bridges, and drainage ditches.

Their job also

included preparation of all blueprints and sketches, building
specifications, and estimated costs for forwarding to
Washington.

As 1936 closed, the Construction Division was

®2Region Six Management Division, News Letter, July 1,
1935 to January 1, 1937, Region Six, ibid. ■
®^Region VI Progress Report, Land Utilization Division,
Period ending December 31, 1936, ibid.
®^Report of the Architectural and Engineering Staff,
Region VI, July 1, 1935-December 31, 1936, ibid.
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just beginning work on the first resettlement projects in
Arkansas.65
Between November, 1935, and February, 1936, the
Resettlement Administration gave approval for all resettlement projects it initiated in Region Six.

66

After 1937, the

Farm Security Administration continued the resettlement pro
gram but barely finished many projects before having to start
their liquidation.

No two projects were exactly alike, but

they all had basic similarities.

Some were agricultural

communities formed by breaking up one or more large planta
tions; others consisted of single, isolated farms or clusters
of farms scattered throughout several counties.

Some were

Negro projects, others were for whites only, and still others
were mixed, though always the races lived separately.

Most

projects centered around a cooperative association which sub
leased land to its members in family-size units for indi
visual operation.

What gave unity to the overall resettle

ment program in Region Six was this emphasis on the family
farm.

When project construction ended in the region, Whitaker

^Resettlement Administration, Construction Division,
Progress Report for Projects in Development and Planning,
July 1, 193jS to August 1, 1936, ibid.; Resettlement Adminis
tration, Region VI Annual Report, As of December 31, 1936,
ibid.; Rexford G. Tugwell to T. Roy Reid, February 2, 1937,
ibid.
66parm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro
jects," ibid*? Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of
Assistant Regional Director in Charge of Rural Resettlement,
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, ibid.
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had charge of a total of thirty resettlement projects.

Two

communities and part of another broke with tradition and
experimented with communal farming.

But the remaining

twenty-eight projects were all based on the family farm
ideal.

By 1940, there were about 175 families living on the

cooperative projects, but about 2,500 families occupied pro
jects where they had a chance to become owners of their own
farms.

fi7

Essentially, the rural resettlement program m

Region Six sought to stabilize tenancy by taking low-income
farmers off poor land and helping them get a new start as
independent farmers with better land.

The Region Six pro

jects reflected the same overwhelming emphasis on the family
farm that existed nationally in the community program.
Since projects were developed as funds became avail
able from Washington, Whitaker had construction in progress
constantly from 1936 to 1940.

In 1935, Tugwell gave approval

for work to start as early as possible on five projects:
Plum Bayou, Lakeview, and three farm tenant security projects.
Plum Bayou, an agricultural community type project near
Wright, Arkansas, was the first Resettlement Administration
project to be completed in the united States.

In 1935 and

1936, the R A purchased 9,854 acres of river bottom land in
Jefferson and Arkansas counties and divided it into 200 farm
units averaging forty-two acres each.

Plum Bayou's primary

67parm security Administration,
jects, " ibid.

"Resettlement Pro
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purpose, as a Gazette editorial noted, was "to demonstrate
the feasibility of land ownership by young farmers and young
farm wives following a 'live at home' program."®8

A coopera

tive association provided such community services as a general
merchandise store, repair shop, feed mill, cotton gin, live
stock breeding, and heavy equipment.

But every Plum Bayou

farmer did his own farming and owned his own land.

At Lake-

view, an 8,163-acre project in Phillips and Lee counties in
eastern Arkansas, the RA developed 142 units for Negro share
croppers and farm laborers.

The Camden and West Helena

subsistence homesteads were to be for Negroes, but they never
got beyond the planning stage.®8

The Resettlement Adminis

tration was the first community-building agency to show
effective concern for Negro farmers in Region Six.
In contrast to Plum Bayou and Lakeview, the R A under
took three "farm tenant security" projects, one in each of
the three states.

These differed from the community projects

since they resettled farm families on units scattered or
infiltrated into existing farming districts, although some
tracts were large enough in themselves to become separate
communities.

The Louisiana Farm Tenant Security project,

for example, consisted of nineteen tracts of land totaling
7,165 acres; fourteen tracts each contained eight units or

68Arkansas Gazette, November 20, 1936.
® 9Glenn E. Riddell to Bruce L. Melvin, March 1, 1934,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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less, but one tract, the Millsaps plantation at Crew Lake in
Richland Parish, contained 2,947 acres.

Thus the farm

tenant security projects shared features of both the community
projects and the Bankhead-Jones tenant purchase program.

The

Crew Lake community closely resembled Transylvania or Mounds,
but the development of most of the other units did not differ
essentially from the tenant purchase units.70
Lake Dick, Terrebonne, and Marcella were the only
projects in Region Six which ran counter to the traditional
pattern of individually~owned family farms.7!

The Lake Dick

project near Altheimer, Jefferson County, Arkansas, con
sisted of 4,529 acres of sandy lpam and buckshot soil lying
in a basin between the Mississippi and Arkansas rivers.

At

Lake Dick, the Resettlement Administration experimented with
a pattern common in European agriculture where farmers lived
in villages and went out to work in surrounding fields.

The

Lake Dick homes and most of the community and cooperative
buildings formed a village around the banks of a horseshoe
shaped lake in the middle of the project.

A cooperative

association, Lake Dick Farm, Inc., rented the land and
facilities from the FSA and carried on the farming operations;

70Heaxinc[s on the Farm Security Administration. 1062?
Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Projects, " R. G.
96, National Archives.
7!conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 168-70? Joseph W.
Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow’s Agriculture (New York, 1943),
66, 67.
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through membership in the association, the project families
collectively "owned*1 the land, their homes, the community
center, school, cooperative store, dairy, cotton gin, and
barns.

As individuals, they owned only their "children and

chickens."72

Members worked as day laborers for wages paid

at the end of each week and shared annually in the associa
tions * profits

(if any) on a patronage basis.

their homes and garden plots rent free.

They received

In 1939, the FSA

developed four sugar cane plantations in Terrebonne Parish,
Louisiana, into one large collective farm of seventy
7 0

families.

At Terrebonne, each farmer rented a six-acre

homestead unit? his home occupied two acres, but he could
use the other four to grow food for his family's own use or
for sale as supplemental income.

Despite plans for coopera

tive ownership, the FSA divided Terrebonne into forty-acre
units, perhaps an indication of growing doubt about the
practicality of cooperative farming.

Less important, the

Marcella project was a 2,686-acre collective farm in Holmes
County, Mississippi, but it never had an independent
existence.

Marcella was part of Mileston Farms, the only

project in Region Six that the FSA was solely responsible
for initiating, planning, and developing.

Constructed in

720ren Stephens, "FSA Fights for Its Life." Harper *s
Magazine, CLXXXVI (April, 1943), 482; Arkansas Gazette,
January 11, 1938, Arkansas Democrat Sunday Magazine/ August
11, 1940.
73item-Tribune

(New Orleans), June 25, 1939.

61
1939 and 1940, Mileston was a community type project of
9,350 acres and 106 units, only thirty-six of which were
operated collectively.7^
Beginning about 1938, Whitaker launched a final round
of project building.

Most of the early projects had been

located in Arkansas, but now Louisiana and Mississippi
received more attention.75

Transylvania Farms, in East

Carroll Parish, was a 10,725-acre community type project
designed to provide 160 low-income farm families in the Louisi
ana delta with family-type farms and a chance to obtain an
adequate living.

In 1938, Transylvania Association, Inc.,

taking a ninety-nine-year lease on the land, developed the
project with funds borrowed from the government.

Whitaker

created the Mounds project nearby because the Transylvania
purchase had displaced many Negro families.

He purchased an

additional 11,896 acres in East Carroll and Madison parishes
and developed the land into 145 family-type farms.

The

Mounds project did not differ at all from Transylvania except
in the color of the clients.
Except for Transylvania, Mounds, and Terrebonne, the
Farm Security Administration's late projects were somewhat

7^Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture. 142, 1515;
Hearings on the Farm Security Administration. 1072, 1073;
Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Projects," R. G.
96, National Archives.
75T. Roy Reid to the Employees of the Farm Security
Administration in Region Six, July 6, 1938, ibid.
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more improvised than those w611 underway by 1936 or 1937.
The FSA., for example, developed Northwest Arkansas Farms in
Benton and Washington counties to provide farms for
families being displaced from submarginal purchase areas in
the Ozarks.

Northeast Mississippi Farms— an infiltration

type project covering Choctaw, Clay, Kemper, Lowndes,
Noxubee, Oktibbeha, and Winston counties— offered opportunity
for similar families in the north Mississippi hills.

The

FSA inherited 5,744 acres of cut-over land in George and
Green counties, Mississippi, built a community center and
other facilities at Lucedale, and developed ninety-three
family-type farms.

Unlike most resettlement projects, Luce

dale relied on income from truck crops, grain, and livestock.
In 1939, the Farm Security Administration created five
separate projects out of land originally purchased for an
older project known as Arkansas Delta Farms.7®

Biscoe,

Clover Bend, and Lonoke were for white families; Desha and
Townes were for Negroes.

These were essentially infiltration

type projects, but they differed from the farm tenant
security projects by utilizing larger tracts of land.

They

actually included many plantations of 1,000 or more acres
scattered throughout the delta.

The total project acreage

usually ran from 3,000 to 5,000 acres and contained between
fifty and 100 units.

Since they were developed late, they

7®T. Roy Reid to Will W. Alexander, May 17, 1939,
ibid.
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did not always have the variety of community facilities
characte]:istic of early projects.7?
Despite differences among the projects, the resettle
ment program possessed a basic continuity, especially after
1935.

The RA and FSA were identical organizations, with the

latter incorporating the RA's entire staff from the regional
office down to the lowest level.

With one exception, the FSA

did not initiate any new resettlement projects in Region Six,
but completed those it had inherited, using the RA's plans.
How projects were planned and developed will be discussed in
the next chapter.

77F.arm Security Administration, .."Resettlement. Pro
jects, " ibid. ? Hearings on the Farm Security Administration.
1038-49, 1074, 1075.

CHAPTER III
THE MISSISSIPPI SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEADS
"There are in one sense," wrote M. L. Wilson in 1940,
"two polar extremes of thought in respect to the direction
agricultural development should followiin the future."

One

school would stress greater technological efficiency, mechan
ize farming on a huge scale as rapidly as possible, and put
surplus farm workers into industry.

But Wilson objected:

as long as unemployment was high, industry could not provide
employment for surplus rural people.

The second school of

thought favored breaking up agriculture into small units,
turning away from modern technology and specialization, and
returning to "subsistence practices that were common before
the industrial revolution."

Again Wilson objected:

specialized, large-scale agriculture had become absolutely
necessary to supply raw materials for industry and to feed
the industrial population of the cities.
extreme? he asked.

Why go to either

Why not combine both modern farming

techniques and small subsistence farms?

All agriculture

need not be commercial, and subsistence farming did not
necessarily mean going back to the Middle Ages; it could be
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as modern as any large-scale farm.1
As chief of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads in
1933 and 1934, Wilson followed this middle course.

He

experimented with subsistence farming, but he did not seek
to form enclaves where homesteaders could escape modern
problems and retreat to a simpler life near the soil.

Nor

did he want to use subsistence homesteads as a defeatist
attempt to reverse progress.

In the South, Wilson estab

lished a few colonies for stranded workers, as at Arthurdale,
West Virginia, the first and best-known subsistence home
stead project.

He also built a few all-rural colonies for

submarginal farmers, but for the most part he concentrated
on homesteads for part-time farmers near industrial employ
ment.

In Mississippi alone, the Division of Subsistence

Homesteads planned five industrial-type projects and one
rural colony.

Also taking a middle course, Mississippians

saw them primarily as a means of promoting home o w n e r s h i p . 2
The industrial projects became the best examples of
what subsistence homesteads were supposed to be.

A subsis

tence homestead, according to an official definition, was "a
house and out buildings located upon a plot of land on which
can be grown a large portion of the foodstuffs required by

1M. L. Wilson, "Beyond Economics, " in Farmers in a
Chancing- World: The Yearbook of Agriculture. 1940 (Washing
ton, 1940) , 922-37. Quote from p. 930.
^See Daily Register (Clarksdale, Mississippi, May 1,
1934.
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the homestead family.”

The homesteader produced only for

home consumption and not for commercial sale.

"In that it

provides for subsistence alone, it carries with it the
corollary that cash income must be drawn from some outside
source.

The central motive of the subsistence homestead

program, therefore, is to demonstrate the economic value of
a livelihood which combines part-time wage work and part3
time gardening or farming."
Except for their small size,
the Mississippi projects were probably typical of most
industrial-type subsistence homesteads.

They all contained

between 100 and 300 acres of land broken up into twenty to
twenty-five units, with an average of four to seven acres
per homestead.

They were all located within about five

miles of a small town with industrial jobs available.

The

Division of Subsistence designed them to take up the slack
of seasonal employment in cotton gins, textile mills, and
other industries common in small Southern towns.

These pro

jects offered opportunities both for industrial workers to
practice subsistence farming and for farmers to earn cash
income as part-time industrial workers.^
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads announced plans
for industrial-type projects at McComb, Laurel, Tupelo,

^u. S. Department of the Interior, Division of Sub
sistence Homesteads, Bulletin 1 (Washington, 1934), 4,
quoted in Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New
Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y . , 1959), 110,111.
4conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 105, 106, 110, 111.
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Meridian, and Hattiesburg, M i s s i s s i p p i . ^

None of these towns

were urban centers, but they all possessed economic poten
tial.

In 1935, Meridian had the largest population (31,954),

with Hattiesburg (18,601) and Laurel
McComb (10,057) and Tupelo

(18,017) almost equal;

(6,361) were considerably smaller.

Meridian, Mississippi's second largest city, was located in
the east-central part of the state, a region famous for
yellow pine, hardwood, cotton, livestock, and dairying.
Timber was practically the only natural resource of this
region; but lumber companies had already stripped the best
virgin forests by 1930.

The most important railroad center

in eastern Mississippi, Meridian was the junction of the
Mobile and Ohio, the New Orleans and North Eastern, the St.
Louis and San Francisco, and several smaller lines.
Meridian's cotton mills produced more cotton oil for sale in
Europe than did any other city in Mississippi, but a shirt
and garment factory and three hosiery mills made the city an
important textile town as well.

In the northeastern part of

the state, Tupelo was one of the first TVA cities and per
haps Mississippi's best example of the "New South."

Like

many other Southern towns, Tupelo took its first step away

^Report of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and
Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation, June, 1934,
Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers' Home Administration,
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G; 96,
National Archives); U. S. Department of the Interior, Division
of Subsistence Homesteads, Monthly Rroject Report, April 26,
1935. ibid.
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from the land with the cotton mill? but three garment fac
tories soon became the city's major industry.®
McComb, Hattiesburg, and Laurel all lay within the
coastal plain.

At one time, this region had consisted of

thick forests of long-leaf yellow pine? but in the thirties,
it too was mainly cutover land with little or no marketable
timber left.

In addition, southern Mississippi was a truck

farming area specializing in corn, sweet potatoes, oats,
tobacco, sugar cane, garden vegetables, pecans, and peanuts.
For both truck farming and industry, McComb occupied a
favorable geographical position as the largest town along
the Illinois Central railroad between New Orleans and
Jackson.

McCombians found industrial opportunities in

Illinois Central repair shops, an ice company, sawmills,
(textile mills, and a woodworking plant.

Once a mere sawmill

camp, Hattiesburg had become an important manufacturer of
naval stores, railroad center, and college town.

Twenty-

five miles north, Laurel was still primarily a lumber town
on the extreme northeastern edge of the yellow pine forest.7
The Mississippi industrial-type homesteads all fol
lowed the same basic stages of development? they were also
virtually identical as completed projects.

First, the

^Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress
Administration, Mississippi; A Guide to the Magnolia State
(New York, 1938), 227-31, 261-65.
7Ibid., 396, 417, 222-27.
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Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation organized the five
projects into separate subsidiary corporations, assigned
each a general or project manager, and released an allotment
to cover development and management costs.

Subsistence Home

steads officials worked closely with chambers of commerce
and other local "sponsors11 in selecting land for each pro
ject.

Next, the general manager began clearing and surveying

the land and opened bidding on the homesteads and out build
ings.

As originally planned, each homestead would cost

between $2,500 and $2,800, including land and all improve
ments.®

The general manager also supervised the work of

selecting homesteaders, breaking the land up into individual
subsistence plots, and building roads.

Since the projects

were all close to town, the Division of Subsistence Home
steads planned no community facilities for project resi
dents .®
At first, McComb set the pace for the subsistence
homesteads program in Mississippi.

During a visit to McComb,

®Report of the Division of Subsistence Homesteads and
Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation, June, 1934, R. G.
96, National Archives.
9Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 106, 107. Besides the
industrial projects, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads
announced a full-time farm colony at Richton, Mississippi,
purchased 7,753 acres of farm land for $36,753.24, and made
plans to divide it up into about 310 farm units. But the
Resettlement Administration inherited Richton in 1935 as a
completely undeveloped project. U. S. Department of the
Interior, Division of Subsistence Homesteads, Monthly Pro
ject Report, April 26, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives.

on December 26 and 27, 1933, I. R. Bradshaw, Mississippi
field representative for the Division of Subsistence Home
steads, and N. A. Keller, land clearing specialist of the
Department of Agriculture, revealed unofficially that the
city had won approval for a subsistence homestead project.-1-®
The people of the city responded with enthusiasm.

In fact,

a special committee of the McComb Chamber of Commerce, had
already been lobbying for a project.

To business men, a

homestead project meant more than merely homes for twenty or
twenty-five families; it meant employment for laborers,
carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and other workers who
would develop the homesteads „

Within a week after Bradshaw

and Keller left, a group of McComb people decided to ask
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt to dedicate the project; knowing
her interest in the subsistence community idea, they also
wanted to name the project the Eleanor Roosevelt Homesteads.
Edgar G. Williams, chairman of the Mississippi State Demo
cratic Committee, agreed to present their invitation to the
first lady at the White House; and Senator Pat Harrison set
up the appointment with Mrs. Roosevelt.
G. Williams? he asked.

Did she know Edgar

"Oh, I remember him," she replied.

"He's the gentleman from way down in South Mississippi who
wore a silk suit and a red necktie to the inauguration."
When Williams called at the White House, he found her "well

^•®McComb Enterprise, December 29, 1933.
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posted on the plan of a subsistence homestead project at
McComb."

She was pleased with the invitation, he reported,

but she could not give a definite answer since the Division
had not officially approved McComb for a project.
On December 29, 1933, the Federal Subsistence Home
steads Corporation, the action arm of the Division of
Subsistence Homesteads, formed McComb Homesteads of Missis
sippi, Inc.12

Organized under Delaware law, McComb

Homesteads was a subsidiary corporation with responsibility
for developing and operating the McComb project.

Rather

than set up a regional or state-by-state organization, the
Division of Subsistence Homesteads virtually operated its
entire program through such local corporations, setting up
one for every homestead project.

A legal device, McComb

Homesteads of Mississippi would borrow money from the
parent corporation, hold title to the land, buildings, and
other property, enter into contracts with architects,
contractors, and building supply companies, make all expen
ditures, and issue purchase contracts to individual home
stead families.

Once construction work was over, McComb

Homesteads would manage the project.

As on all subsistence

^ I b i d ., January 5, 1934? January 19, 1934.
12McComb Homestead Project SH-MS-4, Report of Examina
tion, dated June 22, 1937, Records of the Housing and Home
Finance Agency, National Archives (to be cited hereafter as
R. G. 207, National Archives) ; Conkin, Tomorrow a, New
W o r l d . 106, 107.
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homesteads, the corporation officers were prominent citizens
of the local community.

In early 1934, Edgar Williams, state

Democratic committeeman, became president of the corporation.
J. 0. Emmerich, editor of the McComb Enterprise, took over
as general or project manager, while Xavier A. Kramer, mayor
of McComb, W. M. Webb, and J. c. Flowers, both businessmen,
rounded out the board of directors.13
On January 18, Senator Pat Harrison and Congressman
H. D. Stephens and Russell Ellzey wired Emmerich:

"MCCOMB HAS

BEEN SELECTED A SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEAD SITE [, ] ANNOUNCEMENT BY
DIRECTOR OF SUBSISTENCE HOMESTEADS TO BE MADE TODAY."14

A

few days later, M. L. Wilson officially gave the board of
directors of McComb Homesteads of Mississippi full authority
to go ahead with plans for developing a project.

Then on

February 1, the board announced the purchase of a
364.04-acre tradt of land three miles southeast of the city.
McComb Homesteads of Mississippi paid John 0. Lanier, a local
landowner, $2,200.00 for the undeveloped land. 3

Almost

as soon as the purchase was made, engineer Jimmie Barnes had

13McComb Enterprise. January 5, 1934; February 2,
1934.
In May, 1934, however, Secretary of the Interior
Harold L. Ickes federalized all subsistence homestead pro
jects, abolished the control of the subsidiary corporations,
and placed the entire program directly under the Federal
Subsistence Homesteads Corporation.
See Conkin, Tomorrow a
New World. 120-23.
14McComb Enterprise. January 19, 1934.
15Ibid., February 2, 1934? A. T. McCurdie, Memorandum
to J. Lloyd Taylor, January 15, 1946, R. G. 207, National
Archives.
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two crews of men on the project drawing contour maps of
elevations, streams, and other land marks, while a third
crew under Walter Fitzgerald was locating the legal bound
aries.

In the meantime, the board of directors began working

on plans for the project with agricultural engineers, horticulturalists, and the state extension service.
Within a few weeks, homestead officials had drawn up
building plans for an initial group of twenty-five homes,
with a total of thirty-seven homes planned for future develop
ment.

On March 5, a capacity crowd of prospective home

steaders and other interested people jammed the McComb City
Hall auditorium where Emmerich outlined the corporation1s
plans for "Eleanor Roosevelt Homesteads."

Since the

engineering Work had been completed, he explained, actual
construction awaited Washington's approval of final building
plans.

Emmerich had already submitted these plans to Brad

shaw; he in turn had approved them, Emmerich said, and sent
them on to Washington.

"The program," he wrote later,

"will

carry out a dream of President and Mrs. Roosevelt to provide
modern homes in ideal surroundings near a city for part-time
17
industrial workers." '

On April 24, McComb Homesteads held a ground-breaking
ceremony, an event that put it ahead of all other subsistence

■^McComb Enterprise, February 9, 1934.
•*-?Ibid.. March 9, 1934.

homesteads projects in Mississippi.

A. B. McKay, state

horticulturalist, and J. T. Copeland, state agricultural
engineer, had both participated in planning the project; now
they turned over the first spade of earth on the site of the
first h o m e s t e a d . T h i s ceremony did not actually launch
the building program at McComb.

Emmerich had already

started construction on three homesteads; he added five more
within a week and planned to keep enlarging the construction
program until all twenty-five houses were underway at once.
Between April and September, 1934, Emmerich completed twenty
homesteads.

The McComb houses were all frame clapboard

structures except for two frame shingle structures; eight
had four rooms, ten five rooms, and one six rooms.. The
original project plan called for equipping them with running
water, indoor toilets, electric lights, gas for cooking and
heating, and telephone service; but electricity, gas, and
telephones were later dropped due to high installation costs.
Emmerich's engineers divided the 364 acres into different
sized plots.

Nineteen homesteads ranged from four to fourteen

acres each, and one had a twenty-four acre plot.

In addition

to the dwelling, each unit contained a garage and well-house
and a combination cow stall, chicken house, and store room.
All of the homesteaders had some wooded land, a truck garden,
and an orchard, as well as the use of a thirty-seven acre

18Ibid., April 27, 1934.
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community pasture.

Emmerich let contracts for drilling a

well for each unit, and for installing individual septic
tanks.

Each homesteader had his own sow, milch cow, mare,

twenty-five to fifty hens, and essential farm equipment.
FERA labor built dirt roads through the project connecting
the homesteads with each other and with existing roads.

For

recreation, homesteaders had a seventeen-acre park and a
thirteen-acre lake, but no other community facilities were
provided.19
As early as January, Emmerich called for applicants
even though he had not yet received the proper application
forms.

He invited all interested persons to leave their

names and addresses with the McComb Chamber of Commerce.

90

When application forms came in, they could fill them out and
make formal application.

Within two weeks, 232 people had

applied for homesteads; by April, the number had risen to
518. ^

To handle family selection, the Division of Sub

sistence Homesteads set up a series of four committees from
local to national level.

First, a committee of McComb

citizens interviewed all applicants and drew up a list of
the most likely families.

Then the board of directors of

•^For the floor plans see ibid., March 15, 1935? Re
settlement Administration, "Project Description Book," MarchDecember,. 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; see also McComb
Enterprise, January 18, 1935.
20lbid., January 5, 1934.
21Ibid., January 19, 1934; April 6, 1934.

76
McComb Homesteads formed a selection committee of its own
membership, reviewed the citizen committee's list, and in
turn made its recommendations to a state committee.

This

committee served as a clearing house for family selection on
all Mississippi subsistence homesteads; its members, Miss
Ann Jordan of Mississippi State College and I. R. Bradshaw,
went over the choices again and passed the revised list on
to Washington.

Mrs. Charlotte Smith of the Division of

Subsistence Homesteads headed the national committee which
made the final selection for all projects in the nation.
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads was looking for
thrifty, industrious, honest people who had already proven
themselves reliable.

The most preferred families were those

who earned part of their income in local industrial work.
Heads of families had to be under fifty years of age, possess
a reputation for good character, and show ability to pa y for
the homestead.

22

By April, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads had
approved nine applicants:

a linotype operator, railroad

switchman, brakeman, truck driver, cotton mill worker, black
smith, restaurant cook, printer, and mechanic.22

Their

22Ibid.,. April 6. 1934; John B. Holt, An Analysis of
Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for Coloniza
tion Projects, Social Research Report No. 1 of the U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration, and
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Washington, 1937), 36,
37.
23j4cComb Enterprise. April 6, 1934.
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average annual income ran between $1,000 and $1,200.

The

McComb project probably attracted these people because of
the security and stability they believed it would afford.
Most homestead families were interested above all in home
ownership.

In the Subsistence Homestead Division's plan,

each homesteader occupied the homesteads under "temporary
licensing agreements,” a contract calling for monthly rental
payments based on the size and cost of each unit.

The home

stead corporation would later offer each family a sales con
tract with payments amortized over a thirty-year period at
three per cent interest.

What each family had paid as

licensees would apply to reduce the final purchase price of
their homestead unit.

As permanent residents, they would
24.
continue making monthly payments.
Emmerich planned for families to occupy the home
steads as they were completed.

In early June, 1934, Guy A.

Betz, a mechanic and night watchman, took the first home
stead.^

Two other families, those of J. R. Butler and M. T.

Rhodes, soon followed.

Emmerich initially advised them that

the homesteads would each cost $2,500, more or less; he could
not determine the exact price until construction was further
advanced.

But somewhat later, he presented the three fami

lies with licensing agreements based on a purchase cost of

24conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 127.
^ M c C o m b Enterprise. June 8, 1934.

$3,200.

Betz refused to sign, and so did Butler and Rhodes,

objecting that the price was unreasonably high.

On instruc

tions from Washington, Emmerich ordered them to vacate their
homesteads.

For the time being, the Division of Subsistence

Homesteads decided not to move any more families into the
project.

The Betz episode may have contributed to the

decision, but it was not the only reason.

McComb Homesteads

of Mississippi had wired the finished houses for

electricity,

but then decided the cost of extending power lines to the
project was too high.

Thus the McComb homesteaders were

without lights? and since all well pumps were electric, they
were also without water.^6
In early 1935,tthe Division of Subsistence Homesteads
came up with a plan for reorganizing McComb.

After a re

study of the project, Charles E. Pynchon, Wilson's successor
as head of the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation,
proposed to construct ten more houses, bringing the total to
thirty-five, and to reduce the larger homestead plots.
Although he contemplated spending an additional $26,000 at
McComb, Pynchon pointed out that these changes would lower
the average cost of each homestead from about $3,800 to
$2,865— a price that he hoped would attract settlers to the
project.

Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Iekes gave

26project Analysis Questionnaire, McComb, Mississippi
Project No. 27, n.d., R. G. 207, National Archives; McComb
Homestead Project SH-MS 4, Report of Examination, dated
June 22, 1937. ibid.
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approval, then apparently changed his mind.

After February,

1935, the Division of Subsistence Homesteads suspended all
activity at McComb except for such work as planting trees
along project roads.

Since no permanent residents were on

the project and no effort was being made to find any, McComb
Homesteads went into a kind of limbo until the Resettlement
Administration took it over three months later.27
Soon after construction started at McComb, the
Division of Subsistence Homesteads launched building programs
at Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Meridian.

Tupelo Homesteads of

Mississippi purchased a 171-acre tract for $6,259.37, built
twenty-five clapboard homes of English and colonial American
design, and leased them primarily to low-income families
employed in the textile industry.

Tupelo had three parks

and a six-acre lake with a community pavilion.

The Wilson

Dam power plant of the Tennessee Valley Authority supplied
electricity for the project, and all occupants had one-party
telephone service.28

Magnolia Homesteads, near Meridian,

consisted of 233 acres of land in three tracts costing a
total of $5,325.00.

Mrs. L. C. Gray, general manager of

27Charles E. Pynchon, Memorandum to the Secretary of
the Interior, February 5, 1935, Record Group 48, Records of
the Office of the Secretary of the interior, National
Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 48, National
Archives); McComb Enterprise. January 18, 1935.
28Resettlement Administration, "Project Description
Book"; Mississippi Projects, June 1, 1935, R. G. 96,
National Archives.
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Magnolia, was the only woman in the nation to manage a sub
sistence homesteads project.

The homes at Magnolia were

bungalow-type frame structures, with electric lights but no
gas or telephone service.

Like McComb and Tupelo, Magnolia

had a park and lake for recreational purposes.^9

Hatties

burg Homesteads invested $2,379.20 in a mere 129-acre-tract,
the smallest project in the state.

Hattiesburg had twenty-

four frame clapboard houses, a park but no lake or other
community facilities and no utilities at all.30

At Laurel,

the Division of Subsistence Homesteads purchased a 183-acre
tract costing $2,010.33, but the Laurel project never even
31

got as far as construction. x
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads, in fact, did
not exist long enough to complete any of the Mississippi
projects.

In late April, 1935, President Roosevelt re

organized the New Deal community program and abolished the
Division of Subsistence Homesteads after an existence of
twenty-one months.

The new Resettlement Administration

^ P r o j e c t Analysis Questionnaire, Magnolia Gardens,
Meridian, Mississippi, R. G. 207, National Archives; Thomas
K. Shuff, Memorandum to Lee Pressman, July 15, 1935, ibid.
30Rexford G. Tugwell to William M. Colmer, May 20,
1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; Report on Examination,
Hattiesburg Homestead Association, dated September 20, 1943,
i b i d.; A. T . McCurdie to H. V. Rouse, June 20, 1935, R. G.
207, National Archives.
^Mississippi Projects, June 1, 1935, R. G. 96,
National Archives; Report of the Division of Subsistence
Homesteads and Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation,
June, 1934, ibid.
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inherited the subsistence homesteads program on May 15,
1935.32

As Resettlement Administrator, Rexford G. Tugwell

assigned the five Mississippi industrial-type projects to
the Suburban Resettlement Division; but in August, he trans
ferred them to the Management Division, which would assume
responsibility for completing and then operating

them.

33

One of T . Roy Reid's first tasks as director of
Region Six was the unfinished business of the Division of
Subsistence Homesteads in Mississippi.

After examining the

status of each project, he decided to drop Laurel, since it
was so far from completion; but he went ahead with McComb,
Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Meridian.

With one exception, no

major construction was undertaken on any of the projects
beyond finishing what had already been started.

The Con

struction Division built ten additional houses at Tupelo,
bringing the total number of units to thirty-five and making
it the largest of the Mississippi projects.

James B. Lawson,

chief of the regional Management Division, made only minor
repairs at Hattiesburg and Meridian, as some of the homes
were badl^ydeteriorated.

At McComb, Lawson redivided the

land and enlarged some of the homestead tracts, erected more

3?T# h . Hibben, Memorandum to R. G. Tugwell, June 29,
1935, ibid.; Tugwell, Memorandum to John S. Lansill, July 10,
1935, ibid.; see also Mas tin G. White to F . K. Ethridge,
October 2, 1937, R. G. 207, National Archives.
33Rexfor(j
Tugwell to Harry L. Hopkins, July 18,
1935, R. G. 96, National Archives; R. R. Ehrlish, Memorandum
to R. K. Straus, October 17, 1935, ibid.
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outbuildings, and installed gasoline well pumps.

In addition,

the Management Division investigated and selected families
for all twenty units at McComb, and filled the vacancies at
Tupelo, Hattiesburg, and Meridian.3^
Beyond this point, the Resettlement Administration
program differed slightly from that of the Division of Sub
sistence Homesteads.

Once each project was fully occupied,

the regional office organized the families into a local home
stead association, the same kind of organization that the
Resettlement Administration used for operating all of its own
community projects.

At first, both old homesteaders and new

families remained under the terms of their old licensing
agreements.

When the new homestead association took over,

the Resettlement Administration offered them a chance, after
a one-year trial period, to enter into a Tenure Form A con
tract, a forty-year purchase agreement.

Those not wanting

to purchase their homesteads could take a Tenure B contract,
a monthly lease based on the unit's selling price.

The

Resettlement Administration required occupants to follow a
live-at-home program of home management in order to help
them reduce theitiliving expenses.35

^Management Division, News Letter, July 1, 1935 to
January 1, 1936, Region VI, ibid.; Rexford G. Tugwell to T.
Roy Reid, February 2, 1937, ibid.; "Subsistence Homesteads,"
April, 1935, Ibid.? "Mississippi Projects," June 1, 1935,
ibid. See Leon Shirman, Memorandum to Mrs. L. M. Walker,
February 9, 1937, ibid.; Edward Stone, Memorandum to Mrs.
L. M. Walker, December 14, 1936, ibid.
35Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 215, 216.

For the next five years

(1935 to 1940) , the Resettle

ment Administration and then the Farm Security Administration
struggled unsuccessfully with the problem of the Mississippi
subsistence homesteads.

At McComb, Lawson quickly ran up

against the project's old nemesis.

"The selection of

families and the filling of the houses on the McComb project
are progressing in accordance with our anticipation, " he
wrote in November, 1935, "that is, we are having trouble in
getting the houses filled.

. . ."

Families who could qualify,

he reported, refused to accept the properties under the terms
of the temporary licensing agreements.36

By June 15, 1935,

however, Lawson had filled nineteen out of the twenty home
steads, using basically the criteria drawn up by the Division
of Subsistence Homesteads.37

a year later (the probation

period), the regional office incorporated McComb Homesteads
Association under Mississippi law on January 12, 1937, for a
period of fifty years.

The association had authority to

issue 250 shares of common stock with a par value of three
dollars per share.

According to the Charter of Incorporation,

the McComb Homesteads Association was to "participate in the
+
3®J. B. Lawson to Robert K. Straus, November 6, 1935,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
See T. Roy Reid to Rexford G.
Tugwell, December 9, 1935, ibid.; Wendell Lund, Memorandum
to Mrs. Loretta M. Walker, March 10, 1937, ibid.? John 0.
Walker to Reid, April 17, 1937, ibid.; Walker to Reid, May
17, 1939, ibid.
•^Rexford
1936, ibid.

g

. Tugwell to Dan R. McGehee, June 30,
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establishment, maintenance and development of a community at
McComb Homesteads . . . for the mutual benefit of the members
of such community; to engage in activities designed to
rehabilitate such members and make them self supporting; and
to do and perform all acts and things necessary, convenient,
useful or incidental to the accomplishment of these purposes ." 38
The regional office next drew up plans for selling the project
property and assets to the association for $44,360.00, less
credits of $2,250.17 for rent paid, leaving a net price of
$42,109.83.

In contrast, the total estimated cost of the

McComb project was $110,088.00.

Homesteaders would pay an

average of $2,218.00 for their units, with monthly install
ments over a forty-year period at three per cent interest.39
Despite the $65,728 write off, the Resettlement
Administration's plans for a homestead association at McComb
failed miserably.

The new project manager, John S. Grant,

offered each family the option of signing a Tenure A purchase
contract with the association or staying for a reasonable
length of time under the old agreement while looking for a
new home.

Most took the latter course.

In July, 1938,

3®The Charter of Incorporation of McComb Homestead
Association, dated January 12, 1937, R. G. 207, National
Archives. The charter is published in McComb Enterprise.
February 11, 1937.
39Edward Stone, Memorandum to Donald MacGuiness,
March 17, 1937, R. G. 207, National Archives; Mastin G.
White, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture, July 18,
1938, ibid-
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there were only five families in occupany, all under tempo
rary licensing agreements.

The McComb project experienced

difficulty keeping occupants because of its distance from
the corporate limits of McComb, its lack of utilities, and
its generally poor soil.

Like all subsistence homesteads in

Mississippi, McComb also suffered from the lack of employment
opportunities in nearby towns.
After conferring with local citizens of McComb,
regional officials decided to scrap the plan for a homestead
association.

If the units were simply offered at an average

price of $1,200 per unit at six per cent interest with a
twenty-year term, McComb citizens contended, then enough
interest could be aroused to fill the project.

Although

such an arrangement would come close to eliminating govern
ment control over the project, the Farm Security Administra
tion went ahead.

In July, 1938, FSA officials mad§ an

outright sale to individual clients, giving a deed to each
homesteader and taking a mortgage and promissory note.
Homesteaders agreed to repay the purchase price in equal
monthly installments amortized over twenty years at five
per cent, with average monthly payments of $14.25.

At

$1,200, the government lost $3,114.00 per unit, or a total

4°Milo Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agri
culture, July 14, 1938, Record Group 16, Records of the
office of the Secretary of Agriculture, National Archives
(to be cited hereafter as R. G. 16, National Archives) ?
J. 0. Walker, Memorandum for the solicitor [Mastin G. White],
April 15, 1938, R. G. 207, National Archives.
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or $62,292.00.

At last, the Farm Security Administration

had little trouble finding occupants for the project.^-*Hattiesburg and Meridian were the only two projects
in the nation that defaulted after being organized into
homestead associations.

On September 30, 1936, the Resettle

ment Administration sold the Meridian project to the Meridian
Homesteads Association for $60,000, less $2,424.67 in credits
for rent paid.^2

Hattiesburg Homestead Association acquired

the Hattiesburg property and assets on October 1, 1936, for
$49,720.00, minus credits of $3,473.61.^
$92,488.20, Hattiesburg $91,035.36.

Meridian had cost

The Meridian homesteaders

bought their individual units for an average price of
$2,400.00, with an average monthly payment of $18.64, while
at Hattiesburg each unit sold for an average of $2,075.00,
with an $18.08 monthly payment.

At both Hattiesburg and

Meridian, regional officials and interested local citizens
*

had agreed that the price represented not only the fair
market value of the homesteads; it was also in line with

^ M a s t i n G. White, Memorandum for the Secretary of
Agriculture, July
18, 1938, ibid.; T. Roy Reid to Rexford G.
Tugwell, Sepfembef 4, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives;
Leon Shiman, Memorandum to Edward Stone, September 11, 1936,
ibid.
^ 2Ibid.; Milo Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary
of Agriculture, July 18, 1938, R. G. 16, National Archives.
42Milo Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of
Agriculture, July
14, 1938, ibid.; E. E. Agger to T. Roy
Reid, January 22,1937, R.
G. 96, National Archives. See
Hattiesburg American, December 9, 1936.
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real estate values in the locality and imposed no undue
burden on the homesteaders.44
The Resettlement Administration found it difficult to
attract families at either project and almost impossible to
keep them once they came.

For one reason, the regional

office built up a heritage of misunderstanding when it tried
to purge both projects of undesirable occupants before
offering purchase contracts.

After the cooperative associa

tions were organized, other residents withdrew voluntarily
because they felt themselves unable tommake the necessary
payments.

At Hattiesburg, especially, the homesteaders were

not satisfied with the terms and conditions of the Tenure A
contracts.

"The chief reason," Reid reported,

"probably is

that the total monthly outlay under Tenure Form 'A' is a few
dollars more than it was under the Temporary Licensing
Agreement."45

They also objected to the cooperative associa

tion; "that is," Reid wrote,

"some of the individuals feel

that they should be allowed to purchase directly from the
Government and not through the association, thereby relieving
them of any responsibility in connection with the balance of
the property."

In addition, some felt they should not bear

44^110 perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agri
culture, July 14, 1938, R. G. 16, National Archives; Milo
Perkins, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture, July
18, 1938, ibid.
4 5t . Roy Reid to Rexford G. Tugwell, November 4, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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any of the management expense; and some were worried about
the forty-year clause, although none of them could make a
substantial down payment.

"I believe," Reid wrote,

"that

all of the above reasons are due primarily to the lack of
business experience of a group of people such as we have on
the project.

. . ."46

From 1934 to 1938, Hattiesburg experienced a ninetytwo per cent turnover.

By July, 1938, there were only six

families in occupancy.47

Meridian's record was similar.

Neither association could make their first payment w h e n .it
came due on October 31, 1937, and neither ever met any
future payment on their obligations.

In 1938, after

reappraising the project, the Farm Security Administration
lowered monthly charges to $16.24, an amount based on an
average selling price of $1,840.00; at Hattiesburg, the new
figures were $14.74 per month and $1,578.42 per unit.4®
This reduction made the projects more attractive, but it was
not a permanent solution.

In March, 1941, acting regional

director T. B. Fatherree wrote:

"The affairs of the

Magnolia and Hattiesburg Homestead Associations are so badly

46Ibid.
47John O. Walker, Memorandum for Will W. Alexander,
July 9, 1938, ibid.
48John 0. Walker to T. Roy Reid, July 28, 1938, ibid.;
Walker to Reid, July 30, 194, ibid.; Milo Perkins, Memorandum
for the Secretary of Agriculture, July 18, 1938, R. G. 16,
National Archives.
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involved as to be considered insolvent, and to all purposes
are looked upon as such by those of us responsible for
their operation."^9
Tupelo was the last project to be conveyed to a home
stead association.

The Resettlement Administration formed

the Tupelo Homestead Association on May 17, 1937, and
approved the sale of the $149,290 project for $110,000.50
The Tupelo Homesteaders did not wait until after the project
had been sold before they started voicing complaints.

When

the new board of directors put the questions of sale to a
vote, the homesteaders turned it down cold.

The Resettlement

Administration had not taken into consideration recent
changes in Tupelo real estate values.

In April, 1936, a

tornado had swept through the city killing 201 people,
injuring more than 1,000, and causing considerable property
damage.

As a result, building activity increased sharply

and peaked in early 1937.

By May, there were more rental

apartments and homes in Tupelo than before the tornado, and
the new buildings were superior to the ones lost.

The RA's

Land Utilization Division, with the assistance of local

49t . B. Fatherree to C. B. Baldwin, March 22, 1941,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
50Will W. Alexander, Memorandum for the Secretary of
Agriculture, April 15, 1937, R. G. 16, National Archives;
Alexander, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture,
October 2, 1937, ibid.? The Charter of Incorporation of
Tupelo Homestead Association, Dated May 17, 1937. A copy
is published in Tupelo Daily News, May 31, 1937, R. G. 96,
National Archives.
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citizens, reappraised the project and recommended that the
price be dropped to $95,557.50, making a net loss of
$53,732.50.

The board of directors favored the offer, but

the homesteaders still objected strongly.

After the regional

office reappraised the project a second time, the associa
tion finally agreed on October 1, 1938 to purchase the pro
ject for $73,182.00.
a stable future.

Tupelo could still not look forward to

Since a large number of the families were

Tennessee Valley Authority employees, not Tupelo natives,
C 1

they were not interested in purchasing their homes.
In Region Six, the Farm Security Administration started
its liquidation program with the Mississippi subsistence
homesteads.

For practical purposes, McComb had been in a

state of liquidation ever since the project had been opened
for sale to homesteaders in 1938.

On October 31, 1940,

according to a memorandum of understanding between the
Secretary of the Interior, the National Park Service took
over the Tupelo project and made it part of its Natchez
Trace Parkway system.^

in December, 1941, both Hattiesburg

and Meridian homestead associations transferred all assets,

^ M a s t i n q . White to Brooks Hays, September 21, 1938,
R. G. 207, National Archives; Hays to White, September 29,
1938, ibid.; Report of Examination, Tupelo Homestead Associa
tion, For the Period November 15, 1934 to October 10, 1940,
R. G. 96, National Archives; Deed of Trust Note, dated
October 1, 1938, ibid.
52Frank W. Hancock to John E. Rankin, December 4,
1944, ibid.; John 0. Walker to T. Roy Reid, October 5, 1940,
ibid.
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real and personal property, to the united States Government,
and then voluntarily dissolved.53

Bureau of Plant

Industry had already taken over five units at Meridian for
its Horticulture Field Station there.^4

But now the Farm

Security Administration sold the remaining homes to indi
vidual purchasers, either current homesteaders or new fami
lies who filled the unoccupied units.

As World War II

stimulated employment, FSA officials found it less difficult
to obtain occupants than ever before, especially since they
were now offering these units at ridiculously low prices.
On October 1, 1942, Farm Security Administrator C. B.
Baldwin transferred to the Federal Public Housing Authority
all resettlement projects on which clients did not earn
their principal income from agriculture.^5

The Mississippi

subsistence homesteads came under this classification.
Alexander T. McCurdie opened an office for the Federal
Public Housing Authority in Hattiesburg and operated the
three remaining projects, McComb, Hattiesburg, and Meridian,
throughout World War II.

McCurdie, who had been one of the

Division of Subsistence Homesteads1 project managers in

B. Baldwin, Memorandum to the Secretary of Agri
culture, March 8, 1942, ibid.; D.-L. Hopkins to E. G. Benser,
July 20, 1943, ibid.
54john O. Walker to T. Roy Reid, July 3.0, 1940, ibid.
55Mason Barr, to A. D. Stewart, September 30, 1942,
ibid.
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Mississippi, functioned chiefly as a rent collector.

After

the end of the war, he handled the liquidation of the Missis
sippi projects.

Under the Federal Public Housing Authority,

occupants could receive quitclaim deeds to their homesteads
when they had paid twenty per cent of the purchase price of
their units, signing a note and mortgage as security for the
balance.5®

By June, 1946, McCurdie had sold all units on the

three projects and issued the homesteaders quitclaim deeds.
On June 28, he closed his Hattiesburg office.

57

That was the

end of government responsibility for managing the Missis
sippi subsistence homesteads.
With a minimum of prior experience, the Division of
Subsistence Homesteads launched a rather ambitious program
of industrial-type projects in Mississippi.

Like many of

the division's projects, the Mississippi subsistence home
steads possessed an amateurish quality? and in the long run,
they were among the most unsuccessful of all projects in
Region Six.

Mississippi officials located the projects on

rather poor soil, did not always insure sufficient employment
opportunities for occupants, and sometimes furnished rather
haphazard management.

Despite such mistakes, McComb, Tupelo,

Hattiesburg, and Meridian all blazed trails that the Resettle
ment Administration and the Farm Security Administration

56conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 231, 232.
^ O l i v e r C. Winston, Memorandum to John P. Broome,
May 1, 1946, R. G. 207, National Archives? A. T. McCurdie;
Memorandum to Arthur Taylor, June 5, 1946, ibid.

would profitably follow, if they avoided the pitfalls.

In

fact, T. Roy Reid's regional organization cut its teeth on
the Mississippi subsistence homesteads.

The Management

Division, for example, gained its first practical experience
in the management of resettlement projects when it took over
the subsistence homesteads program.

One of the family

selection unit's first assignments was to fill the vacancies
at McComb.

In addition, the regional office had its first

chance to experiment with cooperative associations in
Mississippi, and later it first confronted the problems of
liquidation on these projects.

If the Division of Sub

sistence Homesteads had not pointed out some of the hazards,
or if the Mississippi projects had not provided an oppor
tunity for "practice," perhaps the Resettlement Administra
tion would have made more mistakes than it did in launching,
developing, and operating its own resettlement program.

CHAPTER IV
DYESS COLONY:

A. FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF

ADMINISTRATION COMMUNITY
Soon after dark on January 14, 1936, the Southerner,
a Douglass twin-motor American Airlines plane, took off at
Memphis, Tennessee, for Little Rock.

John T. Shea, a pas

senger who had just left the plane, noticed that one of the
Southerner’s motors did not "sound right."

At 7:18, veteran

pilot Jerry Marshall, flying at 3,000 feet twenty-five miles
west of Memphis, reported scattered clouds at 4,500 feet and
a fifty-five degree temperature.
with the Southerner.

That was the last contact

Beyond Forrest City, the night fog was

already hanging over the eastern Arkansas swamps.

At about

7:20, two farmers near Goodwin saw the plane flying low over
the woods, with an engine popping and missing.

Helplessly,

they watched the plane disappear into the trees and fog,
heard a terrific crash, and then silence.

George Jones,

another farmer, walked to a nearby store and reported that
he had heard a deafening roar to the northeast.

The

Southerner crashed of unknown causes in four or five feet of
water in a swamp two miles from the Little Rock-Memphis
highway, killing all seventeen persons aboard.
94

At the time,

95
it was the worst tragedy in American aviation history.

Among

the dead was William R. Dyess, Works Progress Administrator
for Arkansas and founder of the largest.of all New Deal farm
colonies.
W. R. Dyess was six feet tall, slender, prematurely
gray, and, at the time of his death, forty-one years of age.^
Born in Hazelhurst, Mississippi, and educated at Mississippi
State College, he became a successful farmer and contractor
specializing in levees, railroad beds, and gravel roads.

He

first came to Arkansas in 1926 with a contract to improve
the levees on the Mississippi and White rivers.

In 1930,

Dyess bought a large Mississippi County plantation, in north
east Arkansas, and made Osceola his home.

Three years later,

he entered public service as head of the Mississippi County
Committee on local relief.

In August, 1933, Harry L.

Hopkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, appointed
Dyess FERA state director for Arkansas.

Governor J. Marion

Futrell had strongly backed Dyess for the job,^ perhaps as a
political pay-off for the latter's support during the 1932

■^•Arkansas Gazette
18, 1936.

(Little Rock) , January 15 through

^For brief biographies of Dyess, see Arkansas Gazette,
January 15, January 16, 1936; Osceola Times. January 17,
1936.
3j. m . Futrell to Harry L. Hopkins, June 20, 1933,
Record Group 69, Records of the Works Projects Administration,
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 69, National
Archives) ; Aubrey Williams to Harry L. Hopkins, August 9,
1933, ibid.
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gubernatorial campaign.

Even though he had no social work

experience of any kind, Dyess made a favorable impression on
Aubrey Williams, Hopkin's right-hand man.

"Dyess is a young

chap of thirty-eight," Williams wrote Hopkins,

"a big planter,

college man, and does not have any employment . . . which I
figure should make for [financial] i n d e p e n d e n c e . i n
November, 1933, he became Civil Works Administrator; when
the FERA was revived in April, 1934, he. returned as Emergency
Relief Administrator.

From July, 1935, until his death, he

was WPA director for Arkansas.®
After his appointment as Emergency Relief Administra
tor, Dyess wasted no time in setting up a state relief
organization.

He named Floyd Sharp as Director of opera

tions and executive secretary.

Sharp was thirty-seven years

old, a University of Arkansas Law School graduate, and a
member of the state Committee on Unemployment.®

(As the

number-two man in the Federal relief organization, he took
Dyess' place as administrator in 1936.)

U n d e r Dyess, the

Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration consisted of two
assistant directors of operations, two assistant comptrollers,

^Aubrey Williams to Harry [L. Hopkins], August 6,
1936. ibid.
5J. M. Futrell to Harry L. Hopkins, September 23,
1933. ibid.; Arkansas Gazette, January 15, 1936.
®Field Men, State Emergency Relief Commission, Arkan
sas, n.d., R. G. 69, National Archives? Fay Williams,
Arkansas of the Years (4 vols.? Little Rock, 1951-1954), II,
368-83.
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social service field representative, and seven divisions:
works, rural rehabilitation, auditor, commodities, research
and statistics, transients, and education.

Dyess' job was to

channel Federal relief funds into the hands of needy Arkan
sans.

The Emergency Relief Administration and its successor

agencies stressed work relief in preference to the "dole."
Thus Arkansas relief workers built roads, streets, airports,
water plants, schools, sewers, hospitals, public buildings,
recreational facilities, canning plants, utility systems,
libraries, levees, light plants, and other such projects.7
Since Arkansas was an agricultural state, one of
Dyess' most important tasks was rural rehabilitation.
Following the lead of most FERA state directors, Dyess
placed all rural relief work under a state rural rehabilita
tion corporation.

A Delaware corporation formed on May 30,

1934, the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation was a
device to handle certain legal and financial problems.
Using Federal funds, the Arkansas RR Corporation loaned money
to relief clients, purchased land for rehabilitation pur
poses, and established a revolving trust fund to insure the
corporation's existence after the FERA was abolished.
Unlike later cooperative associations set up under the

7See Arkansas Emergency Relief Administration, A
Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas. April 1st.
1934. to July 1st. 1935 (Little Rock, 1935); Arkansas
Emergency Relief Administration, Traveling Recovery Ro a d :
The Story of Relief. Work-relief. and Rehabilitation in
Arkansas. August 3 0 . 1932 to November 15. 1936 (Little Rock,
1936).

Resettlement Administration, the Arkansas Rural Rehabilita
tion Corporation limited its membership to a small circle of
stockholders.

No rehabilitation client was eligible to

purchase stock in the corporation.8
Dyess relied on the Rural Rehabilitation Division to
administer the actual rural rehabilitation programs.

In

late 1933, Dyess recruited E. B. Whitaker from the Extension
Service and made him head of rural relief in Arkansas.
During the next eighteen months, Whitaker developed the same
kind of program that he would later operate for the Resettle
ment Administration and Farm Security Administration.

In

1934, according to ERA estimates, there were over 30,000 farm
families in Arkansas eligible for rural rehabilitation.
included a wide variety of groups:

They

landowners who had lost

all of their equity in their farms, former landowners and
share tenants who were unable to get credit to make a crop,
sharecroppers who had been displaced from the land, and even
mill workers and coal miners who had rural backgrounds and
wanted to get back to the farm.

The ultimate aim for all

rural rehabilitation clients was independent land ownership.
Whitaker rehabilitated some clients where they were, if the

8M. J. Miller to Aubrey Williams, November 10, 1934,
R. G. 69, National Archives? Audit Report on Arkansas Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation, May 28, 1934 to June 30, 1935,
i b i d .? Miller Memorandum to Williams, October 1, 1934, Record
Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home Administration,
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 96,
National Archives) ? see Blvtheville Courier N e w s , October 16,
1934? Osceola Times, May 25, 1934.
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land they owned or rented was good enough.

In the case of

families stranded in submarginal areas, he resettled them on
better land.

The rehabilitation division repaired the home

steads or erected low-cost houses, mapped out a farm and
home management plan for each rehabilitation client, and
loaned him the necessary capital for equipment, workstock,
and subsistence.

Thus the Emergency Relief Administration

stressed long-term rehabilitation rather than merely immedi
ate relief.9
A planter and humanitarian, W. R. Dyess was especially
interested in rural relief.

As the depression wore on, he

apparently reacted as did many Americans:
went, had to get "back to the land."

people, the saying

Dyess wanted to

develop a farm colony, a complete community, for relief
clients.

"He conceived the idea of building an agricultural

community,” wrote assistant ERA director of operations H. C.
Baker after Dyess1 death.

"A colony of five hundred homes—

homes which were to be modern, liveable homes with electricity,
running water, private sewage systems and other advantages
usually associated only with urban communities, and which
would raise the standard for farm homes to a high level.

He

conceived in his plan a hospital, schools, churches, in fact
a new order of things for those who through no fault of their

9
'Plan of Work for Rural Rehabilitation in Arkansas,
1935, Mimeographed, R. G. 69, National Archives.

own found it almost impossible to make their way.

it was

hafdly an original idea, either in American agricultural
history or in the early New Deal.

The Division of Subsis

tence Homesteads had already launched its community program
for part-time industrial workers.

In 1932, Lawrence West

brook had built a Prench-style farm community near Houston,
Texas; and, as assistant Federal Emergency Relief Adminis
trator, he favored more such projects.

What made Dyess

successful was that he possessed executive ability and
experience in both construction and agriculture.

More

important, he had the ability to sell his ideas to Federal
authorities.

In early 1934, Dyess personally submitted his

plan to Harry Hopkins.
Baker,

According to ERA assistant director

"Mr. Hopkins listened attentively.”

More likely,

Westbrook was the one who did the listening and urged
approval.

At any rate, Hopkins did agree to Dyess' plans

and released federal funds for the project.

That was the

beginning of Dyess C o l o n y . H
(

Dyess had already picked out a location for his colony.
He hoped to acquire a total of about 20,000 acres in separate
but adjacent tracts from the Creamery Package Company,
Drainage District Number Nine, and Lee Wilson and Company;
but he was only partially successful.^

•^Traveling Recovery Road. 153.

in early 1934, the

-^ I b i d .

•^Blythevilie Courier News, May 19, 1934.

Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation purchased 15,144
acres of unimproved cutover timber land ten miles from
Wilson, Arkansas, and about twenty miles from Osceola, D y e s s 1
home town.

Geographically, the tract lay in Township 11 and

12 North, Range 8 and 9 East, with the Tyronza River cutting
through it from northeast to southwest.

A lumber company

had previously owned part of the land, cut the best timber,
and when the Depression hit forfeited it for taxes.

Dyess

was able to purchase it for an average of $2.50 per acre.
Payment of state taxes, redemptions, and purchase of state
title raised the average cost per acre up to about eight
dollars.

Even during the Depression, improved land of

comparable quality brought sixty to one hundred dollars per
acre.

Contemporary newspaper reports said only that Dyess

had bought about 16,000 acres at an average of $2.50 per
acre without specifying the total amount paid or the total
acreage.

In 1936, however, Russell Brown and Company, Certi

fied Public Accountants of Little Rock, audited the colony's
books and reported the total cost of land to have been
$136,994.48.13
The selection of this particular land, wrote H. C.
Baker, was a demonstration of "rare judgment."

He doubted

l^Ibid.; Osceola Times. May 25, 1934; Traveling Re
covery Road. 153, 154; A Review of Work Relief Activities in
Arkansas. 130; Dyess Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment
with a New Kind of Rural Community, dated, May 7, 1941, R.G.
96, National Archives; Audit Report, Dyess Colony, Incor
porated, Dyess Arkansas, February 29, 1936, ibid.
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that "anywhere in America could land of greater potential
possibilities have been

chosen.

"14

Until about 1900, much

of the northeast Arkansas Delta, including Mississippi
County and the Dyess Colony land, was largely swampland and
dense, almost tropical, forest.

By 1920, army engineers had

built levees and drained the swamps, while lumbermen had
removed most of the virgin timber:

white, black, and red

oak, ash, elm, maple, gum of several varieties, cottonwood,
and cypress.

What they revealed was a fabulously rich agri

cultural region.

The Mississippi River had spent centuries

building up the alluvial soil, a black loam running from
forty to several hundred feet deep.
tically unknown.

Fertilizer was prac

The climate, too, was perfect for agricul

ture, with a growing season of seven and a half months free
from frost.

After large planters moved in, Mississippi

County gained a reputation for growing more cotton than any
other county in the nation.

In 1930, cotton was not only

the dominant crop; it was virtually the only crop.

Ninety

per cent of the farmers of the county depended almost solely
on cotton for their income.

But nine out of ten farmers were

either tenants or sharecroppers.

They needed land to farm

and credit to finance their farming operations; the

1%[. C. Baker,
Road, 153.

"Dyess Colony,” in Traveling Recovery
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Depression made both difficult to get.-^
In May, 1934, Dyess launched "colonization Project
No. 1," the colony's original designation.

Construction

crews literally had to hack and chop the colony out of a
veritable jungle.
Baker recalled,
place.

After the virgin timberhhad been removed,

"dense impenetrable underbrush had taken its

Trees left at the time of the original cutting had

grown to enormous size, and the whole area was almost in a
wilderness.

0 .

G. Norment, construction supervisor, was

a member of the first crew that invaded this wilderness.
With a truck, tractor, and other equipment, he and his men
entered the project through a winding trail that reminded
him of an Indian path.

"I shall never forget what a

seeming[ly] unsurmountable [sic] task we had before us the
first morning I arrived . . . ," he wrote later.

"Practie

cally the entire acreage consisted of cut-over hardwood
timber land.

...

There were a few cleared spots where old

logging camps had been established, most of these grown up,
however, into a mass of bushes and small saplings.

. .

■^A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas,
120922; Dyess-Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment with a
New Kind of Rural Community, dated May 7, 1941, R. G. 96,
National Archives; Mabel F. Edrington, History of Mississippi
County. Arkansas (Ocala, Florida, 1962), 75-87, 91, 92, 378,
382.
•^Traveling Recovery Road, 154.
17(5. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell, January 15, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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A few squatters lived in small log or box shacks on small
patches of cleared land.

Otherwise, the colony land was

uninhabited, inhospitable, and forbidding.
Cone Murphy was the over-all construction supervisor.
After gathering 115 logging mules, wagons, and equipment at
the northeast corner of the project, he put several hundred
unskilled men to work felling trees, while a force of
skilled laborers set up two or three saw mills.

To hold

costs down, Dyess' plan called for using lumber cut and
sawed on the colony's own land for as much construction work
as possible.

In a few weeks, Murphy had seven saw mills in

operation, one a large steam-powered mill, the others
gasoline-powered including two portable mills.

Their com

bined daily capacity was about 65,000 feet of lumber.
By June 15, Murphy's men had completed the first
buildings on the project, a temporary headquarters complex
including administrative building, barracks, kitchen, and
mess halls.

The barracks consisted of four screened and

electrically lighted bunk houses with accommodations for
about 400 men.

Before their living quarters were finished,

workmen came from Osceola by truck every day; afterward,
almost t;he entire labor force lived a kind of camp life on

IQlbid.; Report of Roland R. Pyne, Regional Engineer,
Period Ending November 10, 1934, Harry L. Hopkins Papers,
Box 79, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York
(to be cited hereafter as Hopkins Papers, FDRL); A Review of
Work Relief Activities in Arkansas, 132.
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the project itself.

Each man slept on an iron cot, cotton

mattress, feather pillow, with clean sheets and blankets.
The kitchen served three mess halls, two for white workers
and one for Negro.

The workmen were housed and fed for about

seventy-five cents a day, which was deducted from their wages.
By mid-summer, the temporary headquarters consisted of more
bunk houses, barns, stables, blacksmith shop, supply depot,
general office building, payroll building, first-aid build
ing, dynamite building (more than a mile away), two shower
bath houses, and various store houses.

19

From July to September, 1934, Murphy consistently had
1,400 workers under his supervision.2®
off relief rolls.

Most of them came

Dyess obtained common labor through the

Mississippi County office of the National Reemployment
Service and skilled labor from the state office.

Using the

National Recovery Administration's wage scale for timber and
mill workers, he paid skilled labor three to five dollars a
day and unskilled labor slightly less, both roughly the

•*-90. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell, January 15, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives; A Review of Work Relief Activi
ties, in Arkansas. 132, 136; Osceola Times, June 22, 1934;
Arkansas Gazette, June 17, 1934.
2®Report of Roland R. Pyne, Regional Engineer, Period
Ending November 10, 1934, Hopkins Papers, Box 79, FDRL; O. G.
Norment to R. G. Tugwell, January 15, 1936, R. G. 96,
National Archives; A Review of Work Relief Activities in
Arkansas, 138.

prevailing rates for northeast Arkansas.21

But when Blythe-

ville labor union leaders protested in early July, Nels
Anderson of the American Federation of Labor and George D.
Babcock, United States District Engineer, investigated the
colony's labor practices.

As a result, they recommended a

higher wage scale for all workers.

On July 7, the National

Reemployment Service ordered Dyess to begin paying common
labor thirty cents an hour and skilled carpenters from
seventy-five cents to a dollar an hour, while shortening the
work-week to thirty-six hours.

Dyess argued that this

change would interfere with his desire to keep the invest
ment as low as possible for families who would occupy the
farm units.

The higher wage scale both increased expenses

and momentarily slowed up construction, with unexpected
results.

Since the men could work only six hours a day,

they now had lots of leisure time on their hands.

After

several fights broke out at the colony, officials organized
boxing matches in order to let the men work off excess
energy and to accommodate those wanting to fight somebody.
Boxing became a regular Saturday afternoon diversion and
almost the only available form of recreation.

Soon, colony

officials furnished material for building two boxing rings,
and matches were held at night as well.22

21John H. Caufield to Lawrence Westbrook, July 7, 1934,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
22A review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
122, 132, 136.
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With preliminary construction out of the way, Murphy
began building the farmsteads on July 13.

On these sample

farmsteads, he personally supervised a crew of twenty-five
carpenters, and then put each one in charge of their own
crews for erecting the rest of the farmsteads.

Little Rock

architect Howard Eichenbaum designed the basic plans for
three-, four-, and five-room type houses.

Like the first

farmsteads, all cottages at Dyess were frame structures,
simple, convenient (indoor toilets), and modern
lights).

(electric

The three-room house, with one bedroom, living

room, and kitchen, would accommodate a family of three or
four members.

The four-room house, for a family of five or

six, had two bedrooms, while the five-room house provided
three bedrooms for families over six.

Although Murphy's

carpenters followed one basic plan for each type of house,
they varied the location of rooms,, porches, doors, and
windows enough to avoid monotony.

The houses were painted

white, with green, dark red, or brown trimming.

Workers

cleared about two acres of land immediately around each
house and barn, but the colonists themselves had to clear
the rest of the land,

colony officials furnished the sample

houses in order to determine the cost

($195.00 for three

bedrooms, living room, and kitchen) and made them into
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temporary sleeping quarters for some of the workers .

33

According to D y e s s 1 original plan, there would be 500
three-, four-, and five-room cottages located on farm units
of thirty, forty, and fifty acres, respectively.

The colo

nists would purchase them at cost with payments amortized
over a ten-year period.

He estimated that the house and

barn together would average $600, $800, and $ 1 ,0
on size.
the first

0 0

, depending

But in late August, Dyess revised the colony plan,
of many changes.

Now he intended to build 750

cottages, while limiting all farm units to tzwenty acres
e a c h . D u r i n g the summer and fall, Murphy's work crews
regularly completed ten to fifteen houses each week.

On

October 15, Murphy had 101 houses either finished or under
construction.

By the end of 1934, there were 146 farm cot

tages ready for occupancy; seven months later, the number
had risen to 277 completed and sixteen under construction.
In January, 1936, Dyess Colony contained 490 completed farm
homes .

33

Since the colony was mostly wilderness, one of
Murphy's earliest tasks was to build roads and bridges and

23ibid.. 1 3 2 , 136, 138; "Rural Industrial Community
Projects: Woodlake, Texas, Osceola,.Arkansas, and Red House,
West Virginia," Architectural Record, LXXVII (January, 1935),
13.
24a Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas. .
122-24.
Ibid.. 140, 143, 145; 0. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell,
January 15, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
25

dig drainage ditches.

As soon as the saw mills began buzz

ing, three draglines, two caterpillar tractors, and a pile
driver went to work on both new roads and old county roads.
Radiating out in all directions from the temporary head
quarters, road crews cleared right-of-ways, graded roads,
and spread gravel.

When completed, the colony's road system

followed the section, half section, and sometimes quarter
section lines, forming a grill-like pattern.

In all, Murphy

completed about thirty-five miles of gravel roads, built
twenty-four main bridges and numerous small bridges, and dug
some ninety miles of drainage ditches.

What made the task

of road building easier was the fact that no one lived on
the land the roads were traversing.

The road builders, wrote

Norment with obvious satisfaction, did not have "to consider
what this property owner or that influential citizen had to
say about it, or institute an condemnation proceeding or
experience any useless d e l a y . L i k e
project also needed a railroad.

any small town, the

The St. Louis and San

Francisco Railroad agreed to run a train to the colony, pro
vided the colony would construct about five miles of track
from the spur southeast of Wilson, Arkansas.

The colony

sawmills provided 24,600 oak cross ties for this five miles,
several sets of switch ties, and additional cross ties for a
half mile of switch track that served the warehouse and

26Ibid.
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cotton gin.

On November 15, the Frisco Railroad began

running one train to the colony and back to Wilson each
day .^
Near the heart of the project, Dyess set aside about
150 acres for the community center.

When he first began

laying plans for an agricultural colony, he knew that lowincome families would be unable to provide for themselves
normal community needs like education, medical care, and
recreation.

With Eichenbaum's help, Dyess created not

merely a community center but a veritable small town business
district.

In early September, Murphy assigned a crew of men

the task of clearing the community center grounds and staking
out the building sites for administration building group,
while other men laid out the streets and boulevards.

In

October, construction crews stafcted work on the administra
tion buildings, including the administration building proper,
commissary, cafe, and various stores.

In November, work

began on the hospital and school buildings.

As the year

ended, Murphy sharply cut back work on farmsteads and con
centrated on the community center.

By January 31, 1935, the

administration was ninety-five per cent complete, with com
missary, hospital, cafe, and store buildings not far behind.
In early May, the administrative staff moved their offices
from the temporary headquarters to the new administration

27a Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas,
132, 143.

Ill
building.28
The Social Service Division of the Arkansas Emergency
Relief Administration supervised the selection of colonists.
"The choice of Colony families is made on a very rigid selec
tive basis," wrote Mrs. Dot Kennan, Division director.29
Realizing how crucial family selection was, she was looking
for people with leadership qualities, stability, and resource
fulness, people who would help make Dyess Colony a successful
community of self-governing individuals.

Mrs. Kennan's

staff gave first consideration to former ERA rehabilitation
clients, especially those who had lost their homes and farm
equipment during the Depression.

To qualify, applicants had

to have farming experience, submit references from leading
citizens in their home communities, and prove their good
health by passing a physical examination.20
After a year of experience, the Social Service staff
tightened their selection criteria.

They began requiring a

physical examination of each member of the family, not just
the family head, with a Wassermann test on parents and grown
Children.

28

They stressed the selection of people with skills,

Ibid., 127, 128, 140.

29The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for
Dyess Colony Project— Mississippi County, Arkansas, n.d.,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
20John B. Holt, An Analysis of Methods and Criteria
Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects. Social
Research Report No. 1 of the U. S. Department of Agriculture>
Farm Security Administration, and the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics (Washington, 1937), 45-50.
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in addition to farming experience, that could be utilized at
the colony.

More important, they checked closely the atti

tudes of applicants toward colonization, farm ownership, and
the contribution they could make to the colony.

Did they

want to plant deep roots in a farm, or was colonization
simply a "way out" until something better opened up?

The

Social Service staff also paid more attention to religious
affiliation:

"experience has shown that emotional insta

bility iexperienced in excessive religious fervor of certain
religious sects was a disturbing element, and was inter
fering with work at the colony."

Since a few families had

come to the colony with a mistaken impression of requirements
or conditions or had otherwise proved unsuited to the pro
ject, the Social Service Division began arranging for pros
pective colonists to visit the colony with their county
administrator in order to make sure they thoroughly under
stood what they would be getting into.3-*The Emergency Relief Administration established a
definite procedure for locating and approving qualified
families.

At the request of the Social Service Division,

each ERA county caseworker and rural supervisor recommended
"one or two eligible families whom they considered most
likely to succeed in the colonization program."

If

31Sociai Service Division, Report on Colonization
Project No. 1, dated March 25, 1935, R. G. 96, National
Archives; A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
123, 127.
>
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interested, the families filled out appropriate applicant
forms.

The county administrator and his staff verified the

information given, studied the records of these families, and
made recommendations to the state ERA office, specificing
first and second choice.

A committee made up of Mrs. Kennan

and W. A. Rooksberry of the Social Service Division, Mrs.
Hilda K. Cornish, director of Women's Work, and E. B. Whit
aker, director of rural rehabilitation, went over.each
application and made the final selections.

When notified,

the county administrator gave approved clients a "twenty-four
hour preparatory notice" for removal to the colony on a
given date, with ERA providing transportation .

22

On October 25, 1934, the first colonists arrived at
Dyess Colony, thirteen families from thirteen different
counties.

One of these families was W. H.

("Harve") Smith,

his wife and five children, from Bassett, Arkansas, seven
miles away.

A cash tenant who rented land outright, Harve

Smith had been a cotton farmer all his life.
Depression left him destitute.

Then the

With cotton hovering around

six cents a pound, he could no longer pay rent for land, nor
could he find a place as a sharecropper.

Forced on relief,

he and his family struggled through the winter of 1933-1934.

22The Procedure Followed in Selecting Applicants for
Dyess Colonization Project No. 1— Mississippi County,......
Arkansas, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives; Holt, An Analy
sis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for
Colonization Projects, 46, 48, 49.

In early May, 1934, he became a rural rehabilitation client
and quickly demonstrated that his plight was due not to his
own incompetence but to circumstances beyond his control.
He grew enough produce for his family, paid back his relief
loan, and had enough left to buy a mule from the ERA..

When

he arrived at Dyess Colony, he brought with him his own cow
and calf, 105 chickens, enough forage to carry his stock
through the coming winter, and enough canned food to feed
his family.

Before moving, the Smiths lived in a leaky

three-room cabin; when it rained, they had to move all the
furniture out of one room.

At Dyess, Smith moved his family

into a new five-room home, still smelling of fresh paint,
located on a thirty-acre tract.

He spent the winter clears

ing the land and working part-time for the colony itself.
In the spring of 1935, he had his unit ready for cultivation
If he stuck to it, one day he could own both the house and
the land .

33

FERA officials began finding fault with family selec
tion at Dyess as early as November, 1934.

"Dyess Colony is

troubling everyone," wrote regional social worker Loula Dunn
Until recently, she said, the colony had no qualified social
worker, and the basis of family selection was still

33

123, 126.

A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
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puzzling.34

jn

1935

t there were further complaints that the

pace of family selection consistently ran behind farmstead
construction; available houses at the colony were not being
filled fast e n o u g h . ^

After the first thirteen families

came in October, 1934, ten families arrived in November,
eighteen in December, and four in January, bringing the total
to forty-five families.

As a result, a large number of

houses stood empty during the crop year of 1935 when they
1

might have been used.

By November, the Emergency Relief

Administration had selected a total of 161 families, thirtyeight of whom returned home after a short stay, leaving 133
or

families then living on the colony.

In contrast, there

were over 300 cottages completed and ready for occupancy.
In November, 1935, the Resettlement Administration
took over family selection for Dyess Colony.

The Little

Rock regional office had developed an efficient staff of
family selection specialists— a staff that could possibly
provide the guidance needed at Dyess.

A senior selection

specialist took up residence at the colony itself, while a

S^Loula Dunn, Memorandum to Josephine C. Brown,
December 3, 1934, R. G. 69, National Archives; Dunn to W. R.
Dyess, November 30, 1934, ibid.
•^social Service Division, Report on Colonization
Project No. 1, dated March 25, 1935, R. G. 96, National
Archives; Loula Dunn to Malcolm J. Miller, March 20, 1935,
R. G. 69, National Archives.
36pinal Report on Selection Program, Dyess Colony,
May114, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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five-man staff worked in the field visiting and interviewing
rural rehabilitation clients.

The Resettlement Administra

tion approved only two families for Dyess in December, but
thirteen in January, sixty-four in February, 128 in March,
120 in April, and twenty-two by mid-May.

In six or seven

months, the RA had assigned 349 families to Dyess, filling
all but eighteen of the farmsteads at the colony, and these
q7
were filled soon afterward. '
As families arrived, colony officials assigned them
to farm units according to the number of family members.

A

husband and wife with one or two children received a twentyacre tract.

Larger families had more manpower available, so

they settled on thirty-acre tracts.

Exceptionally large

families, perhaps around ten members, took the forty-acre
units.

In effect, most newly arrived families went on

temporary relief.

Since most arrived without adequate house

hold equipment, the Emergency Relief Administration immedi
ately supplied them with beds, mattresses, and stoves,
expecting these to be paid for later.

To get them on their

feet, relief officials also took care of anything they could
not provide for themselvess

food, clothing, tools, house

hold necessities, medical attention.

In return, the head of

•^Management Division, News Letter, July 1, 1935 to
January 1, 1936, Region VI. ibid.; Charles L. Gaines, Jr., to
Mrs. Katherine A. Kellock, November 13, 1935, ibid.? Final
Report on Selection Program, Dyess Colony, March 14, 1936,.
ibid.? T. Roy Reid to R. G. Tugwell, December 9, 1935, ibid.
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each family worked a certain number of days on colony con
struction, usually as unskilled labor.3®
The social service supervisor and the rural super
visor helped the colonists establish homes and farms at
Dyess.

Appointed October 26, 1934, one day after the first

families arrived, Mrs. Ed L. Salyers supervised home demon
stration work .

39

Stressing self-sufficiency, she worked with

the wives in preparing household budgets and gave instruc
tion in canning, sewing, and other homemaking arts.

To aid

families with home furnishings, she converted one of the
farm cottages into a home demonstration house, using furni
ture that carpenters could easily copy at the colony work
shop with lumber cut on the colony land.

Starting November

26, Jake Terry, rural supervisor, helped family heads plan
the best use for their land.4®

He advised farmers through

weekly group meetings, individual visits to their tracts,
and published bulletins.

Based on the Extension Service

program of diversified farming, Terry's farm management pro
gram emphasized four basic principles:

food for the family,

3®A Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
126, 127.
3 ^Traveling- Recovery Road, 157 ? A Review of Work
Relief Activities in Arkansas. 147 ? Osceola Times. February
15, 1935.
40a Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
126, 146, 147? Connie J. Bonslagel to Colonel Lawrence West
brook, November 12, 1934, R. G. 96, National Archives;
Arkansas Gazette, JMav 12, 1935.

118
feed for livestock, cash income, and soil income and soil
improvement.

Thus colonists planted not only cotton, but

corn, truck gardens, hay crops, and pastures.

In addition,

each farmer had a flock of chickens, a sow, at least one
milch cow, and a mule for plowing.

As rural supervisor,

Terry sought to build a community of farmers who were both
self-reliant and ready to act as a group when this would
give them an advantage.^
After two years of construction, the Emergency Relief
Administration halted work on community facilities and farm
steads at Dyess Colony in the early summer of 1936.
then, Dyess was a community of about 3,000 people.

By
At the

center of the project, the community center had grown into a
small city, with city blocks, paved streets and sidewalks,
stores, official buildings, and residential sections.

The

main administration building, a two-story brick veneer
structure, with smaller brick veneer buildings on either
side, formed a semicircle around a memorial plaque to the
colony's founder.

The building to the right contained a

community department or general store, the left one a cafe,
barber shop, and post office

(with rural free delivery).

Two

blocks away stood a combination grade school and high school,
while three other grade schools were located in other sec
tions of the project.

Nearby, a wood-working and furniture

41a Review of Work Relief Activities in Arkansas.
146, 147.
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factory, canning plant, saw mills, machine shops, cotton gin,
and grist mill provided employment for a few colonists and
vital services for all.

In addition, community facilities

included a filling station, railroad depot, canning plant,
ice house, laundry, garage, barn, and four warehouses; later
there would be a print shop and credit union.
field and grandstand faced the Tryronza River.

A baseball
Across the

street were a swimming pool, bath houses, tennis courts, and
not far away, a city park.

The community hall, a T-shaped

building, held a library and movie theatre-auditorium, plus
space for a variety of indoor entertainment.

Besides the

community buildings, there were about forty private resi
dences for the families of administration

personnel.

42

Completely surrounding the community center, the
colony land stretched out in every direction.

When con

struction ended, Dyess colony consisted of 500 farmsteads of
varying sizes:

sixty-one three-room, 233 four-room, and 206

five-room houses.

Similarly, the land had been broken up

into 500 farm units:

334 farms of twenty acres, sixty-four

of thirty acres, and 102 of forty acres.

By spring planting

time in 1936, colonists had cleared only about 4,875 acres.
In all, the Emergency Relief Administration had invested
$3,645,193.00 in Dyess Colony— a total that included

42ibid., 128, 129; 0. G. Norment to R. G. Tugwell,
January 15, 1936; R. G. 96, National Archives; Final Report
onoEfelection Program, Dyess Colony, March 14, 1936, ibid.;
Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1938.
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everything from land and all construction'to direct relief
for individual colonists.
At the start of 1936, Dyess Colony had several serious
deficiencies for a project almost two years old.

Except for

construction supervisor Cone Murphy, no one administrative
officer had ever been in charge of the entire project.
Instead, W. R. Dyess relied on a half dozen people— Murphy,
E. B. Whitaker, Jake Terry, Mrs. Ed Salyers, Howard Eichenbaum, and Dr. L. L. Huebner, colony physician— with each
person responsible only for the specific tasks assigned to
him, nothing more.

Until his death on January 14, Dyess

himself seems to have provided the only overall direction
the colony had.

Perhaps more serious, Dyess Colony still

had no organizational structure.

The Arkansas Rural Reha

bilitation Corporation had launched Colinization Project
Number One and still held title to the project property; but
Dyess was only part of its total program of rural rehabilita
tion, and indeed was only one of the community projects it
undertook.

What Dyess Colony needed was its own organiza

tion, one that would allow the colony to achieve maturity as
an independent and self-sufficient community.
important matter been definitely worked out.

Nor had another
The colonists

did not know what obligations they had incurred by moving to

^3Audit Report, Dyess Colony, Incorporated, Dyess,
Arkansas, February 29, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives;
Traveling Recovery Road. 154, 155.
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Dyess; they had no idea how much their farmsteads would cost
or how long they would have to pay it off.

All they had was

faith in the good will of the government.^4
After Dyess' death, the new Works Progress Adminis
tration for Arkansas, Ployd Sharp, could no longer postpone
these problems as his predecessor had done.

The Resettlement

Administration already had plans for absorbing the Arkansas
Rural Rehabilitation Corporation within a few weeks.

Sharp

had to take immediate action if Dyess Colony was not to be
absorbed along with it.^5

At a special meeting on February

17, 1936, the board of directors of the Arkansas Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation formed a new organization, Dyess
Colony, Incorporated, to take over the management of the
Colony and carry W. R. Dyess' plans to conclusion.

Floyd

Sharp, Henry B. Baker, and R. C. Limerick comprised both the
board of directors and the stockholders of the new corpora
tion, each holding one share of no par value stock.

They

^ R e p o r t of Roland ER Pyne, Regional Engineer, Period
Ending November 10, 1934, Hopkins Papers, Box 79, FDRL.
45see Rexford G. Tugwell to Harry L. Hopkins, n.d.,
R. G. 69, National Archives; Carl C. Taylor to Hopkins,
September 18, 1935, ibid.; W. R. Dyess to Colonel Lawrence
Westbrook, November 11, 1935, ibid.; Dyess to Westbrook,
July 22, 1935, ibid.; Dyess to Westbrook, July 17, 1935,
ibid.; Dyess to Taylor (telegram), July 6 , 1935, ibid,; T.
Roy Reid to Taylor, November 19, 1935, R. G. 96, National
Archives; Reid to Taylor, July 11, 1935, ibid. Three FERA
communities were not turned over to the Resettlement Admin
istration in 1935s Pine Mountain Valley, near Columbus, .
Georgia; Cherry Lake Farms, near Madison, Florida; and
Dyess Colony. Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New Worlds The
New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N.-Y., 1959), 137.

pledged their stock to the WPA national director, Harry
Hopkins, who held it "in trust against the faithful perform
ance of duties on the part of the Board of Directors .

”48

Since all three were also stockholders in the Arkansas RR
Corporation, the meeting turned into a joint conference of
officers of both corporations.

The Arkansas Rural Reha

bilitation Corporation sold for one dollar all real and
personal property of Colonization Project Number One to Dyess
Colony, Inc.4 ^

Then they discussed plans for the formation

of a subsidiary corporation to manage the colony and com
munity facilities and sell stock to the colony residents.
"Under this plan," Sharp explained,

"the residents of the

colony will eventually own the land they are n o w purchasing
and in addition will own the corporation that operates the
community center . "

48

At last, Dyess Colony had not only the

kind of organization it needed for permanence, but a new
name as well.

The term "Dyess colony" had been used almost

from the start, but it did not become the official designa
tion of the colony until after Dyess 1 death and the creation

Arkansas Gazette. February 18, 1936? Osceola Times,
February 21, 1936; Extract of Minutes, Arkansas Rural Reha
bilitation Corporation, dated February 17, 1936, R. G. 96,
National Archives. See Floyd Sharp, Memorandum to All Resi
dents of the Dyess Colony, February 10, 1936, ibid.
47Raymond 0. Denham to Rexford G. Tugwell, July 15,
1936, ibid.
48Arkansas Gazette. February 18, 1936.

123
of Dyess Colony, I n c . ^
Less than a week after the creation of Dyess Colony,
Inc., Sharp gave E. S. Dudley a leave of absence from his
job as state director of the WPA's Division of Employment
and appointed him colony administrator.5®
one unsolved problems

That left only

the terms on which colonists could

get possession of their homes and farms.

Again, colony

authorities had to reach a decision soon.

Cone Murphy, who

had stayed on as superintendent of construction, would have
the last of 500 farmsteads ready in June or July.5-1- The
Resettlement Administration planned to be through with
family selection by early June, and about 350 new families
would want to know exactly where they stood in regard to
future ownership.

More important, a new crop year had

virtually arrived, and Dyess Colony could be successful only
if full use were made of its land and facilities.

Within a

few weeks, Sharp, Baker, and Limerick, with the help of the
colony's special council, Lawrence Westbrook, worked out
what they considered to be a fair and equitable plan for home
ownership.

Perhaps to impress the colonists with the impor

tance of this step, Westbrook visited Dyess and personally
explained the details of the purchase plan.

...... 4®Blvtheville Courier N e w s , May 23, 1934; Daily
Graphic (Pine Bluff), January 18, 1936.
5®Arkansas Gazette. February 22, 1936.
51

Ibid.
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Everyone would have a chance to own his own farm,
Westbrook assured the colonists in a speech in early August
of 1936.

Until then, they had been merely "licensees”

renting their land.

But, Westbrook explained, Dyess Colony,

I n c ., would have each tract of land and its improvements
appraised.

The appraisers would consider the earning power

of the property— not only its value as a home but the ability
of the land and improvements to produce a living— the tax
rate, replacement value, and market price.

Then the Dyess

corporation would offer to sell each family the house and
land they occupied at the appraised value, less ten per cent.
"We are," Westbrook explained,

"making this deduction to the

family living there not as any special mark of favor, but
<

because we think it would cost about that much to get some
one else established there."

Finally, Westbrook said, the

corporation Dyess Colony, Inc., and each purchaser would
enter into a sales contract, with the selling price amortized
over a thirty-year period at six per cent annual interest.
The colonists could make monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual
payments as they wished; and at its discretion, the corpora
tion could defer all or any part of a payment and extend the
loan in emergency s i t u a t i o n s . N o one would be permitted to
re-sell their farm except to the colony corporation.

All of

this was in the future for most colonists, however, since
each family had to serve a two-year probationary period
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before becoming eligible for a purchase contract.
From 1936 to 1940, Dyess Colony, Inc., operated the
project under W P A direction.

The colony became perhaps the

most highly organized community project of Region Six;
because of its size, it had to be.

As colony administrator,

Dudley was responsible for three large areas of activity:
farm operations, business management, and community govern
ment.^

He assigned farm operations to his assistant

administrator, Jake Terry, and a staff of farm advisors; they,
in turn, worked closely with the colony's home demonstration
agent and 4-H Clubs to coordinate farm and home management
planning.

Dudley retained major responsibility for business,

marketing, and cooperative activities, while delegating
specific tasks to a business manager and accountant.

After

October 31, 1936, Dudley marketed all cash crops grown at
the colony through Dyess Colony Corporative Association, an
organization in which all project residents owned s t o c k . ^
In addition, the cooperative association operated the store,
gin, feed mill, cannery, commissary, lumber mill, blacksmith

52address to the Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission by
Lawrence Westbrook, September 21, 1936, Hopkins Papers, Box
116, FDRL; Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10,
1936, and enclosures, R. G. 96, National Archives; see
Arkansas Gazette. January 9, 1938.
53azile Aaron to W. A. Rooksberry, March 25, 1936,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^Arti c l e s of Incorporation of Dyess Colony Coopera
tive Association, dated October 31, 1936, Arkansas Secretary
of State, Corporations Department, State Capital, Little
Rock, Arkansas.
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shop, furniture factory, and all other community facilities.
" 1 Cooperation'

the colonists.

must be our watchword . . . ," Westbrook told
"In this community here we aim to apply the

principles of co-operation to all our important activities
and at the same time to preserve and develop that spirit of
competitive individualism which seems necessary for the
highest achievement in any line of human endeavor."5^

As

time went on, the colonists themselves, through the Dyess
Cooperative Colony Association, were expected to purchase
the cooperative facilities and take on more and more the
tasks of running their own community.

As for community

government, Dudley functioned as a city manager coordinating
the work of schools, utilities, public health and sanita
tion services, police and fire departments, plus religious,
civic, and recreational activities.56
By 1939, the air had begun visibly seeping out of the
Dyess balloon.

To some of its supporters, like Lawrence

Westbrook, the development of Dyess Colony was a romantic
vision of rugged, pioneer farm families engaged in "carving
their homes out of the wilderness.”5^

Undoubtedly, the

colony's early years did afford challenge, excitement, a

5^Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10,
1936, and enclosures, R. G. 96, National Archives.
56Azile Aaron to W. A. Rooksberry, March 25, 1936,
and enclosures, ibid.

^^Arkansas Gazette, June 10, 1936.
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sense of blazing new trails for others to follow if the
colony were successful.
to be glorious.

For the colonists, the future was

"I predict that within ten years, this will

be the most prosperous community in Arkansas or any other
State," Westbrook once told the colonists.

"There will be

no rich people here, but everyone will be well-to-do .

”58

Westbrook's promises, however, never caught up to reality.
Life at Dyess was much like life at any other rural com
munity during the Depression.

It was hard.

There was

little romance in cutting down trees and clearing land,
walking behind a mule all day long, or picking cotton from
sun up to sun down.

"Any colonist with a modicum of indus

try, ” Henry Baker wrote in 1936, "can be assured of owning
his own home within a reasonable time . "

58

Yet in early

1938, for example, only 155 families had deeds to their
homesteads, leaving about 445 families still on probationary
status.

There was a constant turnover of families.

Between

October, 1934, and April, 1938, a total of 649 families lived
in the colony at some time; of these, 252 or thirty-nine per
cent moved away .

88

financial failure.

As a WPA project, Dyess Colony was a
Dyess Colony, Inc., lost $386,729.02 in

58Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10,
1936, and enclosures, R. G. 96, National Archives.
5t r a v e l i n g Recovery Road. 156.
SOcharles P. Loomis and Dwight Davidson, Jr., "Soci
ometrics and the Study of t h e N e w Rural Communities,"
Sociometry, II (January, 1939), 57, 58.
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1937, $221,325.70 in 1938, and $144,181.35 in 1939, though
its operations did show constant i m p r o v e m e n t . T h e seeds
of future trouble had already started to sprout.

^ A u d i t Report, Dyess Colony, Inc., Dyess, Arkansas,
February 28, 1937, R. G. 96, National Archives; Audit Report,
Dyess Colony, Inc., Dyess, Arkansas, February 28, 1938,
ibid.; Audit Report,.. Dyess Colony, Inc., Dyess Arkansas,
February 28, 1939, ibid.

CHAPTER V
DYESS COLONY:

POLITICS AND DENOUEMENT

During the twelve-year history of the New Deal com
munity program, Dyess Colony generated more internal quarrels
and political controversy than any other project in Region
Six.

One of Dyesfi 1 most persistent problems was unrest among

the colonists.

When discontent first appeared in 1936,

Dyess authorities took the position that the colony offered
residents opportunities on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

"No

one of you is under any obligation to stay here if he doesn't
think he will like it," Lawrence Westbrook told the colonists,
"nor is the Corporation under any obligation to keep anyone
here if its officers feel that that person would not make good
and cooperate with the Corporation and with his neighbors.
There is no compulsion on either side."

Westbrook added,

"I

merely mention the matter because I have heard that there
are a few, a very few, people here in the community who have
not understood that the Government was offering them an
opportunity they might take on the Government's terms or
leave without rancor or prejudice, if they didn't want this
particular kind of chance."-1'

^Lawrence Westbrook to Paul V. Maris, August 10, 1936,
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Most of the colonists, then and later, did put forth
an honest effort to take advantage of their new opportunity,
made few complaints, and remained confident that the colony
administration had their best interests at heart.

Harve

Smith, one of the original thirteen colonists, was probably
characteristic of the majority of Dyess residents.

A news

paper reporter talked to Smith after he had lived at Dyess
for three and a half years .

2

"What do you think of this place now?"
"it's the best proposition a poor man ever had,"
Smith said.
"In what respects?"
"Well, there's nothing against a man here.

A man

does need more acreage, but still I've got feed enough to do
two mules and my other stock this winter.

Here, they've

given a man a chance when it looked like no one else would."
"Think you'3il have any trouble buying your place?"
"Nope.

I'll buy it all right."

"What do you think of the co-operative idea for opera
tion of the community center?"
"Swell idea."

(Harve was not much of a talker.)

"What do you like best about the place?"

the reporter

and enclosures, Harry L. Hopkins Papers, Box 110, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (to be cited here
after as Hopkins Papers, FDRL).
2Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), January 9, 1938.
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persisted.
"Well, I've got a home and some good land— best in
the world, and an opportunity to buy them.

If we

boys will

just line with them [the colony directors] they'll back us,
but we wouldn't have a chance without this place.
tellyou, the sentiment of the farmers is looking

Let me
up."

“Anything you don't like about it?“
"Well, yes, but it can't be helped.

The only thing

hurtin' now is this 'PWA' that is putting us on jobs and
keeping us off our farms."
Harve was working for the PWA because he was broke.
After he had cleared thirty-one acres of land, he lost "near
everything" in the floods of 1937:

his corn crop, most of

his feed, hay, hogs, chickens, and other stores.

After the

flood, he tried to make a go of it on a twenty-acre tract.
But like many other colonists, he was forced to go to work
for the PWA until he could get on his feet again.
wanted desperately to get back to farming.

Smith

He asked:

"Why

not give me a $25 mortgage on my cow and let me go on my
farm and make it back?"
"They've been awful nice to us>" Harve concluded.
"They've given me a good school for my kids, a good hospital
— and a chance."
"I don't suppose you're interested in politics?"
[Translation:

Are you part of any dissension movement?]

"Nope," Smith grinned.

"We ain't interested in poli

tics .*’ I guess w e 'd just do what 'they' wanted us t o ."
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But by 1938, an increasing number of families had
developed an interest in "politics."

Like all communities,

Dyess contained its share of trouble-makers.

Discouraged,

many families left the project when they saw only hard work
ahead.

Other dissidents stayed on and found plenty to criti

cize, but only sporadically did discontent flare into the
open.

In April, 1938, for example, Dudley discharged two

men, the colony store manager and the dry goods department
manager.

He explained that this aetion was taken in order

to enable the colony to hire more experienced personnel.-^
"They did not have enough experience in merchandizing to
operate the general store," Floyd Sharp commented.

But in

protest, 156 colonists signed a petition asking that the
store clerks be rehired; and

200

sent a second petition to

Mrs. Roosevelt, who had visited and expressed an interest in
Dyess, requesting her to investigate the "administrative
activities" of the colony.

After Sharp refused to rehire

them, the protest gradually subsided.

"As to an investiga

tion, " he said, "I am sure that the clerks would not welcome
one.”^

Until 1939, however, no major dissension movement

challenged the colony's leadership, largely because colo
nists discontent lacked an issue and, most important, leader
ship .

3 Ibid.,

4ibid.

April 27, 1938; Osceola Times, April 25, 1938.
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Suddenly, it seemed, the dissidents found both.

On

March 17, 1938, colony officials served eviction notices on
two colonists, ordering them to vacate their houses within
three days.

One was S. B. Funk, fifty-two, a raw-boned

farmer and one-time veterinarian from Haskell in Saline
County, and a resident of the colony since 1934; the other,
A. J. McGravin, also fifty-two, a native of Morrillton who
came to Dyess in 1935.5

They were both incompetent, colony

authorities maintained, and they had performed insufficient
work during the customary two-year probation period to merit
further occupancy.

In addition, Funk owed the colony over

$1,600 and had been a constant source of trouble.

McGavin

was in better financial condition, but he had continually
refused to participate in any of the colony's cooperative
enterprises.

Since both refused to leave, Dyess Colony, Inc.,

initiated a suit against them for unlawful detainer and cut
off their credit at the colony store.

But Funk and McGravin

obtained credit outside the colony, employed A. F. Barham,
an Osceola lawyer, to represent their case, and apparently
spent their spare time building up support among other colo
nists.

The lawsuit, they later claimed, was the start of

"open indignation” at Dyess; before then, other colonists had

^Arkansas Gazette. April 2, 1939. Both Funk and
McGravin took their cases to the Arkansas Supreme Court and
lost. Arkansas Reports: Cases Determined in the Supreme
Court of Arkansas from March 1940 to October, 1940 (Little
Rock, 1940), CC, 180-93.
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been afraid to discuss openly their dissatisfaction.

When

others saw they might also lose their farms, Funk and M c 
Gravin said, they "at first bided their time but last fall
[1938] decided nothing was to be done about the present
management and decided they must interest the public."®

So

in 1939, Funk and McGravin emerged as the ringleaders of a
dissident element made up of about a third of the total
colony population.

(There were then about 375 families at

Dyess.)
When refused permission to hold protest meetings at
the colony, on March 17 a group of about 250 Dyess residents
— men, women, and children, not family heads— gathered at
the courthouse in Osceola to protest against what they
called "unfair and discriminatory management . "

7

The pro

testers claimed they had been charged eexorbitant prices for
land they bought at the colony.

On March 29, 275 held a

second mass meeting in Osceola, this time an all-day affair
climaxed with the sending of telegrams to President Roosevelt
and Governor Carl E. Bailey.

In the telegram to Bailey, they

requested that the Governor use his "influence with Mrs.
Roosevelt to put an end to the intolerable conditions exist
ing here."

"The records of this county show," the telegram

read, "that this land was purchased at $2.50 per acre.

Our

contracts call for its sale to us at its actual cost plus

^Arkansas Gazette, April 1, 1939.
7Ibid., March 18, 1939; Osceola Times. May 19, 1939.
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improvements, but officials have now insisted that we agree
to pay from $75 to $100 per acre— many times the value of
the land."

If they failed to pay, they faced the threat of

being thrown off the colony.

"Unless you can prevent this

. . . ," they said, "we will lose four years of labor and
our last chance for a home.

Please help u s . "

8

The most vocal dissenter, Funk was probably the author
of the telegram.

"I bought 38 acres to be paid for over a

period of years and thought I was to get it at $2.50 an acre,"
he complained.

"After I had worked it for three years I

found out they had charged me $3,900."

Colony officials, he

further charged, had meted out brutal treatment to dissenting
colonists.

In June, 1938, a Dyess farm supervisor had

supposedly beaten one colonist unconscious and injured four
others who were holding a meeting at a schoolhouse in the
colony.

When a speaker from outside the colony attempted to

make a talk, colony authorities ordered him out? then, as he
attempted to go on with his remarks, Funk claimed the farm
supervisor and a deputy sheriff assaulted him, t o o .

8

Scarcely bowing to the more spectacular charges,
colony officials countered with facts and figures.

Resident

manager E . S ..Dudley denied that anyone had been charged
exbrbithnfct prices.

8 Arkansas

"Prices of the tracts are based on the

Gazette. March 30, 1939; Daily Graphic.

March 30, 1939.
9Arkansas Gazette. April 2. 1939.

size and the amount of the improvements," he explained.
"The land is appraised and the improvements, such as drain
age ditches, roads, schools and other conveniences, are
figured in as part of the purchase price. ”1°

R. A. Lile,

colony accountant, admitted that some of the land had been
purchased for $2.50 per acre, but that did not represent the
entire cost of obtaining title.

Lile placed the actual cost

at $9.82 per acre— a figure that included the cost of land,
legal expenses, quitclaim deeds, surveying and payment of
delinquent taxes.
$382.88.

For example, Funk's land alone cost

But counting improvements, he was paying $76.93 an

acre on 38.99 acres.

The average cost of improvements—

five-room house, barn and poultry house of the type built on
the Funk tract— was $2,291.88, while the cost of drainage
ditches amounted to $7.18 per acre or $279.95.

"In view of

the fact that various tracts were to be sold to the home
steaders as cleared land," said Lile,

"$15 per acre was

included in the cost price and set up in a reserve for
clearing.

This added $584.85 to the cost of the land."

Thus,

Lile said, the cost of the Funk tract was $1,247.68; with
improvements, it came to $3,539.56.

But he received a

$273.90 credit, or fifteen dollars per acre, for land which
he had cleared, reducing the cost of the tract to $3,265.66.

1 0 Ibid.. March 18. 1939.
Dudley, however, seems to
have been confused about what went into the purchase price
just as some of the colonists were.
See Lile's statement
next.

137
Finally, allowing him ten per cent off, the sales price to
Funk was

$2,999.52.

Dyess Colony, Inc., had added no inter

est, nor prorated the cost of roads and bridges.
annual payments were

$153.03,

Funk's

or about four dollars per acre

per year; and he had thirty years to pay.
There were several reasons for the dissension at
Dyess.

The Emergency Relief Administration had made at least

two major mistakes that plagued the colony for years after
ward.

From the start, FERA region engineer Roland R. Pyne

warned against the danger of not thoroughly acquainting
clients with the size of the financial obligations they
assumed as Dyess colonists.12

This mistake was never fully

corrected, and it did immeasurable harm.

A number of colo

nists, like Funk and McGravin, expected to buy their land
and homes at a cheaper price than the colony could offer.
Newspaper stories of

$2.50

an acre land and

$1,000

homes had

made such a deep impression that it could never be eradicated.
Equally serious, family selection specialists allowed a num
ber of poor choices to slip through.

The project, Dudley

later explained, was set up to assist only persons with
farming backgrounds, but relief agencies had admitted people
who were not primarily farmers, people who were, for example,
carpenters or who worked at other trades.^3

H l b i d . , April

1,

One colonist,

1939.

l2Report of Roland R. Pyne, Regional Engineer, Period
Ending November 1 0 , 1 9 3 4 , Hopkins Papers, Box 7 9 , FDRL.
•^Arkansas Gazette, April 2, 1939.
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Homer Williams, put it this ways
When this thing started out back in 1934, they brought
us here people who hadn't had anything before in their
lives. They were on relief. They took them from all
walks of life and from all parts of the state, and put
them down here on an equal basis, doing the same thing
— farming. As time went on, they began to sift down.
Some of them couldn't take it. Others made a go of it.
You just can't take so many different types of people
and set them down doing the same thing without having
a little trouble.14
Many colonists may have started out with high hopes, worked
hard for the first year or two, but, after repeated disap
pointments, lost their enthusiasm.

Some found it difficult

to adjust to the full-time job of farming, to the sticky
black gumbo soil, to the "buffalo gnats" common in that part
of eastern Arkansas.

A few colonists, it seems, were unable

to understand the legal documents and technicalities involved
in purchasing their homes.
Both the Emergency Relief Administration and the Re
settlement Administration share responsibility for selection
mistakes at Dyess.
greatest blame.

But probably the ERA should take the

Funk, who came to Dyess in November, 1934,

and McGravin, who came in April, 1935, were both ERA choices.
Dyess Colony, after all, was the Emergency Relief Adminis
tration's first colonization effort in Arkansas.

No one in

1934 or 1935 had the experience in community building avail
able a few years later.

Even the Resettlement Administration's

family selection staff, young and inexperienced in 1936, had

^ibid.
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undertaken no major selection task except for the Mississippi
subsistence homesteads.

It is likely that they, too, were

feeling their own way.
Since the dissenters represented only a minority,
other colonists resented the unfavorable publicity they gave
the colony.

In early April, one group, a newspaper reported,

was planning to send petitions to President Roosevelt and
Governor Bailey denying all charges in the dissidents 1 peti
tions and expressing satisfaction with the opportunity of
living at Dyess . 1 5
ported.)

(Whether they actually did so was unre

Colonists C. E. Tarpley reflected the attitude of

some toward Funk and McGravin when he said, "If those two
birds were in paradise they wouldn't be satisfied unless
they were raising a ruckus."

They were "sore because they

don't want to get down to work."1^
colonists divided into three groups:

One reporter found the
those strongly favor

able to the colony, those strongly opposed, and those in the
middle, not highly favorable but not discontented either.
The majority took the third course.
of those in the middle.
remarked,

"I would move."

Homer Williams was one

"If they don't like it here," he
Williams, however, had actually

signed the dissenters' petitions, not because he was dis
satisfied, but because he was willing to help those who asked
him to sign to improve their condition.

iSibid., April 2, 1939.

Williams had no

^ibid.
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grievances against the colony or its management; they had
always given him a square deal, he said, and he was making
progress toward acquiring his home and land . - 1*7
In Arkansas politics, Dyess Colony was always a
potential issue, especially as deficits mounted and dis
senters grew more vocal.

At first, the colony's identifica

tion with W. R. Dyess was alone enough to attract controversy.
As a large planter and businessman, Bill Dyess had been
involved in politics since moving to Arkansas in 1930— first
local, then state politics.

In Mississippi County, the most

important political fact was its division into rival northern
and southern sections.

The largest county in Arkansas,

Mississippi County had two courthouses, one at Blytheville in
the northern section, the other at Osceola in the southern
section; the existence of two courthouses not only indicated
the size of the county but the bitterness of the sectional
rivalry.
Since Dyess* home was at Osceola, he had built politi
cal ties in the southern section with, for example, Ben F.
Butler, farm implement dealer and landowner, and R. E. Lee
Wilson, a large planter who owned the entire town of Wilson,
Arkansas, a few miles south of Osceola .-*-8

17

Later, as

Ibid.

18Qeorge D. Babcock to Winthrop D. Lane, July 13,
1934, Record Group 69, Records of the Works Projects Adminis
tration, National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G.
69,. National Archives); Nels Anderson to Lane, July 9, 1934,
ibid.
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Emergency Relief Administrator, Dyess became a powerful
force in statewide politics, with large amounts of Federal
funds to dispense on relief projects and thousands of jobs
to fill in every part of the state.

In 1932, Dyess had

supported J. M. Futrell for governor against Dwight H. Black
wood of Blytheville, and he did much to win the county for
Futrell.

In 1933, Futrell in turn backed him for the job as

relief administrator; and in turn, Dyess threw his relief
organization behind the Governor's campaign for reelection
in 1934.

According to current rumors, Dyess himself was

ambitious for elective office? and he planned to run for
governor in 1936 after Futrell stepped down— or perhaps for
United States S e n a t o r . H e probably had a good chance for
either office.

He was already well known among political

leaders, across the state, had built up a favorable popular
image as relief administrator, and possessed a magnetic
personality.

ERA social service chief Gertrude S. Gates,

who was one of Dyess* severist critics, admitted that "he
could charm the birds off the trees if he c h o s e . " 2 0

But at

times, Dyess' political ambitions and activities made the
colony a political football.

When political foes attacked

■^Gertrude S. Gates, Memorandum to Winthrop Lane,
June 18, 1934, ibid. Dyess denies his political ambitions,
in Blytheville Courier News, July 6 , 1934; Arkansas Gazette,
July 7, 1934.
20Gertrude s. Gates, Memorandum to Winthrop Lane,
June 18, 1934, R. G. 69, National Archives.

142
him# they usually wound up attacking the colony as well; it
was a soft spot few could resist.
During the 1934 gubernatorial campaign# for example#
D y e ss' involvement in local and state politics combined to
drag the colonization project# then only a few weeks old#
into the first primary as a political issue. ^

A strong

Futrell partisan, he found himself facing a number of embar
rassing charges— charges intended, the Osceola Times said#
to "react upon the present state administration."22

Had the

Emergency Relief Administration shown favoritism to the
southern half of Mississippi County# the least populated
part?

Why did most of the relief labor being used at the

colony come from Osceola rather than from Blytheville?

How#

indeed# did the colony itself come to be located not only in
Dyess' home county, but in the very part of that county
where he himself lived?

Was it not true that a substantial

part of the land purchased for the colony, if not all of it#
had been owned by none other than Lee Wilson?

Had he, with

Dyess' help, neatly unloaded a large tract of worthless land
on the government?

What about Dyess' political favoritism#

such as the purchasing of building materials and machinery
from his friend Ben Butler in the early days of the coloniza
tion project?

Why# too, had ERA crews improved roads running

2-^See Arkansas Gazette# June 17, 1934; Blytheville
Courier News. July 6 # July 11, 1934.
22oSceola Times# July 6# 1934.
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past D y e s s ' private land in Mississippi County?

Why had

there been extensive resurfacing of thirty or forty miles of
formerly gravel roads near Wilson, Arkansas?2** Why, why,
why?
As a result of such criticism, George Babdock, Nels
Anderson, and Winthrop D. Lane, all FERA representatives,
spent three days in Mississippi County investigating charges
against Dyess.

Anderson took a less toleraht attitude toward

Dyess* conduct than did Babcock.

By improving roads on land

which he and Wilson owned, Anderson emphasized, Dyess had
committed a clear indiscretion.

As for the development of

the colonization project, Babcock believed that Dyess had
shown no "unusual” favoritism to the Southern section of the
county.

"That the location of this project," Babcock noted,

’'happened to have been in the part of the county which is
generally considered as that section in which our executive
lives, and almost surrounded by property owned by one who
seems to be one of his strongest friends [Wilson], should not
be a particular reason for criticism."
tinued,

"In fact,” he con

"I believe that if his home had not been located in

this Southern section region there would have been little
criticism of any kind so far as selection and location were

22George D. Babcock to Winthrop D. Lane, July 13,
1934, R. G. 69,. National Archives; Nels Anderson to Lane,
July 9, 1934, ibid.
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c o n c e r n e d

24

Dyess' home, Babcock pointed out, was at

least twenty-five miles from the colony and at the very
northern border of the Southern section of the county.

In

summary, Lane reported finding "serious indiscretions but no
criminal acts or acts justifying removal."

He added:

"I am

still uncertain whether I shall recommend a new state adminis
trator.”^

The Federal Emergency Relief Administration did

not fire Dyess, though that was a possibility; and in
Arkansas, the criticism died down after Futrell won a second
term.

But this was not the last time Dyess Colony would

become involved in state politics.
In 1939, a political feud between Floyd Sharp and
Governor Bailey caught Dyess colony squarely in the middle.
Bailey and Sharp had been at odds politically for two or
three years.

According to the Governor's supporters, Sharp

had made the Arkansas WPA into a powerful political machine
and had used it with deadly effect against Bailey when the
latter ran for United States Senator in 1937

(John E. Miller

defeated him to fill Senator Joseph T. Robinson's unexpired
term)

Apparently, Bailey was determined to get revenge.

On February 25, 1939, Representatives B. Frank Williams,

24Qeorge D . Babcock to Winthrop D . Lane, July 13,
1934, ibid.
25winthrop D. Lane to Aubrey Williams, July 10, 1934,
ibid.
26see Arkansas Gazette. March 8, 1939.

L. H. Autry, and Woodrow A. Hutton of Mississippi County
introduced an administration-sponsored bill into the House
directing the Arkansas Corporation Commission to audit the
affairs of Dyess Colony, Inc.; Senator Ivy W. Crawford of
Blytheville sponsored the bill in the Senate .

27

The bill

called for an investigation "to determine the extent of the
State of Arkansas's interest in the establishment, manage
ment, and disposition of Dyess Colony."

The Williams-Autry-

Hutton bill passed the House, but in the Senate it quickly
ran into opposition.
political maneuver.

The bill's opponents denounced it as a
"I'm going to tell-you what's behind

this bill," Senator Ellis M. Fagan of Little Rock said.
"I'm speaking for a man who can't speak for himself— Floyd
Sharp.”

The fact that the bill called for only an investi

gation of Dyess Colony, ignoring the Arkansas Rural Reha
bilitation Corporation, Fagan said, showed it was "aimed to
embarrass Mr. Sharp and to enliven agitation for his removal."
The Corporation Commission was responsible only to the
Governor, he asserted, and it will bring out the report it is .
told to bring out.

Senator Jeff Bratton of Paragould also

opposed the investigations

"Instead of trying to investigate

the h o w and why of Dyess Colony, we ought to be glad the

27Journal of the House of Representatives of the
Fifty-Second General Assembly, State of Arkansas. ..(Newark,.
Arkansas,. 193,9)986;. Journal of the Senate of Arkansas of
the Fifty-Second General Assembly,. State of Arkansas (Newark,
Arkansas, 1939), 1300; Arkansas Gazette. February 26. 1939.
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federal government has given the money to some of our
people."28
On March 7, Senate opponents amended the bill to place
the investigation under the attorney general's office— and
out of reach of the Corporation Commission, some of whose
members were known to be hostile to Dyess C o l o n y . F o r

an

instant, it looked as if they had averted any threat of
investigation.

Then, unexpectedly, Bailey's forces accepted

the amendment and lined up enough votes to pass the new
version of the bill.

But on March

8

, with the legislative

session scheduled to end at noon the next day, Pagan and
twelve other senators filibustered the bill to death.

To

gether, they kept the floor of the Senate for nearly eight
hours, the longest filibuster in recent Arkansas history.
Pagan read a voluminous report of a federal audit of Dyess
colony, interrupting the narrative with comments on the high
cost of living, termites, and the Far Eastern situation.

He

took almost three hours alone reading the first page of the
report and two explanatory letters.

The Senate adjourned at

eleven o'clock that night without taking a vote .
But Bailey had held back a trump card.

20

On March 6,

the very day of the first mass demonstration of colonists at

28 a11 quotes from ibid., March

8

, 1939.

29senate Journal, 1408.
30lbid.. 1412, 1439, 1460; Arkansas Gazette. March 8,
1939.
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Osceola courthouse, he dissolved Dyess Colony, Inc., leaving
the $3,000,000 corporation without legal right to do busi
ness in Arkansas.

In an executive proclamation, the Governor

ordered the dissolution of 153 domestic and thirty-seven
foreign corporations which had failed to file reports and pay
Arkansas franchise taxes for the past three years.
only one of these, but the intent was clear.

Dyess was

Dyess Colony,

Inc., Bailey said, had failed to pay thirty-three dollars in
franchise taxes due the state.

Former Governor J. M. Futrell,

colony attorney, had recently advised the Arkansas Corpora
tion Commission that Dyess Colony, Inc., contended it was a
federal agency and not liable for the state franchise tax;
in turn, the Arkansas Tax Division's secretary, colony
officials claimed, notified them that the commission would
accept this contention.
changed their minds.

But the commissioners apparently

Now they claimed that Dyess Colony,

Inc., possessed the same powers as any other business corpora
tion, with nothing in its articles of incorporation restric
ting its operations to a non-profit basis or establishing it
as an instrument of the Federal government.
Sharp, perhaps a little stunned, declared that the
dissolution of Dyess Colony, Inc., was a waste of time if it
were an effort to oust h i m from the project.

”1

have asked

Harry L. Hopkins to be relieved of my duties with the

3-LIbid., March 17, 1939.
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colony," he announced .

32

on March 22, he obtained a new

Arkansas charter setting up Dyess Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation as the successor to Dyess Colony, Inc.

Like

Dyess Colony, Inc., the new organization was a "benevolent,
non-profit corporation" whose major objective was "to reha
bilitate individuals and families as self-sustaining human
beings.”

Secretary of State C. G. Hall issued the new

charter upon payment of the usual fee of ten dollars.

Legally,

Dyess Colony was back in business . 3 3
Thus, at the end of March, 1939, Dyess Colony was in
serious trouble; it was on the verge of financial collapse,
a third of the colonists were in open revolt, and a state
investigation had been just barely averted.

As Sharp rea

lized, the only way he could safely protect the colony from
Bailey's vendetta was to cut all ties between it and the
WPA.

Besides, the Works Progress Administration had been

under congressional orders since mid-1938 to wind up the
affairs of the old Federal Emergency Relief Administration,
including the liquidation of WPA interests in three rural
community corporations:

Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia;

3 2 Ibid., March 23, 1939.
Sharp, however, stayed on
as president of Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation.

33Articles of Incorporation of Dyess Rural Rehabilita
tion Corporation, March 22, 1939, Secretary of state,
Corporation Department, State Capital, Little Rock,
Arkansas.

Cherry Lake, Florida; and Dyess.34

m

February, 1939, soon

after the Bailey feud started to heat up, Sharp approached
regional director T. Roy Reid about the possibility of trans
ferring Dyess colony to the Farm Security Administration .

33

In August, the FSA agreed to take over Dyess, but no one
appeared in any hurry to do so.

As Paul Conkin notes, Dyess

colony was hardly a welcome addition to the FSA's communi
ties.3^

In September, Reid stressed that the FSA should not

move too rapidly in taking control of the project.

There

was "considerable unrest" at Dyess, he advised, and the FSA
take-over was expected to greatly increase that unrest.

The

Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation was planning to ask
forty or fifty families to vacate their units; and the pres
ent management, Reid contended, should ask them to leave
before the FSA took over.

It would be hard for the FSA, he

argued, to assume management and then demand their withdrawal
immediately after taking charge.

Nor should the FSA take

over until after the corporation finished out a final full

3 ^H. M. Colvin, Memorandum to William E. Linden,
February 2, 1939, Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers
Home Administration, National Archives (to be cited hereafter
as R. G. 96, National Archives).

Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, February 2 3 , 1 9 3 9 ,
ibid.; Reid to Alexander, March 2 1 , 1 9 3 9 , ibid.; R. W.
Hudgens, Memorandum to Monroe Oppenheimer and J. 0. Walker,
August 3 0 , 1 9 3 9 , ibid.
35r .

33Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), p. 138.
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year for accounting purposes . 3 7
Finally, the FSA decided to go ahead with transfer.
On November 22, the board of directors of the Dyess Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation held a special meeting; and,
Floyd Sharp, H. C. Baker, and R. C. Limerick, resigned.
Then FSA personnel— Reid, resettlement director E. B. Whit
aker, and regional finance director James T. Holliday— took
their places as president, secretary, and treasurer, respec
tively . ^

8

Soon after, the new board of directors trans

ferred their Dyess corporation stock in trust to the
Secretary of Agriculture, as the old state Rural Rehabilita
tion Corporations had done in 1936.

The main purpose of this

move was to place eviction cases at Dyess in Federal court
and guarantee speedy conviction .

88

When the Farm Security Administration took over Dyess,
Reid had already set up a committee under E. B. Whitaker to
visit the project, report on conditions there, and recommend

37T . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, September 15, 1939,
R. G. 96, National Archives? Reid to Alexander, September 21,
1939, ibid.; see G. E. Lukas, Memorandum to J. O. Walker,
October 9, 1939, ibid.
3 8 E. B. Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, November 27,
1939, ibid.; Mastin G. White, Memorandum for Alexander,
December 4, 1939? ibid.? see Alexander to Corrington Gill,
October 23, 1939, ibid.?T. C. Donnahue to Baird Snyder,
December 5, 1939, ibid.? Arkansas Gazette.
3 8 E.
B . .Whitaker, Memorandum for T. Roy Reid, December
20, 1939, R. G. 96, National Archives? Whitaker, Memorandum
for Reid, December 22, 1999, ibid.? see G . E . Lukas, Memo
randum for C. B. Baldwin, January 20, 1940, ibid.

future action.

Whitaker found 339 families living at Dyess

with a total population of nearly
were school-age children.

2 ,0 0 0

people? about

1 ,0 0 0

The Resettlement Administration's

Management Division had selected about two-thirds of these
families, and about eighty per cent of the population had
been residents of Dyess three years or longer.

The colony

contained 518 farm units; 332 were twenty-five acre units,
while 186 were between twenty-five and forty-five acres,
making the size of the average unit about twenty-five acres . ^ 0
Dyess Colony, Inc., had let its farm management program
dwindle.
tion:

The basic community services were still in opera-

gin, store, blacksmith shop, schools, hospital,

library, and some others.

The physical property had never

been put back in first-class condition after the flood of
1937.

With the project under the Tyronza River, about six

inches of water stood inside most of the homes; as a result,
their floors and walls were out of plumb and in need of
repair.

There was very little fencing on any of the units,

and some had no barns or other outbuildings.^

Roads through

the project were in poor conditions, some of them almost
impassable.

"In general, the physical condition of the

40t . Roy Reid
ibid.; Dyess Farms:
Whitaker, Memorandum
Whitaker, Memorandum

to W. W. Alexander, August 16, 1939,
Project Date, n.d., ibid.; E. B.
for T. Roy Reid, January 3, 1940, ibid.;
for Reid, December 29, 1939, ibid.

41jjConomic Justification, Dyess Farms, Inc., Summary,
n.d., ibid.
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community and its various structures is good," district
engineer Troy C. Donnahue reported,

"in fact, considering

the size of the property and various damaging elements to
which it has been exposed, such as the flood of 1937, the
cost of putting this large project in good physical condition
is comparatively moderate."42

yet Whitaker estimated that

it would take an expenditure of $830,697.81 to put the Dyess
on a par with other projects in the region.

This would

represent a cost of $2,770 per unit assuming the project
were finally divided into 300 units.43
In the spring of 1940, the Farm Security Administra
tion launched a long-range program of reorganization at
Dyess.

On June 19, the regional office set up Dyess Farms,

Inc., a cooperative association composed of the heads of
families living on the project.44

^s the master association,

42preliminary Engineering Report on Dyess Community,
Mississippi County, Arkansas, December 1939, ibid.
4 3 e. b. Whitaker, Memorandum for T. Roy Reid, January
3, 1940, ibid.
By-Laws of Dyess Farms, Inc., June 19, 1940, ibid.
Under the FSA, Dyess would be known as Dyess Farms, not Dyess
Colony.
"The name has been officially changed from 'Dyess
Colony' to 'Dyess Farms, '"Reid wrote in early 1940, "to give
emphasis to the fact that this is a farming enterprise and
to remove the general impression that it is a government
colony for the segregation of a number of relief clients who
are being cared for by the government." The change of name
also eliminated a somewhat collectivist sounding word and
substituted another which emphasized the individualistic
nature of the project. Dyess had never stressed collective
ownership of farm land, but in 1940 the FSA could not afford
to take any chances. T. Roy Reid, Quarterly Report, Region
VI, January-March, 1940,ibid.
44
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Dyess Farms intended to purchase the entire project, all
15,144 acres and nearly 600 structures, from Dyess Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation, although the latter retained
title for another year.

In the meantime, Ray D. Johnston,

the new community manager, went ahead with Dyess' most
pressing needs

the reorganization of individual farm units.

Whitaker's committee had reported that many of the original
518 farmsteads were too small to support a family.

So

Johnston re-subdivided the farm land, combined adjacent
units, and brought uncleared land into cultivation.

He

increased the size of the units to an average of forty acres
wherever possible and decreased tht total number of farm units
to 300, expanding the amount of available crop land from
9,600 to about 12,000 acres.45

jn addition, the FSA provided

Dyess Farms with a $872,920 loan to cover the cost of putting
the project structures in good repair and a $30,000 loan for
operating capital.

As soon as possible, Johnston made neces

sary repairs to the buildings on all 300 of the reorganized
units, improved the drainage system, reconditioned roads,
cleared more land, constructed fences, and insured an ade
quate water supply.46

45Dyess Farms, Inc., Economic Justification, Organiza
tion and Management, n.d., ibid.; Dyess Farms, Inc., Economic
Justification, Summary, n.d., ibid.
Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 22, 1940 and en
closures, ibid.? Reid to C. B. Baldwin, August 7, 1940, ibid.?
Loan Agreement, dated June 29, 1940, ibid.; Alexander to Reid,
June 29, 1940, ibid.? J. 0. Walker, Memorandum for R. W.
Hudgens, June 25, 1940, ibid.
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As units were repaired and reorganized, the Farm
Security Administration sold them to the occupant families,
if they could qualify under the FSA's standards, or to other
families selected for residence at Dyess.

About 200 of the

families then living on the project already held deeds from
Dyess Colony, Inc., although most had made little progress
toward purchasing the units.
rental contracts.

The rest had year-to-year

Since Dyess Farms could not make any

improvements until the old deeds had been canceled, the asso
ciation requested most of the residents, especially those
living on smaller units, to surrender their deeds in return
for a n e w purchase contract.

The Dyess Farms contracts took

into account the increase in size of each farm as well as
home improvements; each family received credit for any
equities they had in their unit.

Dyess Farms based the cost

of the additional land and improvements on an appraisal of
the earning capacity of each unit.

The conversion from WPA

deeds to FSA contracts was an extremely slow process; by
July, 1943, Dyess Farms had executed only ninety-six new
contracts.

The board of directors of Dyess Farms and the

project manager had to consult with each family, adjust
their past indebtedness, and work out the exchange to the
satisfaction of the families while protecting the govern
ment's interests.

To insure the success of farm operations

on the new units, Dyess Farms mapped out a new farm and home
management plan in which each family supplied its own beef,
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pork, milk, eggs, garden vegetables and any other subsis
tence goods.

As before, all Dyess farmers continued to own

and operate their units

i n d i v i d u a l l y . 47

Under the WPA, the cooperative services program had
gradually dwindled.

In 1936, the Dyess Colony Cooperative

Association leased the store, cafe, filling station, and
blacksmith shop; but it was a financial failure.

Dyess

Colony, Inc., took back the store after only six months of
unsuccessful operation.

Since then, the colony cooperative

had subleased the blacksmith shop to an individual resident;
so by 1939, it was reduced to operating only the cafe and
filling station, and the cafe was selling only soft drinljs
and cigarettes.48

The Dyess hospital had never set up a

cooperative medical association; it was still in operation
but under an informal association of project families on a
monthly fee basis.

The colony store had long suffered from

lack of participation.

None of the families had supported

the store fully, and by 1939 only about 200 of the resident
families were patronizing it at all.

The gin was somewhat

47;Dyess Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment with a
New Kind of Rural Community, dated May 7, 1941, ibid.; John
UewAjfriiBtrong to John L. McClellan, July 21, 1943, ibid.;
John Fischer to Mrs. A. B. Adams, April 26, 1940, ibid.;
Dyess Farms, Inc., Economic Justification, Organization and
Management, n.d., ibid.
T. Frazier,. Memorandum for Brice M. Mace, J r . ,
December 19, 1939, ibid.; U. S. Department of Agriculture,
Farm Security Administration, Monthly Narrative Report, Dyess
Farms, May 1, 1940, ibid.
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better patronized, although some of its 300 customers had
ginned as little as one bale of cotton each since it opened.
Many of the other community facilities were simply not in
"One of the main problems that must be overcome

use.49

before a cooperative association can hope to be successful
on this project is the apparent lack of knowledge of co
operative principles and of cooperative spirit among the
families now residing on the project," cooperative specialist
W. T. Frazier reported.

"it is my understanding that the

present cooperative association has only about 40 members
out of the 370 families.

. . ."50

Th e Dyess school system,

on the other hand, was apparently the only unqualifiedly
successful community activity on the project.
The Farm Security Administration streamlined the com
munity program by reorganizing the basic enterprises and
eliminating the more superfluous ones.

On March 1, 1940,

with FSA help, the farmers at Dyess formed the Dyess Coopera
tive Store Association and borrowed $5,000 for operating
capital;

The store association leased the store building

from Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation and purchased
the inventory of merchandise on hand for $ 1 0 , 0 0 0

over a ten-

49Rate Fulton, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, December
19, 1939, ibid.
50W . T. Frazier, Memorandum for Brice M. Mace, Jr.,
December 19, 1939, ibid.
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year period.51

During the summer# the Dyess Hospital and

Health Association began operations with a $4#760 grant.
Two physicians# a registered nurse# and the community hos
pital provided members with medical care at an annual cost
of twenty-two dollars per family . 5 2

On September 9# Dyess

farmers organized the Dyess Cooperative Gin Association,
borrowed $6,000 from the FSA# leased the project's gin, and
started ginning their 1940 cotton crop.5^

Dyess Farms leased

other facilities from the Dyess RR Corporation and subleased
them to individual operators:
station, garage# and feed mill.

blacksmith shop# gasoline
No provision was made for

the operation of the shoe and harness shop# canning plant,
cafe, or craft building.

The local school district con

tinued to operate the school system as before.5^

Finally,

on June 2# 1941# Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation and
Dyess Farms# Inc.# entered into as "Agreement for Sale of
Dyess Colony."

The initial purchase price was $650,000 for

5-*-Mastin G. White, Memorandum for C. B. Baldwin# July
2, 1940, ibid.; Mason Barr, Memorandum for J. 0. Walker,
November 28, 1940, ibid. ? E. B. Whitaker to W. W. Alexander,
June 20, 1940, ibid.; A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, April
26, 1941, ibid.
52Dyess Farms, Arkansas: The First Experiment with a
New Kind of Rural Community, dated May 5, 1941, ibid.
5 2 J. 0. Walker, Memorandum for R. W. Hudgens,.August
10, 1940, ibid. ? E. B. Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, June 20,
1940, ibid.; J. T. Holliday to Carl H. Bass> October 4,
1940, ibid.

54j}yess Farms, Inc., Economic Justification, Summary,
n.d.. ibid.
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the farm property, not including the community center and
facilities.

After the project had been fully reorganized,

the FSA would appraise the property in terms of its earning
capacity and then establish the final purchase price, not to
exceed the initial $650,000.

According to the terns of the

agreement, Dyess Farms would begin making annual installments
ten years after the date of conveyance.

But in June, 1941,

the association began legal occupancy of the project.55
The Works Project Administration left a legacy of
unrest among the colonists.

When the FSA took over, the

unrest, if anything, increased.

"The proposed transfer of

the management of Dyess Colony Community to the Farm Security
Administration," wrote family selection specialist Kate
Fulton in December, 1939,

"is contributing to the already

unsettled state of mind in the Community."5^

Many colonists

were guessing how the FSA program would operate.

Some were

afraid they would no longer be able to supplement their
incomes with W P A work.

Some believed they should not have

to repay the full amount of their old indebtedness.

The

Farm Security Administration naturally wanted to end uncer
tainty, establish a harmonious relationship with the

55Mason Barr, Memorandum for J. O. Walker, March 11,
1941, ibid.; C. B. Baldwin to A. D. Stewart, April 3,. 1941,
ibid.; Agreement for Sale of Dyess Colony, dated June 2,
1941, ibid.? see J. O. Walker, Memorandum for R. W. Hudgens,
June 25, 1940, ibid.
56£ate Fulton, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, December
19, 1939, ibid.

159
colonists, and restore their faith in the colony.

Regional

director T. Roy Reid and assistant director E. B. Whitaker
made a trip to Dyess in early January, 1940, and spoke at a
colony-wide meeting in the community center.

They invited

the colonists to elect an "advisory committee" to consult
with the management on matters of mutual concern.

Although

such committees were standard policy on all PSA community
projects, Reid was especially anxious for the Dyess committee
to secure the confidence of the people and insure active
cooperation on the part of everyone.

But soon after the

election results came in, he found that the whole idea had
backfired:

a majority of the new committeemen were members

of the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union.57
Organized in late 1939, STPU Local Number 29 claimed
to represent more than two-thirds of the total number of
colonists on the project.58
active and well organized.

whatever its strength, it was
Before the FSA could undertake

any reforms, local president L. J. Brantley and secretary
Floyd Slayton drew up a petition of grievances, and the
membership passed it unanimously at a meeting on February 22,
1940.

"The main element which has been lacking in the

operation of the Dyess project heretofore," the petition

57ip. R0y Reid to W. W. Alexander, January 4, 1940,
ibid.
58See T. Roy Reid to W. L. Ford, Jr., March 26, 1940,
ibid.

read,

"has been the failure of the management to recognize

and encourage Democratic operation of the project."

Speaking

for the union members, they asked for a greater share in the
making of important decisions affecting their welfare.

"The

colonists have no desire to take away any of the rights of
the management to protect the investments of the Corporation,"
they said.

"The colonists desire only the right to be con

sulted and the right to negotiation of disputed matters as
between management and colonists."

The election of an

advisory committee was a step in the right direction, but
they wanted the scope of the committee enlarged and its power
extended.

"It should become a bargaining agent as between

management on the ond hand and the committee representing
the colonists on the other hand."

Specifically, the com

mittee should have power bargain about such matters as loans
and repayment plans, discipline action against colonists,
equitable settlement of old indebtedness, and the right b<E
colonists to be consulted on the plans for management for
the coming year, and their right to have a voice in the
selection of project supervisors.^9
On March 3, a delegation of STFU members presented
the petition to Farm Security Administrator Will W. Alexander
at his office in Washington.

H. L. Mitchell, one of the

founders of the STFU, headed the delegation; and Slayton was

59T o the Officials of the Farm Security Administra
tion, dated February 22, 1940, ibid.
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there to represent Local Number 29.

Mitchell offered evi

dence that a majority of the families at Dyess were members
of the union and repeated the request that the Dyess advisory
committee be recognized as the "bargaining committee" of the
project.

According to newspaper reports the next day—

reports based on an interview Mitchell gave the Associated
Press— the STFU won a complete victory; Alexander recognized
the union as the bargaining agent for the Dyess colonists.
"Dr. Alexander said he agreed to bargain with the union
because it represented a majority of the project colonists,"
the AP reported, paraphrasing Mitchell.

"He said he would

grant similar recognition to any group on any FSA project,
whether it be a union or not, as long as it represented a
majority."

Mitchell added that FSA recognition would pave

the way for unionization of sharecroppers and tenants on
privately-owned cotton plantations . ® 0
rect, Reid moaned,

If the report is cor

"our actions in attempting to get harmony

in the administration at Dyess are nullified."63In reality, Alexander had granted nothing.

Either

Mitchell misunderstood what Alexander was saying, or the
Associated Press misunderstood Mitchell.
Alexander wrote Reid immediately,

"I believe,"

"I made it perfectly plain

60Arkansas Gazette. March 3, 1940 ? Arkansas Democrat
(Little Rock), March 2, 1940. See Commercial Appeal (Memphis,
Tennessee), March 9, 1940.
Roy Reid to Pate R. W. Hudgens, March 3, 1940,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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that such committees are purely advisory, and the responsi
bility for the management and operations of the project must
rest with PSA officials."

"I agreed, of course, that the

Advisory Committee recently elected at Dyess Colony should
be recognized as representing the project residents.
It was well understood," Alexander said,

. . .

"by everyone in the

meeting that the Committee could be recognized as representing
project residents and not the Southern Tenant Farmers Union.
Two days later, on March 6, Reid and Whitaker went
back to Dyess and, with Ray Johnston, met with advisory com
mittee.

When Reid asked Tom Hale, chairman of the committee,

to preside at the meeting, Hale objected that L. J. Brantley
should take charge, since the union was to be recognized as
the colony's bargaining agent.
I immediately advised him [Reid reported] that the
Farm Security Administration wanted the advice and
counsel of the committee which had been selected by
the people, but did not consider any organization or
committee from any organization as a bargaining
agency. He stated that we should so consider it since
Washington had authorized such action.
I then read
your letter.
[Reid had set Hale up nicely.] We had
about a five minute discussion and the committee
seemed to feel that it was all right and that it would
be best for us to deal with them as a committee re
porting to the residents of Dyess Farms.
The meeting then moved on to a calm, two and a half hour dis
cussion of the requests listed in their petition.
The committee seemed pleased that we are taking steps

W. Alexander to T. Roy Reid, March 4, 1940,
ibid. See William Lightfoot, Jr., to E. P. Coleman, March
14, 1940, ibid.
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to appraise the farms and rewrite the contracts on
the basis of the appraised value or present contract
value, whichever is less. . . . They were advised
that it would not be possible for them to make changes
in our loan policy but we asked for suggestions from
them. Apparently they were misunderstanding on some
provisions and they were not insistent on any point;
however, they were strongest in their views that we
should not take second mortgages on this year's crops
to secure their past indebtedness to the Dyess Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation, but they seemed to under
stand the purpose of this and raised no real objec
tion to it.63
The basis of the colonists' request for a voice in personnel
selection, Reid learned, was the fact that they objected to
two men already employed at Dyess, a farm foreman and the
clerk in charge of the main office.

The foreman had also

served as a dephty sheriff, and he was the man who had
allegedly broken up a protest meeting in 1938.

Reid

promised an investigation of both men, and later transferred,
the foreman and fired the clerk for incompetence.

The PSA

had as much trouble with factionalism among the colonists as
it did with STFU petitions.

A group of five men, for

example, had asked for a meeting; so Reid and Whitaker stayed
overnight at the colony and met with them the following
morning.

Unlike the other group, these men opposed the

announcement that the STFU had been granted bargaining rights
at Dyess, and they spoke for a large number of colonists who
felt as they did.

Reid read Alexander's letter a second time,

and they seemed pleased.

STFU organizers, they told Reid,

®^T. Roy Reid to WT. W. Alexander, March 9, 1940,
ibid.
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had been using the newspaper statement to coerce colonists
into the union.
both meetings.

Reid left, satisfied with the results of
"I think we made progress in handling our

relations with the people on Dyess Farms," he wrote,

“and

that we can now make more progress."®4
To further set matters straight, Reid published
Alexander's March 4 letter in the press.

After this experi

ence, however, he was determined to keep Dyess Colony out of
the news as much as possible.

During the coming weeks, news

paper editors and reporters applied considerable pressure to
regional information advisor George Wolf for news about Dyess,
but he successfully stalled for time.

"Reid is not in favor

or any publicity for some time to come," Wolf wrote,

"as we

have not had time to accomplish anything worth mention
ing."®^

Reporters could still go directly to the colony.

"Fortunately," he commented,

"the roads into the project are

so bad that newspaper men don't drop by there lightly."®®
As for congressional inquiries, ESA policy was to "speak
about Dyess only when spoken to" until project affairs had
reached a more settled state.®7

64Ibid.
®5George Wolf to John Fischer, May 16, 1940, ibid.
66 (3e o r g e wolf to Nathan W. Robertson, April 11, 1940,
ibid.
67Jack H. Bryan to George Wolf, April 7, 1941, ibid.
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Some of the colonists, like Floyd Slayton, seemed to
have made a career out of dissent.

In 1939, Slayton had

been one of the demonstrators who claimed they had been
charged e.ekorbitant land prices at the Osceola courthouse.®8
About that time, Kate Fulton of the Family Selection staff
reviewed Slayton's case and recommended he be evicted, but
no action was taken.69

After Funk and McGarvin's evictions

in 1940, he graduated to ringleader of the dissident faction
as both secretary of the STFU local and a member of the
advisory committee.

Although Local Number 29 soon disbanded,

Slayton and four or five others kept up a running battle
with F S A officials.

70

Most of his clique were holders of

old Dyess Colony deeds, and they claimed that Dyess Farms,
Inc., had no right of control over the actions of such deed
holders except to collect payments.

They insisted they did

not have to abide by the rules and regulations of the new
management.

In January, 1943, Slayton was behind a petition,

with sixty-eight signatures, proposing the removal of the
board of directors and the revision of Dyess Farms land

68See Arkansas Gazette. March 18, 1939.
69Homer N. Hall, to A. M. Rogers, January 3, 1942,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
^8See, for example, Floyd Slayton to Brice M. Mace,
Jr., October 15, 1940, ibid.
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purchase contracts.71

"Mr. Slayton's record here shows that

he has not cooperated with the organization at any time and
that he has gone out of his way to cause dissatisfaction
among other members," community manager Homer N. Hall wrote
in 1943.

"So long as he and his four or five buddies are

permitted to carry on as they are now doing, it will not be
possible for us to put the program over as it must be put
over."

With people like Slayton, Hall believed, the F S A had

reached an impasse; it was either Slayton or the colony.
"This whole thing hinges on whether or not the Farm Security
Administration is going to manage the operation of this P r o 
ject of have it operated by Floyd Slayton, Dewey Smothers,
W. M. Hodnett and two or three others."

"I think the exis

tence of this Project depends on the elimination of this
bunch."72

in 1943 and 1944, the FSA took a number of colo

nists, including Slayton, to court on eviction suits and won;
but as late as 1945, there was still a group at Dyess who

71Homer N. Hall to A. M. Rogers, January 3, 1943, with
enclosed copy of Petition for Call of Meeting, signed by
sixty-eight people, ibid. Yet when a group of twenty-four
persons signed a letter to the Arkansas congressional dele
gation in March, 1942, defending the FSA's management of
D y e s s, there was Slayton's name along with the others. To
the Honorable Senators and Congressmen from Arkansas, dated
March 23, 1942, ibid.; Ray D. Johnston to E. B. Whitaker,
April 0, 1942. ibid.
7^see Homer N. Hall to T. B. Fatherree, November. 15,
1943, ibid.; Hall to A. M. Rogers, January 3, 1943, ib i d .
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were trying to form another STFU local.
Even after allowing for the trouble-makers, no one
can overlook the possibility that many colonists complained
because they had something worth complaining about.
January,

In

1944, just before liquidating Dyess, regional

director A. D. Stewart, Reid's successor, admitted that
"Many of the claims of unfair treatment of Dyess farmers
arising from conditions existing prior to 1940 . . . are
j u s t i f i e d .

"74

W P A purchase contracts, he said, were not only

unfair but against the principles of sound agricultural
planning.

The units were too small for a cotton economy, he

pointed out, and they cost toommuch.

When the FSA took over,

the new management had to enlarge and reorganize the units
and, "in an effort to adjust the unreasonable contracts they
had signed," offered colonists additional land at an average
of ten dollars an acre.

In addition, the FSA marked off the

greater part of the indebtedness charged against farmers
prior to 1940.

But the correction of past mistakes in turn

created new problems.

"From this reorganization," Stewart

said, "has come much discontent and controversy because of
the lack of understanding by the farmers of what we were

7 ^David Burgess, Memorandum to H. L. Mitchell, May 21,
1945, Southern Tenant Farmers1 Union Papers, Box 47, univer
sity of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
74Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1944; A. D. Stewart
to Floyd Sharp, January 22, 1944, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
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attempting to do."

Some did not understand, for example,

why they had to turn in their old contracts in exchange for
new ones.

"Not understanding that they are bound by the old

purchase contract, no matter how unfair, until they relin
quish it and sign a new document, some farmers have refused
to meetfi this request and for this reason have yet to receive
their deeds."75
Stewart did not say the former management had been
unreasonable, but he did stress that "because of the neces
sity for changing plans[,] some claims of unfair treatment
by occupants were probably

justified.

"76

consider, for

example, the case of a hypothetical farmer who came to Dyess
in 1934 and lived through every change in management down to
liquidation in 1944.

When he first arrived, he expected to

have a chance to purchase his own farm.

He did indeed get a

tract of uncleared land and a new home, but he had to wait
two years, until 1936, before he knew the exact terms he was
offered.

He also had to go through a two-year probationary

period in order to qualify for a purchase contract.

But even

after he finished his second year at Dyess, there was still
no contract.

Dyess Colony, Inc., did not issue any sales

contracts until after the lapse of three years, in 1937.

As

7^Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1944? see John L.
McClellan to C. B. Baldwin, July 10, 1943, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
76a .
ibid.

Stewart to Floyd Sharp, January 22, 1944,
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farmers began finding out how much they had been charged,
unrest broke into the open 7 but our hypothetical farmer, let
us say, along with about 200 others, did receive contracts.
Then, in 1940, the FSA took control of management, changed
the program substantially, and announced that all old deeds
would have to be canceled and new ones issued.

Almost as

soon as this change had been made, Dyess Colony went into
liuqidation, and his new sales contract had to be exchanged
again— this time for a deed and mortgage.
did have a deed to his farm.

But at last, he

He had a deed, that is, if he

had not already been evicted as a trouble-maker.

"Plans for

the sale of units changing at different intervals during the
operation have caused some of the occupants who talked to
me," Stewart said, "to lose faith in any person offering
proposals and to lose faith in all proposals for the final
liquidation of this Project."77
When the Farm Security Administration started liqui
dating the resettlement projects in 1943, Dyess had still
not completed its reorganization program. .A large number of
families, highly dissatisfied with the new sales contracts,
had simply refused to complete negotiations with Dyess Farms
for the purchase and repair of their units.

At the time of

liquidation, Dyess Farms had executed only about 125 new con
tracts, while seventy-five units were still occupied under

77Ibid.
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contracts entered into with Dyess Colony, Inc., and the re
maining 100 or so units were under annual leases.^8

After

several tries and much delay, the Farm Security Administra
tion worked out a plan for the liquidation of Dyess colony
that would satisfy all project residents.

"Each worthy and

eligible occupant now living at the farms," Stewart promised,
"will be given an opportunity to buy his unit at a price
reasonable to him and fair to the government.”79

The board

of directors of Dyess Farms, Inc., stressed the desire of
resident families to secure deeds to their farms immediately.
On the other hand, the board refused to consideraa plan in
which Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation would deliver
deeds to the residents and insisted on dealing directly with
the government.80

On Juhe 16, 1944, Dyess Farms held a

special business meeting, and about 120 members approved a
plan of liquidation.

Many of the colonists who were under

eviction suits attended, and they raised no objection.

The

members passed every required resolution without a dissenting
vote? it was the first time everyone at Dyess had been able
to agree on anything for years.8^

7Qw. T. Frazier, Memorandum to Frank Hancock, March
24, 1944, ibid.
7^Arkansas Gazette, January 9, 1944.
80W. T. Frazier, Memorandum to Frank Hancock, March 24,
1944, R. G. 96, National Archives.
81a . D. Stewart to C. Stott Noble, June 21, 1944,
ibid.
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Thus, on June 17, Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corpora
tion transferred title to the colony's 13,711 acres of farm
land to Dyess Farms, Inc., waiving the payment of $650,000
provided for in the "Agreement of Sale" of April 2, 1941.8 ^
Then Dyess Farms canceled all purchase contracts and deeds,
gave each family a note, deed, and mortgage to their units,
and sold the family farm units occupied under rental con
tracts to applicants eligible for farm ownership under the
terms of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act.

The united

States government took a mortgage on the land and arranged
to make all collections from purchasers without the help of
either Dyess RR Corporation or Dyess Farms.

Next, the Farm

Security Administration amended the loan agreement of June
29, 1940, so that, as part of the final arrangement, Dyess
Farms could make improvement loans to individual purchasers
of farm units.

No loan could exceed $1,000 unless it was

personally approved by the regional director.

Each farmer's

note and mortgage would include the amount of the improve
ment loan if any were made.

Since most of its $872,820 loan

was still unspent, Dyess Farms refunded all excess loan funds
not previously used for repairs and not needed for improve
ment loans.

The refund came to about $325,000.

The coopera

tive association agreed to convey all of its assets— real

8 ^Agreement of Transfer between the Dyess Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation and the Dyess Farms, Inc.,
September 30, 1945, ibid.

estate, notes, mortgages, and other property— to the govern
ment upon request.83

By October, 1944, Dyess Farms had

converted to deed and mortgage 220 FSA purchase contracts
and fifty-six old Dyess Colony deeds, leaving only thirtytwo units still unsold.84
After disposing of individual farm units, Dyess RR
Corporation still owned the community center, a village of
about forty-five buildings, and 2,596 acres of undeveloped
land.

In 1945, the corporation began disposing of most of

its surplus property.

The Dyess Health Association paid

$1,200 for the hospital building and the block on which it
stood.

The Dyess Cooperative Gin Association bought the gin

building and machinery for $22,500, and the Cooperative Store
Association paid $5,000 for the store building and lot.

The

Arkansas Power and Light Company purchased the electric power
distribution system and began furnishing power to the pro
ject. 85

in November, 1945, Dyess Rural Rehabilitation

Corporation opened bids on the remainder of the community

83a .
stewart to Frank Hancock, February 12, 1944,
ibid.; Robert H. Shields, Memorandum to Hancock, April 4,
1944, ibid.; Hancock to Stewart, April 5, 1944, ibid.
84Dyess Colony, Memorandum by A. W. Palmer, October
9, 1944, ibid.
83Dillard B. Lasseter, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker,
July 26, 1946, ibid.; Dyess Cooperative Gin Association,
Annual Report For Fiscal Year Ending February 28,11946, ibid.
E. B. Whitaker, Memorandum to Lasseter, March 1, 1945, ibid.?
Whitaker to J. W. Fulbright, March 1, 1946, ibid.
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center buildings and land.

Lee Wilson and Company, which

had sold a considerable part of the original project land to
W. R. Dyess, submitted the highest bid of $50,100 cash for
the community village as a unit; but the regional office
rejected the offer as they thought a much better price could
be obtained through negotiations.

On the second round, Lee

Wilson was high again with a bid of $60,000, and again he
was rejected.

By this time, some of the families who had

bought farm units had objected that the purchase of the
entire village by one large commercial organization would
depreciate the value of their small holdings.

Conceding their

point, the regional office then sold the community center
piecemeal.

By March, 1946, the Dyess school district,

churches, and ten individuals together had purchased nineteen
structures and seven vacant lots for $26,206.00; twenty-two
houses, the administration building and community building,
three warehouses, and seventeen vacant lots were still on
the m a r k e t . O n May 7, 1948, a notice appeared in the
Lepanto, Arkansas, News Record offering for sale 614 acres
of cut-over timberland, with no improvements and no cultiva
tion; that was all that remained unsold of the Dyess project
property.87
Prior to 1939, the Federal Emergency Relief Adminis-

86ibid.« Thirty-four People to Bill Fulbright, March
5, 1946, ibid.
87]ffews Record (Lepanto, Arkansas), May 7, 1948.
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tration granted Dyess colony a total of $3,396/250.00.

With

these funds, W. R. Dyess spent $136,994,48 for land, invested
$982,284.11 in farm buildings, and built a community center
for $265,123.81.

From 1934 to September 1946, Dyess colony

suffered a net loss from all sources totaling $1,364,890.59.
Down to 1939, Dyess Colony, Inc., had.built up a deficit of
$811,546.91, while Dyess RR Corporation lost $553,343.68
from 1939 to 1945.

In. addition, the colony wrote off

$252,149.35 through debt adjustment.8®

After 1940, Dyess RR

Corporation gradually decreased operations because of the
transfer of the farm units to Dyess Farms, Inc., and the
store, gin, and hospital to other cooperative associations.
Somewhat more successful, Dyess Farms operated at a profit
of $11,423.12 in 1941, but suffered a loss of $2,981.21 in
1942, and then went into liquidation . ® 8
After 1946, the Farmers Home Administration, successor
to the FSA's successor, took responsibility for liquidating
the resettlement program.
much to do.

At Dyess, the FSA had not left

In 1951, both the Dyess Rural Rehabilitation

® 8 Audit Report, Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corpora
tion, Dyess, Mississippi County, Arkansas, For the Period
March 22, 1939 to September 30, 1945, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
89Dyess Farms, Inc., Annual Financial Report, For the
Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943, ibid.; Dyess Farms,
Inc., Annual Financial Report, For the Period October 22,
1941 to December 31, 1941, ibid.; Dyess Farms, Inc., Annual
Financial Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,
1942, ibid.
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Corporation and Dyess Farms, Inc., turned their remaining
assets back over to the parent agency of the Dyess project,
the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, which still
maintained a revolving trust fund under the supervision of
the Secretary of Agriculture.

Since all government mortgages

against Dyess Farms had been paid in full, and Dyess RR
Corporation had disposed of its property, the FHA's next
step was the dissolution of the other two corporations.^

on

June 27, 1951, the Dyess RR Corporation dissolved itself, an
easy task because the corporation had only three stockholders
who could easily meet and take the necessary steps for dis
solution.

The Farmers' Home Administration consistently

maintained that all FSA cooperative associationsranudt be dis
solved in order to comply with the congressional liquidation
mandate.
difficult.

Yet for Dyess Farms, Inc., the matter was more
According to Ray Johnston, who was then FHA

county supervisor at Dyess, the current membership list had
been lost out of the minute books.

In any case, during the

last years it had been difficult to obtain a quorum (twentyfive per cent of the members) at the annual membership
meetings, and Johnston doubted that the necessary two-thirds

90o . N. Spring, Memorandum to D. B. Lasseter, April
23, 1948, ibid.? Minutes of Annual Meeting of Board of
Directors of Dyess Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, held
June 1, 1951, ibid.y J. V . Highful, Memorandum to Lasseter,
August 16, 1951, ibid.? Spring to Highfull, October 9, 1951,
ibid.? Highful, Memorandum to Lasseter, January 17, 1952,
ibid.

would show up for a meeting that held little importance for
them.

Dyess Farms, however, was for all practical purposes

already dissolved.

It had no debts and no assets, and its

membership no longer carried on any business as an organiza
tion.

In 1951, the Farmers Home Administration simply

closed its files on Dyess Farms, Inc., and on Dyess Colony.

9-*-Dan P. Chisholm to J. V. Highful, April 24, .1952,
ibid.; Highful to D. B. Lasseter, April 28. 1952, ibid . 7
Lasseter, Memorandum to Highful, March 15, 1952, ibid.

CHAPTER VI
THE RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION IN REGION SIX
The main highway leading through Plum Bayou was a
solid line of cars.

At project headquarters, a large crowd

assembled in front of a temporary stage made of unpainted .
lumber.

It was Friday, November 20, 1936.

The Resettlement

Administration had invited the public to the ceremonies offi
cially dedicating Plum Bayou, near Wright, Arkansas, the
first RA resettlement project in the nation to be so honored.
After working all summer, the Construction Division had five
homesteads ready for occupancy and over ninety other houses
in various phases of construction.

Regional director T. Roy

Reid, acting as master of ceremonies, introduced the pro
ject's special guests:

Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.

Wallace, Resettlement Administrator Rexford G. Tugwell,
assistant administrator Will W. Alexander, and AAA Director
Howard R. Tolley.

Representing Arkansas were Senators Joseph

T. Robinson and Hattie W. Caraway, Congressman John L. .
McClellan, Governor J. M. Futrell, and Governor-elect Carl
E. Bailey.

Most of the guests made brief speeches. . "I want

businessmen to see this experiment in farmstead operation,"
Wallace said, so they will be "convinced that thousands of
177
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houses like this one [referring to the nearest homestead]
can be built and thousands of farms like this sold on a
business basis as a paying proposition."
in the country," Tugwe11 remarked,

"People who live

"have a right to security

of possession that is beyond question, to an income suf
ficient for a decent standard of living, to rear healthy
families."

The first three families selected for Plum Bayou

were present to accept the keys to their homes.
not keys to houses— " Tugwell told them,
the future."

"they are keys to

Each farmer, alone or with his family, crossed

the stage and accepted his keys from Tugwell:
thank you."

"These are

"I sure do

Although much more remained to be done, Reid's

organization had already invested months of work in Plum
Bayou.^
The Resettlement Administration followed one basic
pattern in developing all resettlement projects.

Tugwell

delegated his regional directors authority to select land
for resettlement purposes, although he himself made the final
decision on all proposals.^

In other words, Reid was respon

sible for exploring resettlement possibilities in Region Six
and recommending specific projects to Washington.

After

^Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), November 21, 1936.
See Arkansas Gazette. November 8 , November 15, 1936. Daily
Graphic (Pine Bluff), November 20, November 21, 1936.
2Rexford G. Tugwell to Theodore G. Bilbo, July 1,
1936, Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home Adminis
tration, National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G.
96, National Archives).
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receiving approval for a project, Reid had to purchase and
develop the land, construct the homesteads, and select the
families to occupy the farm units.

He organized the project

families into a cooperative association, a legal device to
enable the project to borrow federal funds and carry on
certain cooperative activities.

The typical resettlement

project contained a community center, cooperative store,
cooperative gin, and perhaps a school.

Finally, Reid brought

in a community manager, farm advisor, and home management
supervisor to take charge of the project's operations on a
day-to-day basis.^
Reid drew on every available resource, both inside
and outside his organization, for help in locating land
suitable for resettlement purposes.

E. B. Whitaker (resettle

ment director), B. M. Gile (land use director), and Reid
himself all possessed a vast knowledge of agriculture, land,
and land values in Region Six.

The Regional Land Use Com

mittee and the State Land Use Committees located and approved
possible resettlement areas.

To help with this task, Reid

also sought the advice of the land grant colleges, agricul
tural extension services, and essperiment stations of the

3paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y., 1959), 168; Joseph W. Eaton,
Exploring Tomorrow1s Agriculture (New York, 1943), 87-93.
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respective s t a t e s . ^

in addition, he received many unsolic

ited suggestions from individuals with land for sale and
from groups wanting federal money spent in their community.
For example, Oscar Ameringer, socialist editor of the American
Guardian

(Oklahoma City), tried to sell the RA a 5,500-acre

plantation in Louisiana which he described as "my personally
conducted resettlement project .

" 5

In 1936, a group of

citizens of Attala County, Mississippi, complained to
Senator Pat Harrison that the RA had not bought any land, in
their county for some time; they wanted to sell the govern
ment more land.®

At the same time, other people voluntarily

warned of fradulent schemes for selling worthless land to
the government.

In early 1936, Mississippi Senator Theodore

G. Bilbo reported that "a lot of high powered real estate
agents, racketeers, and lawyers bought from the state a lot
of land [which had been forfeited for taxes]

. . . all for

the purpose of unloading this on the Federal Govern
ment.

. . ."^

^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of Assis
tant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement [E.B.
Whitaker], July 1, 1935 to December 31, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
5 T. Roy Reid to C. B. Baldwin, September 14, 1937,
ibid.; Oscar Ameringer to Will W. Alexander, January 14, 1937,
ibid.; Oscar Ameringer, "No Thoroughfare to Utopia," Reader* s
Digest. XXXVII (July, 1940), 13-16.

®Pat Harrison to E. B. Whitaker, August 21, 1936, R. G.
96, National Archives. See T. Roy Reid to Will W. Alexander,
March 31, 1938, ibid.
7Theodore G. Bilbo to Rexford G. Tugwell, June 12,
1936, ibid .
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Once a general resettlement area was approved,
Whitaker's job was to find and purchase suitable land.

First,

he sent out someone with a general knowledge of land values
to canvass the area.

This person, perhaps a county agent or

the man designated project manager, located and took options
on likely tracts of land owned by people wanting to sell . 8
In some cases, Whitaker also issued a press release inviting
tenders on. farm land, an announcement that both urban and
small town newspapers would carry . 9

The Resettlement Admin

istration did not engage in land speculation.

Whitaker was

anxious to buy land on a strictly competitive bases— the
best land available for the lowest possible price.

After the

initial options were taken, Gile's Land Utilization Division
undertook a thorough appraisal of the land and made its
recommendation to the regional office, which then passed
them on to Washington.

The Resettlement Administration

demanded that land meet certain standards of price, market
value, and productivity.

Whitaker wanted to buy productive

farm land, land that was under cultivation, free from flood
ing, and containing little timber.

Ideally, he preferred

land located near improved roads and power lines and
accessible to schools, churches, towns, and markets.

After

8Madison Journal (Tallulah, Louisiana), February 21,
1936; Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of Assistant
Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement, July 1,
1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
9

See, for example Madison Journal, February 14, 1936.
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Gile submitted his appraisals, Whitaker usually took new
options at the appraised value or less if possible .-*-0
Finally, the Federal government actually paid for land only
if the vendor could furnish a title acceptable to the United
States Department of Justice.•*••*•
The Resettlement Administration purchased only the
best land for the resettlement program.

Whitaker was under

no compulsion to settle for anything but the best since the
Depression had knocked the bottom out from under land values
all over the region.

"Almost without exception," wrote

Whitaker in 1936, "the land selected for resettlement pur
poses has an average yield higher than the average yield of
the basic crops in the community where the land is located.
At the same time, the RA's policy was not to take advantage
of any landowner in distress.

Whitaker was careful not to

force anyone to sell his property; he purchased land only
from those who really wanted to sell .-*-3

But he did take

advantage of certain conditions created by the Depression.

^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement,
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National
Archives; Madison Journal, February 14, August 21, 1936.
B. Whitaker to Will M. Whittington, February 25,
1937, R. G. 96, National Archives.
12Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettle
ment, July 1, 1935 to December 21, 1936, ijaid.
^ M a d i s o n Journal, August 21, 1936.
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As he explained:
It was the exception, rather than the rule, if such
land was not owned by an absentee landowner. A
number of larger tracts were bought from banks or
insurance companies in the process of liquidation,
and the fact that the national government was in a
position to pay one hundred percent cash made the
Resettlement Administration a very desirable pur
chaser of the tracts in question. This enabled us
to buy land at a much lower cash price than the
same land would have sold for to a private concern
where from fifty to seventy-five percent of the
purchase price would have been deferred.14
In Region Six, the Resettlement Administration purchased
194,481,934 acres of land for resettlement, a total invest
ment of $4,823,927.92.
$24.80 per acre.
Arkansas

Overall, Whitaker paid an average of

The lowest priced land bought was in

($21.55 per acre), while the cost of land in

Louisiana ($28.00) and Mississippi

($28.57) was somewhat

higher.
Each resettlement project involved painstaking plan
ning and months of work from conception to authorization,
construction, and finally completion.

After locating land

for a possible resettlement project, Whitaker and Reid sub
mitted a preliminary proposal to Washington showing that the
project had enough merit to warrant the expenditure of time

^Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettlement,
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
15u. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Ad
ministration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of
Acquisition, Also Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acre
age and Number of Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region
Six, " January 1, 1941, mimeographed, ibid.

and money needed to prepare a "project plan."

The assistant

administrator checked the proposal and, if he approved,
authorized a detailed study made of the project and released
allotments for that purpose.

Only then could Whitaker begin

taking options on the necessary land.

In the project plan,

Whitaker in effect had to present a justification of the pro
ject, demonstrating the need for it and giving full details
on everything involved in its development:
cooperative store, a gin, or a school?
grown profitably?

would it need a

What crops could be

Did local landbwners and businessmen

favor the idea of a project?

What were the estimated costs

of land, of construction, and of administrating the project?
Then Reid submitted the project plan to Tugwell, who checked
it for feasibility, soundness, legality, and availability of
funds.

If satisfied, he authorized the construction of the

project.

The regional office then went ahead with pur

chasing the land and drawing up construction plans, specifi
cations, and maps for a final check by the Washington office.
Tugwell reviewed the plans a last time to compare them with
budget estimates.

After receiving word of final approval,

Whitaker immediately went ahead with building the homesteads,
dividing the land into individual farm units, and selecting
families.^-®
At first, the Resettlement Administration did all of

^Resettlement Administration, Administrative Order
162 (Revision 1), July 8, 1936, ibid.
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its own construction work, using WPA labor and occasionally
some of its own clients.

But the Construction Division's

building costs ran far beyond what low-income farmers could
ever hope to repay. ^

After 1937, the Farm Security Adminis

tration fought to hold construction costs to an absolute
minimum.

Farm Security Administrator Will W. Alexander

placed a cost limitation of $1,300 on houses built in the
South and, because of the harsher climate, $2,100 on houses
built in the N o r t h . I n

1938, the FSA turned all construc

tion over to private contractors who could build houses more
cheaply than the Construction Division.

On community type

projects in Region Six, private construction firms negotiated
a single contract for building all necessary structures,
with the FSA acting as consultant and architect .-*-8

On the

farm tenant security projects or anywhere units were
scattered, contractors had to make separate contracts for
the construction of each homestead.

l^Henry A. Wallace to the President, March 19, 1937,
Official File 1568, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, New York; Will
M. Whittington toWill W.Alexander,
July 26, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives.
lQNathan W. Robertson to Paul Wooton, March 1, 1939,
ibid.; Conkin, Tomorrow a
New World. 171.
1QC. B. Baldwin to Will M. Whittington,August
19,
1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; R. B. Lord to T. Roy
Reid, April 5, 1939, ibid. See Resettlement Administration,
Construction Division, Progress Report for Projects in Devel
opment and Planning, Period July 1, 1936 to August 1, 1936,
ibid.
20»fha [FSA] Helps Construction . 11 Construction N e w s ,
V (September 28, 1938) , 5, 6 ; C. B. Baldwin to Leonard Allen,
November 24, 1937, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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To further keep costs down, the PSA. experimented with
precutting and prefabrication building methods.

Prefabrica

tion was most successful where fifty or more houses were
erected within a radius of about twenty-five miles.

Setting

up a small portable sawmill on the project and using a
limited number of house plans, a construction crew cut all
lumber to exact specifications and assembled as many parts
as possible in this central shop.
sections:

They completed entire

wall panels, gables, window and door casings, and

floor frames.

Then the components were trucked to the build-

ing sites and nailed together.

21

Whitaker first tried pre

fabrication in Arkansas and later Mississippi, but he never
used it on a large

scale.^2

The Farm Security Administration built about fifteen
different types of houses in Region Six.

All of them were

conventional wood-frame structures stressing utility and
simplicity.

PSA architects eliminated all purely decorative

features as well as every unnecessary gable, beam, and
rafter.

They standardized house plans as much as possible

without making the various types look too much alike.

Built

^ N a t h a n W. Robertson to Paul Woo ton, March 1, 1939,
ibid.; Farm Security Administration, Report of the Adminis
trator of the Farm Security Administration. 1938 (Washington,
1938) , 18, 19; Farm Security Administration, Report of the
Administrator of the Farm Security Administration. 1940
(Washington, 1940), 17-19.
22c. B. Baldwin to Pat Harrison, February 16, 1938,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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on concrete piers, the typical resettlement home contained
three to five bedrooms, living room, kitchen, built-in sink,
shelving, pantry, and screened porch.

Newspaper reporters

generally described project houses as modern, comfortable,
and convenient; but the structures did not measure up to all
of these standards.

The houses, for example, had no indoor

plumbing, although each one had a storeroom designed for
conversion into a bath when the family could afford i t .

The

exterior of the houses was usually white, the interior
finished in natural pine, with the kitchen painted enamel.
In addition to the dwelling, the average homestead unit
included a barn, poultry house, outhouse, all necessary
fencing, several acres of pasture, and about forty acres of
farm land.23
While construction crews were at work, the regional
office started looking for families to occupy the homestead
units.

The Community and Family Services Section of the

Management Division was responsible for family selection.
Miss Kate Fulton (later Mrs. T. Roy Reid), regional chief of
this section until 1941, sought families who could measure
up to rather high standards.

The Resettlement Administration

could not afford to pick clients at random for its

3"FHA [FSA] Helps Construction.M Construction N e w s .
V .(September. 28, 1938) , 5, 6 ; Report of the Administrator of
the Farm Security Administration. 1938,. p. 18; Report of the
Administrator of the Farm Security Administration. 1940. p.
19; Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 170-73.

resettlement projects.2^

Families were eligible for reset

tlement if they were low-income farm owners, farm tenants,
sharecroppers, or farm laborers.

No one without farming

experience could even be considered, nor was anyone qualified
who could obtain credit at reasonable terms from other Fed
eral or private lending agencies.

Candidates for resettle

ment had to show evidence of initiative and ambition, have a
reputation for paying their debts, and show promise of being
able to repay the cost of their units.

They had to be free

from disease or other physical disabilities and pass a
medical examination before final acceptance.

The Resettle

ment Administration preferred married couples with one to
five or six children, a limitation imposed by the size of
the homesteads.

The head of each family had to be at least

twenty-one years of age and under fifty.

The RA and FSA did

not discriminate on the basis of nationality, race, or creed,
although both agencies stressed homogeneity, especially on
community-type projects, to insure smooth relations among
families living closely together.2^
The regional family services section and the community

24Madison Journal. February 26, 1937.
25Resettlement Administration, Administrative Order
105 (Revision 3), September 25, 1936, mimeographed, R. G. 96,
National Archives; Eaton, Exploring- Tomorrow's Agriculture.
94-99 ? John B . Holt, An Analysis of Methods and Criteria
Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects. Social
Research Report No. 1 of the U. S . Department of Agriculture,
Farm Security Administration, and the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics (Washington, 1937), 6-15.
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managers worked closely together to select qualified fami
lies.

Applications would start pouring into the regional

office as soon as Whitaker announced the purchase of resettle
ment land? only in a few cases did the R A have a shortage of
qualified families to choose f r o m . B y u D f e c e m b e r 31, 1940,
the RA and FSA had received over 11,000 applications for
some 2,700 farm units on resettlement projects.27

county

extension agents, home demonstration agents, and district
and county rural rehabilitation supervisors had recommended
most of these families.

On each resettlement project, the

community manager organized a Family Selection committee,
consisting of himself as chairman, the regional chief of the
family services section, a project family selection special
ist, and usually the home economist and the farm management
specialist assigned to his project.

The committee gave

preliminary approval to families which seemed most qualified
and enthusiastic about resettlement.

The family selection

specialist interviewed these families, visited their neigh
bors, their landlord, the merchants they patronized, and the
family physician, seeking their opinions as to the family's

26iphe most notable exceptions were Terrebonne and the
Subsistence homestead projects in Mississippi. See Chapters
III and VIII.
27community and Family Services Section, Annual Report
January 1, 1940 to December 31, 1940, R. G. 96, National
Archives: Farm Security Administration, Report of Family
Selection Applications, Acceptances, and Occupancies for
Units on Projects as of July 1, 1942, dated August 20, 1942,
ibid.
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chances for success in home ownership.

After consulting

with the family selection committee, the project manager sub
mitted a list of names to Kate Fulton, who then reviewed
each case and made the final decision.

The committee ar

ranged for the approved families to visit the project while
it was under construction.

The community manager had to

make sure each family understood all of the responsibilities
and obligations it would assume in becoming a member of the
project.

The family had one week after returning home to

reach their final decision and to notify the community
manager.

If the answer was yes, he took care of moving their

household goods to the project.28
The Community and Cooperative Services staff, headed
by Claude Woolsey, handled the problems of legal organiza
tion for the Resettlement Division in Region Six.

Woolsey

formed the typical resettlement project into a cooperative
association .

29

Each association had its president and board

of directors, sold capital stock to its members, and possessed
authority to engage in all activities related to agricultural
production.

The articles of incorporation of Terrebonne

Association, Inc., for example, authorized its members

^Resettlement Administration, Administrative Order
105 (Revision 3), September 25, 1936, ibid.; Eaton,. Explor
ing Tomorrow's Agriculture, 94, 95; Madison journal. Febru
ary 26, 1936: Conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 186-88.
29claude Woolsey, interview with the author, January
19, 1968; Eaton. Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture. 105-12;
Conkin, Tomorrow a. New World. 202-10.
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To engage in any activity in connection with the
producing, marketing, selling, harvesting, dairying,
preserving, drying, processing, canning, packing,
milling, ginning, compressing, storing, handling, or
the utilization of any agricultural products produced
by it or produced or delivered to it by its members;
or the manufacturing or marketing of the by-products
thereof? or in connection with the purchase, hiring or
use by it or its members of supplies, machinery, or
equipment? or the construction or maintenance of
houses, barns, sheds, or facilities or its use or the
use of its members? or in connection with performing
or purchasing services of an economic or educational
nature to its members.30
Arkansas and Mississippi already had suitable laws regulating
the formation of cooperatives? but in Louisiana, Woolsey
used a statute governing business corporations until the
state legislature passed an agricultural cooperative law in
1939.31
The cooperative association was primarily a device to
simplify certain administrative problems on resettlement
projects.

The Resettlement Administration leased to the

association all project land, houses, community buildings,
schools, stores, gins, and other community facilities.

This

move allowed the project residents themselves to collect
rent, maintain and repair buildings, and eventually to manage
the project.

Without the association, the RA would have had

30»Articles of Association of Terrebonne Association,
Inc.," dated November 8 , 1938, Secretary of State's Office,
State Capitol, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
31woolsey interview? Mastin G. White, Memorandum for
W. W. Alexander, September 26, 1938, R. G. 96, National
Archives? see Conkin. Tomorrow a New World. 202-13, 215.
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to perform such administrative functions indefinitely.

In

addition, the association received a cooperative loan from
the government to finance the construction of its homestead
units and the purchase of necessary farm equipment.

By

loaning the money to the association, the RA made certain
that development and operating funds would be available at
allttimes? otherwise, it would have been necessary to go
back to the United States Treasury every time money was
needed for anything.22
The Resettlement Administration also dealt with pro
ject residents through the cooperative associations.

The

head of each family was entitled to membership in the asso
ciation and to one vote in all of its decisions.

Project

members served as presidents of the association and on its
board of directors.

On most projects, the families sub

leased individual farm units from the association, not from
the government itself.

After a five-year trial period, each

family entered into a sales contract with the association
for purchasing their unit over forty years at three per cent
interest.

On cooperative projects like Terrebonne and Lake

Dick, farmers had no promise of future ownership of indi
vidual farms? instead, they worked as day laborers on land
they all owned in common as members of the association.

At

^Establishment of Community Organizations, Memorandum
approved by the President on December 24, 1936, R. G. 96,
National Archives; Walter E . Packard to all Regional
Directors, n.d. . ibid.
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the end of the year, each farmer received a share of the
profits based on the number of days he had contributed to
working the association's

land.

33

Ultimately, the cooperative associations were to serve
as the instrument through which projects could become selfgoverning.

Under the articles of incorporation,tthe.board

of directors possessed broad authority to conduct the pro
ject's business activities.

Subject to approval by the

general membership, the board of directors could select the
farm manager, determine management policies, authorize budgets,
set membership requirements, admit new members, and control
the terms of contracts with its members.

But the principle

of democratic control came into conflict with the need for
guaranteeing the government's investment.

Thus the RA. and

FSA, under the provisions of their loan agreement with each
association, insured the government complete power of con
trol and veto.

The RA-ESA staff on each project exercised

ejffctive control over the association and over the entire
project.

The regional office appointed the community or pro

ject manager whose duties were to supervise the work of the
project staff and to oversee all project activities.

Since

the government paid the salaries of the farm manager, who
directed day-to-day farm operations, and the project account
ant, they were for all practical purposes FSA employees,

33yjroolsey interview? E. B. Whitaker, interview with
the author, January 19, 1968.
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although both were responsible to the association under the
terms of the articles of incorporation.

In addition, the FSA

approved all project budgets and controlled every expendi
ture made by the association from daily wages to dividend
payments.

No change in the articles of incorporation could

be made without prior permission of the regional office, nor
could any member be expelled from the project unless the
government agreed that such action was justified.^4
In addition to the cooperative associations, the
Resettlement Administration formed subsidiary cooperatives
to carry on certain specialized tasks.

The RA, wrote

Whitaker, encouraged each farmer "to cooperate with his
neighbors in owning grain binders, grain separators, trac
tors, grist mills, blacksmith shops, sweet potato curing
houses, cooperative stores, cooperative gins . . . and other
such cooperative activities where the participation of the
whole community is desirable for the success of the under
taking .

" 35

The typical community type project would also

have a livestock improvement association and several kinds
of marketing associations.*^

The R A and FSA did not

34Eaton,,Exploring Tomorrow1s Agriculture, 105-13.
35Resettlement Administration, Annual Report of
Assistant Regional Director, in Charge of Rural Resettle
ment, July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National
Archives.
3®See Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro
jects," ibid. See J. T. Holliday to G. E. Lukas, April 30,
1940, ibid.; Shelby Thompson to Frank J. Welch, February 10,
1942, ibid.
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completely avoid aid to cooperatives that competed with
private business, nor did they want to force local merchants
into bankruptcy.

Ideally, a project would be justified in

operating a cooperative store or gin if these services were
not available nearby.3^
Since poor health was one of the major handicaps of
many low-income farm families, the Resettlement Administra
tion also developed medical-care cooperatives which provided
its clients with a kind of health insurance.

Each family

made a fixed annual payment, usually about twenty-five
dollars, to a trustee who divided the money into twelve parts,
one for each month of the year.

In case of illness, the

family could go to any local physician participating in the
program; and the physician sent his bills each month to the
trustee. . If the amount on hand was not enoughtto pay all
bills in full

(which was usually the case) , each physician

received his pro rata share.

Even so, this was more than

they might have received otherwise .

38

The purpose of cooperatives was primarily to give
small farmers the advantages that size conferred on largescale operators.

Their use did not represent either a loss

of faith in individualism and private property or an attempt

3^Rexford G. Tugwell to T. Roy Reid, May

8

, 1936, ibid.

38Report of the Administrator of the Farm Security
Administration, 1940, p. 21-24; Richard Heilman, "The
Farmers Try Group Medicine," Harper 1 s Magazine. CLXXXII
(December, 11940), 72-80.
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to rebuild society with collectivist values.

On the con

trary, the Resettlement and Farm Security Administrations in
Region Six worked hard at encouraging individual effort in
the resettlement program.

Farmers owned their own cows,

chickens, workstock, and all farm implements that a familysize farm would justify them in owning.

Above all, they had

a chance to own their own farms and their own homes.

Yet

cooperative enterprises played an important role on every
resettlement project.

According to the FSA annual report of

1938:
Large-scale farms that can use highly mechanized
operation methods have, in some areas, become a
serious threat to the small, family-sized farm
enterprise. The small farm, for example, may not
be large enough to justify the use of a tractor or
other heavy machinery.
If a number of small farmers
band together, however, they can take advantage of
these modern, large-scale methods, and at the same
time preserve the traditional values of independent
farm ownership.39
Since this banding together took the form of cooperative
organization, there was no contradiction in pursuing indi
vidualistic ends with cooperative means.
The Resettlement Administration's stress on coopera
tive enterprises was not a. sudden or spectacular change in
Southern agriculture.

More than a half century before the

New Deal, the Grangers had experimented with cooperative
shipping associations, cooperative fire insurance companies,

3gReport of the Administrator of the Farm Security
Administration. 1939 (Washington, 1939), 17.
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and especially cooperative stores patterned after those of
the English Rochdale societies.

After World War I, many

farm leaders saw cooperative action as a means of alleviating
the effects of the agricultural depression without involving
direct government action.

In 1920, the American Farm Bureau

Federation launched a campaign to encourage cooperative
handling and selling of farm products.

The Capper-Volstead

Act of 1922 defined the legal status of farm cooperatives
and exempted them from antitrust laws.

In 1929, President

Herbert Hoover sponsored the Agricultural Marketing Act
which set up a Federal Farm Board to administer a
$500,000,000 revolving fund for encouraging agricultural
cooperatives.

Essentially, cooperatives were a businesslike

approach to increasing farmers' bargaining power in the
competitive market place.^0
The Resettlement Administration provided all projects
with a staff of farm management and home economic super
visors to teach low-income families the basic tools of
successful farm living.

With many settlers having less than

a grade school education, resettlement projects took on the
appearance of an adult education program.

Through expert

supervision, the Resettlement Administration sought to help

40gee Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United
States. 1790-1950 (New York, 1953), 135, 136, 184, 237, 238,
240,. 241?. George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South.
1913-1945 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1967), 116-21, 132, 133.
See also Robert H. Montgomery, The Cooperative Pattern in
Cotton (New York, 1929).
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families achieve a satisfactory standard of living and
enable them to pay for their farms.

No family was approved

for a resettlement homestead unless they were willing to
participate in the RA's farm and home management program.
Eairly each year, R A advisors worked with client families pre
paring plans and budgets for the next twelve months.

The

farm management plan called for a diversified farm program
rather than a continuation of the South's one-crop system of
agriculture.

Cotton remained the cash crop on most projects,

but each farmer also planted corn, soy beans, truck crops,
and raised livestock.

Each farm program also had to meet

certain soil conservation requirements.

During the growing

season itself, farmers conferred with the parish or county
rural rehabilitation supervisor on proper cultivation
methods.41
The wives followed a "live at home" program of produc
ing as much of the family's needs as possible on the farm
and reducing store purchases to a minimum.

Since most farm

tenants would not (or could not) cultivate gardens, their
diets lacked essential foods.

But in helping housewives

plan the home budget for the year, home management super
visors insisted that each family have a garden and can vege
tables for the winter months.

Farm wives also received

instruction in sewing, sanitation and hygiene, and household

41^110 Perkins to T. Roy Reid, October 19, 1938, R.
G. 96, National Archivesy Perkins to Reid, November 15,
1938, ibid.
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and yard beautification.42

critics condemned this part of

the resettlement program as paternalistic.

This was indeed

paternalism, admitted the Helena Record, "but paternalism
is . . . required to bring the nation's less privileged
citizens into new and better conditions. "43
For all resettlement families, the Resettlement and
Farm Security Administrations tried to create a genuine sense
of community life.

All community and most infiltration type

projects had a community center which provided the focus for
social and educational activities.

Stressing the need for

recreation, the Resettlement Administration encouraged the
use of community centers for dances, plays, musical programs,
and an occasional movie.

The Community and Family Services

staff conducted a broad educational program for resettlement
clients.

Where necessary, the R A built school buildings and

turned them over to local school boards for operation.

Voca

tional teachers arranged regular class work for adults in
scientific agriculture, farm management, and cooperative
organization.

The resettlement program furnished vocational

guidance for school drop-outs, helping them get into CCC
camps, NYA projects, or trade schools.

Religious denomina

tions held services on many resettlement projects.

At Dyess,

42Joyce Mullins, "Some Facts About Resettlement,"
Caldwell Watchman (Columbia, Louisiana), May 21, 1937; Rena
B. Maycock, "Home Economic Work in the Resettlement Adminis
tration," Journal of Home Economics. XXVIII (October, 1936),
560-62.
43nelena (Arkansas) Record. June 20, 1938.
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for example, the major denominations leased lots and erected
church buildings; but on most community projects, Protestant
groups formed a union church which clients could attend if
they wished.

In addition, the R A and FSA encouraged the

observance of certain

11 special

days" of project activity.

One of the most widely used in Region Six was Settlers' Day,
an annual open house for an entire project.

Resettlement

families invited friends from outside the project, the com
munity manager invited prominent people from nearby towns,
and both clients and manager put the project on public dis
play.

Some projects sponsored a similar Neighborhood

Training Days program lasting two or three days.

If there

were no established county or parish fair, resettlement
families substituted a similar event known as Achievement
Days.

Such activities were an effective means of building

good public relations while contributing to the educational
and social progress of project

families.

44

From the beginning, the Resettlement Administration
designed the resettlement program to be self-liquidating.
In other words, all cooperative associations would eventually
pay back their development loans and take full responsibility
for managing the project.

No resettlement project was to

remain permanently in government hands.

But in 1943, before

44Qeorge wolf to John Fischer, November 18, 1939, R.
G. 96, National Archives; A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin,
November 10, 1941, ibid.; Community and Family Services Sec
tion Annual Report, January 1, 1940 to December 31, 1940,
ibid.
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this process could run its course, Congress ordered the
liquidation of the entire resettlement p r o g r a m . T h e Farm
Security Administration canceled its leases with all coopera
tive associations and gave individual farm families a mortgage
to their land and homestead.

By 1945, the FSA had liquidated

all of the resettlement projects; but most of the families
who had participated in the program were at last securely on
the road toward farm ownership.
The resettlement program operated on the assumption
that society rather than the individual was primarily
responsible for rural poverty.

While relief of distress was

indeed a goal, the RA and FSA placed major emphasis on
solving the fundamental causes of distress, an objective
with revolutionary potential.

Yet what is most obvious

about the resettlement program in Region Six is its cautious
and, except for projects like Lake Dick and Terrebonne,
traditional attack on the problems of the rural poor.

The

Resettlement Administration never intended to launch a whole
sale movement to establish good, bad, and indifferent farm
tenants on resettlement farms.^®

Regional and Washington

officials carefully checked every resettlement proposal for
soundness and practicality.

The regional office sent out

agricultural experts to analyze each acre of land anyone

45conkin, Tomorrow A New World. Chapter IX.
^ Madison Journal. February 26, 1937.
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offered the government.

Only farm families who had outstand

ing qualifications could even be considered for membership
in a resettlement project.

The community and social services

program undertook the tasks of giving low-income farm
families a practical education in farm and home management.
Project residents participated in cooperative enterprises,
but they did so primarily as a means to an end.

All but a

few resettlement families in Region Six were working toward
the day when they could become independent owners of their
own farms.

i

CHAPTER VII
PLUM BAYOU AND CREW LAKE:

BACK TO THE FAMILY FARM

The Resettlement Administration's program in Region
Six included almost the full range of possibilities for
resettlement projects.

But since they all shared important

similarities, it is possible to take a few typical projects
and generalize about the entire resettlement program.

Plum

Bayou and Crew Lake illustrate two different approaches to
resettling low-income farmers.

Plum Bayou, Arkansas, was a

community project, the type best adapted to the delta regions
where large tracts of rich land could be purchased cheaply.
At Plum Bayou, the Resettlement Administration laid out 200
farm units on contiguous tracts of land and formed a separate
farm community.

This pattern was used at Lake view, a Negro

project in Arkansas, at Transylvania in Louisiana, at Richton
in Mississippi, and elsewhere.

The Louisiana Farm Tenant

Security project, better known as Crew Lake, was an infiltra
tion project, a more versatile type of resettlement

(if less

glamorous) that could be used in both delta and hill country
where the land was neither rich nor available in large units.
The Crew Lake tract itself was located in the Mississippi
River delta, but the Resettlement Administration infiltrated
203
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or scattered half of the project's units all across the
northern Louisiana hills.

Arkansas and Mississippi repeated

this pattern with their own farm tenant security projects

7

in addition, Campbell Farms, Arkansas Valley Farms, Western
Arkansas Valley Farms, Crowley's Ridge Farms, and Northwest
Arkansas Farms were similarly organized.
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake also offer excellent examples
of the resettlement program's stress on the family farm, in
contrast to cooperative farming.

Plum Bayou was a community

project, but community did not mean collective.

On both

projects, settlers farmed their own units individually and
looked forward to eventually owning them free and clear.
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake were not among the most successful
projects financially in Region Six, but they did enable many
clients to get their feet permanently back on the soil.
Neither project became the subject of controversy, at least
none that made the papers.

Plumb Bayou was not in the head

lines as much as, for example, Lake Dick, a more exciting
cooperative project in the same county? and Crew Lake was far
quieter than Terrebonne, a controversial Louisiana cooperative.

•*TJ. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Admin
istration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of
Acquisition, Also Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acre
age and Number of units Developed or undeveloped, Region Six,"
January 1, 1941, mimeographed, Record Group 96, Records of
the Farmers Home Administration, National Archives (to be
cited hereafter as R. G. 96, National Archives); Resettlement
Administration, "Project Description Book," March-December,
1936, mimeographed, ibid.
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In sum, Plum Bayou and Crew Lake merely illustrate typical
Resettlement Administration projects in Region Six.
I
The Resettlement Administration launched Plum Bayou
at a time of growing unrest among sharecroppers and tenants
in eastern Arkansas and of growing desire among Arkansans to
see something done about tenancy.

For Arkansas, in fact,

1936 was the year of the sharecropper.

In January, the

Southern Tenant Farmers' Union set up a tent colony near
Parkin to give shelter to a group of tenant families

(about

100 people), all recently evicted from a Cross County planta
tion for joining the union.

The next month, Governor J.

Marion Futrell visited Parkin, heard complaints of harasssment, and declared it ’’much ado about a very little.1'^

In

May and June, the STFU called a general strike, and 5,000
croppers left the fields in eastern Arkansas.

When land

lords fought back with a reign of terror, the nation more
than ever became aware of conditions among Arkansas tenants,
but so did Arkansans themselves.

"The latest trouble," the

Pine Bluff Daily Graphic commented of the STFU strike,
"should be a lesson to the leaders of this state that unless
they . . . take some remedial steps, a dangerous situation may
a r i s e . E q u a l l y distasteful was the bad publicity Arkansas

^Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), February 29, 1936.
3Pailv Graphic (Pine Bluff), June 11, 1936.
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was getting in national publications.^

So in August,

Governor Futrell appointed a Farm Tenancy Commission to
investigate all aspects of the tenancy problem.

This move

may have improved Arkansas' image somewhat, but it also
reflected Futrell's growing concern with the tenancy system
as a roadblock to economic progress in the South.

Headed by

Charles E. Palmer, a Texarkana newspaper publisher, the com
mission got down to work in September, held sessions through
out October and November, and turned out a preliminary report
in December . 5
The Palmer commission apparently watched with interest
the Resettlement Administration's work at Plum Bayou.

In

November, Palmer postponed a commission meeting for three
days so that members could attend the project's dedication . 6
A month later, the commission released a summary of its con
clusions, and they were remarkably similar £o what the RA was
already doing at Plum Bayou.

The Arkansas tenancy commission

recommended a "new homestead policy" to give sharecroppers
"the opportunity of farm-homeeownership."

The Federal and

state government, they suggested, should "collaborate on
making available to tenants land sufficiently productive to
permit purchasers to pay for them over a long term at low

4

Ibid., June 18, 1936.

5Arkansas Gazette, August 16, 1936.
6 ibid.,

1936.

November 15, 1936; Daily Graphic. November

8

,
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interest rates."

Palmer described the report as "sane, com

prehensive, feasible."

If action were taken promptly, he

predicted, it would "end all danger from socialist and com
munist activities in rural sections."

But without Plum

Bayou's leadership, it is doubtful that such proposals as
these would have ever been a d o p t e d . ^
The Resettlement Administration made Plum Bayou its
first resettlement project in Region Six.

By laterl935, the

Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation Corporation had successfully
negotiated with the Deming Investment Company of Kansas City,
Missouri,ffor the purchase of the Wright plantation in
Jefferson County, Arkansas.

Then in March, 1936, the Re

settlement Administration's regional office took over the
corporation's activities and completed the purchase, paying
$198,000 for 5,643.60 acres of fertile bottom land located
between Little Rock and Pine Bluff, ten miles from England,
on the northeast side of the Arkansas River.®

According to

the regional office, the Wright plantation "was the first
tract of resettlement land in the United States bought and
paid for by the RA.

”9

For several years, the Arkansas state

penitentiary had cultivated about 3,600 acres of the

7Arkansas Gazette. December 13, 1936.
Ibid«, February 15, 1936? Daily Graphic, February 15,
1936, November 21, 1936.
8

% r i g h t Community Resettlement Project, n .d ., mimeo
graphed, R. G. 96, National Archives; see Albert Maverick,
J r ., to John 0. Walker, October 11, 1937, ibid.
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plantation with convict labor.

The rest of the land suffered

from floods on the Arkansas River, but it was suitable for
future drainage and development.

In May, assistant regional

director E. B. Whitaker purchased more land in the same
vicinity with a view to expanding the Wright project.

The

Resettlement Administration acquired the Ferda plantation,
1,880 acres, for $97,000, and the Morrow plantation, 1,240
acres, for $54,000 both in Jefferson County .

10

In addition,

Whitaker purchased several scattered tracts in Pulaski and
Lonoke counties:

a 120-acre tract for $5,100, a 260-acre

tract for $10,100, a 320-acre tract for $8,500, and a 390acre tract for $12,800.

This made a total of 9,853.60 acres

purchased at a total cost of $386,000.

After being enlarged,

the Wright Community Resettlement project took the name of a
lake left by an old channel of the Arkansas River— Plum
Bayou .

11

The regional office began making plans for developing
the Wright plantation while the Arkansas Rural Rehabilitation
Corporation still held it under option.

As both regional

resettlement director and head of the Arkansas RR Corpora
tion, E. B. Whitaker was in a perfect position to coordinate
the activities of both agencies in launching the Wright

10Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro
jects#’
,’ ibid.; Carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid, February 18,
1936. ibid.
^F.arm Security Administration,
jects," ibid.

"Resettlement Pro

project.

Between October, 1935, and January, 1936, Adminis

trator Rexford G. Tugwell released two allotments totaling
$205,000 to cover the cost of the land and the preparation
of project plans.

On December 23, 1935, Whitaker's prelimi

nary plans for the Wright plantation won approval from
Tugwell; and on February 12, 1936, Tugwell approved the final
project plan with an estimated cost of $845,750

(however,

not all anticipated costs were included at this time )

, 12

Whitaker proposed to establish 100 farmsteads averaging
thirty-six acres each at an estimated net unit cost of
$7,207.50.

The regional office was to begin work on the 100

homesteads without delay and to drain and clear the

2 ,0 0 0

acres of low, wet land on which about fifty families could
be resettled at a later date.

As for community and coopera

tive facilities, Whitaker planned a cotton gin, community
center, cooperative store, and other facilities; but
assistant administrator Carl C. Taylor recommended further
study of their operation and justification before granting
authorization.

Since construction was to start that spring,

there was no chance the project could begin full operations
during the current (1936) crop year.

Rather than let the

land lie fallow and become infested with weeds or lose the

^Arkansas Gazette. February 15, 1936; Daily Graphic.
February 15, 1936; Carl C. Taylor, Memorandum to Rexford G.
Tugwell, February 12, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives; Carl
C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid, February 18, 1936, ibid. See F. P.
Bartlett to W. E. Packard, July 3, 1936, ibid.
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plantation's cotton base of

2 ,0 0 0

acres, the regional office

proposed to operate 3,600 acres with relief labor until
regular clients could take over in 1937.
By the time regional director T. Roy Reid made his
first annual report in December, 1936, his organization had
already put a year's work into Plum Bayou.

On December 23,

1935, the regional Architectural and Engineering staff dis
patched a field survey party to the project.

By May 1, 1936,

the surveyors finished locating all boundaries, roads,
bridges, drainage ditches, wells, and septic tanks and
staking out the final unit subdivisions and all building
foundations.

Working with the Resettlement Division, the

architects and engineers also drew up both the preliminary
and final project plan books which Reid sent to Washington;
in these, the regional office assembled information on the
surrounding area

(average annual rainfall, nearby towns and

markets, etc.) as well as detailed maps, specifications,
sketches, and cost estimates of all proposed w o r k . ^

During

the same period, the Management Division made a study of
social, economic, educational, health, and recreational
phases of the project, worked out an agreement with local
school officials for the project's use of their facilities,

13carl C. Taylor to T. Roy Reid, February 18, 1936,
ibid.
l^Report of Architectural and Engineering Staff,
Region Six, Little Rock, July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936,
ibid.
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and formulated criteria for the selection of families.

At

the end of 1936, the family selection unit had investigated
262 applicants, rejected 136, and approved forty-seven, with
seventy-nine still p e n d i n g . I n April, the Construction
Division moved its crews to the plantation and began actual
work on the homesteads themselves.

According to a report

made before they started, it would cost an estimated $358,000
to build 100 units on the Wright plantation, and require
214,800 man hours of work, and an average monthly employment
of 215 m e n . - 1-6
The dedication of Plum Bayou on November 20 gave the
public its first chance to see what the Resettlement Adminis
tration had done.

It was a big day for Plum Bayou and a

milestone for the Resettlement Administration, since this
was the first dedication of a resettlement project in the
nation.

The list of special platform guests left out few

names of importance in New Deal agricultural programs or in
Arkansas politics:

Henry A. Wallace, Rexford G. Tugwell,

Will W. Alexander, AAA director Howard R. Tolley, BAE chief
A. G. Black, assistant secretary of agriculture Paul H.
Appleby, rural resettlement director Walter E. Packard,
construction division director Prank G. Schmitt, T. Roy Reid,

ISManagement Division, News Letter, Region Six, July
1, 1935 to January 1, 1936. ibid.
-^Employment on Resettlement Administration Projects,
February 18, 1936, ibid.; Resettlement Administration, Annual
Report, Region Six, December 31, 1936, ibid.
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E. B. Whitaker, Senators Joe T. Robinson and Hattie W. Caraway,
Governor J. Marion Futrell, Governor-elect Carl E. Bailey,
Arkansas Democratic national committeeman Brooks Hays, Con
gressmen John L. McClellan and D. D. Terry, Arkansas public
utilities commission chairman P. A. Lasley, state bank com
missioner Marion Wasson, and others.

Plum Bayou's dedication

was important enough for Little Rock and Memphis newspapers
as well as the Associated Press and the United Press to send
reporters.

The general public showed genuine interest in

Plum Bayou by attending in large numbers.

Although no one

made an accurate count of the crowd, its size may be guessed
from the fact that the England, Arkansas, Kiwanis Club served
500 dozen doughnuts and 150 pounds of coffee— perhaps enough
for 3,000 to 4,000 people, depending on how hungry they
17'
w e r e.x
After the formal ceremony, chief construction engineer
George Barton took the visitors on an inspection tour of the
new farmsteads.

"Come over and see the houses we're living

in," one man gushed proudly.
farm we have."

"Come over and see the new

So far, Barton's crews had completed only

five of the proposed 100 homes.

The new farmsteads were wood-

frame structures emphasizing utility and economy? a newspaper

17

Arkansas Gazette. November 21, 1936? Daily Graphic.
November 21, 1936. For the publicity leading up to November
20, see Arkansas Gazette. November 8 , 15, and 20? Daily
Graphic. November 8 , 12, 20.
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reporter described them as "tasteful, simple, and distinc
tive.

They all came equipped with electrical wiring,

plumbing, running water, and outdoor toilets, at least until
septic tanks could be installed later.

As yet, no grass oar

shrubbery grew around the houses, although plans called for
each house to be landscaped with native shrubs and trees.
Each farmstead, Barton told the visitors, would include a
barn, cotton, poultry, and hog houses together with all
necessary fencing.

For water, Plum Bayou families would rely

on individual wells equipped with gasoline pumps.

In addi

tion, each farmer would have an orchard and a small pasture
for his stock.

When construction crews finished in early

1937, there would be thirty-nine four-room, fifty five-room,
and eleven six-room houses on the former Wright plantation.
For Plum Bayou, the Resettlement Administration's authorized
farmstead cost

(planning, land acquisition, and construction)

totaled $739,151 or $7,392 per farmstead unit.

Of the total

authorized cost, construction costs alone amounted to
$512,842.75, which was an expensive $5,128 for each unit.

1Q

"These five homesteads that you see here are not for
everyone,” Tugwell stressed in his speech.

"They are only

^ Arkansas Gazette. November 15, November 21, 1936?
Daily Graphic. November 21, 1936.
•^•^Wright Community Resettlement Project, n.d.,
mimeographed, R. G. 96, National Archives? Facts About Plum
Bayou Farms, n.d., ibid.? Resettlement Administration,
"Project Description Book," ibid.
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for the farm families who have proved their good intentions
and have shown definite ability to succeed."

20

At Plum

Bayou, the Resettlement Administration offered opportunities
specifically to young farm families? the age limit for heads
of families was thirty-five years old or younger preferably,
not the standard fifty years of age at most community-type
projects.

To qualify, farmers also had to have a background

of 4-H Club, Smith-Hughes, or similar training in farm opera
tion and management.

The regional office chose the Plum

Bayou settlers from families on rural rehabilitation rolls
all over the state of Arkansas.21
Only three families had moved into their new homes at
Plum Bayou before the formal dedication, but they were
typical of the kind of people the Resettlement Administrtion was looking for.

At thirty-four, Joe F. Lackey was

almost too old to qualify for Plum Bayou.

But he "just kept

after the Resettlement folks until they gave [me] a chance,"
he said of himself.

During the 1920's he and his family

spent seven lean years on a farm in Faulkner County, Arkansas,
before giving up.

He then got a job in a rice mill at

DeWitt and later as a carpenter in Little Rock; but when
his three children were old enough to help withtthe chores,

^ Arkansas Gazette, November 21, 1936.
^ W r i g h t Community Resettlement Project, n.d., mimeo
graphed, R. G. 96, National Archives?. Daily Graphic. November
8 , November 21, 1936; Arkansas Gazette, November 8 , 1936.

he turned back to the farm.

Prior to coming to Plum Bayou,

the Lackeys lived on the Case plantation, a R A rural reha
bilitation project twenty miles south of Little Rock, and
farmed fifty acres on a share-fcent basis.
lated workstock,

There they accumu

livestock, feed to carry them through the

winter, and 650 cans of fruits and vegetables.

La Vaugh

York, twenty-seven, and his wife, twenty, and their sevenmonth-old daughter, had also served an apprenticeship on the
Case project where they rented a twenty-four acre tract.
They borrowed $461 to make a crop, paid it back, and raised
enough food and feedstuff to make next year's crop.

As

rehabilitation clients, they acquired livestock, farm imple
ments, and canned 175 quarts of fruits and vegetables.

Born

on an Indiana farm, York had struggled to get a high school
education and One year of technical agricultural training.
Ira W. Counts was twenty-five years of age, his wife twentytwo, and Wilber, junior, about three.

Counts was born and

reared on a Lonoke County, Arkansas, farm, but became dis
couraged and tried a job in a nearby town.

In 1930, he

decided to go back to farming; and with the RA's help, he
had a better chance to succeed .

22

Plum Bayou quickly won the endorsement of the most
important newspaper in Arkansas.

"All who realize the pur

pose of the Plum Bayou homesteads project, " the Arkansas

22Ibid., November 21, 1936.

216
Gazette commented editorially,
plete success."

”. . .

must hope for its com

As the Gazette put it, that purpose was "to

demonstrate the feasibility of land ownership by young
farmers and young farm wives.
good to be true?

. . ."23

Bu^ was it all too

Each separate farm, the editorial said,

will make a pretty picture with its modern comfortable house
and outbuildings,
. . . with its landscaping of native shrubs and trees,
its orchard, its trim barn and cotton house and hog
house and poultry house, and its flat fertile crop
land stretching out beyond. Too pretty to last,
might be the criticism of conservatives familiar with
many unfortunately typical sections of rural Arkansas
and the rural South. Wait, such a pessimist might say,
until ranging stock has had its way with young shade
trees and shrubbery, until hogs have rooted in that
young orchard and insect pests taken their toll, until
needed repairs to buildings have gone unmade for a year
or two, and then see how pretty things will look.
The Gazette saw the hope of Plum Bayou in the kind of people
who could meet the RA's membership qualifications.

"The RA

is giving its Plum Bayou clients high standards to live up
to," the paper said.

“But it is selecting them shrewdly."

These farmers were "the best equipped in character, training,
and outlook.

. . .”

What we want for Arkansas, the Gazette

said, was "more small farms whose owners can be proud of the
attractive and comfortable homes those farms support .

" 24

The editor of the Pine Bluff Daily Graphic was another
booster for Plum Bayou.

"According to our way of thinking,"

2^Ibid., November 20, 1936.
24ibid.
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he wrote,

"projects of this kind will do more for the county

than any other effort put forth by the Roosevelt Administra
tion."

"This is one plan of the New Deal wherein the

government will get back some of the money it is putting
out."

Such projects, he believed, should be encouraged

because they will "eventually get us away from so-called
relief projects.
On a visit to Plum Bayou and a neighboring project,
Lake Dick, in 1939, the Graphic editor talked with Dr. J. D.
Niven, landowner and "one of Jefferson county's best known
citizens^,"

Dr. Niven took his New Deal laced with Horatio

Alger and a dash of Abraham Lincoln.

After listening to

Niven, the editor became even more strongly convinced that
his earlier support of Plum Bayou was corrects
Dr. Niven pointed out that the project [Plum Bayou]
was yielding an influence for good. He related how
a little girl came to his store a few weeks ago to
buy some gOods.
She lacked 41 cents having enough
to pay the bill. He told the child he would credit
her with the 41 cents but reminded her that her
father [a resettlement client] owed him a bill of
several years' standing. A few days later the
child returned to the store, paid the 41 cents and
part of the old bill.
Since that time the father
has paid the old account in full.
"That has shown me," Dr. Niven said, "the value
of these resettlement projects. They are making men
feel different.
They are giving them renewed ambi
tions, creating a desire to deal honestly with their
fellow men and pointing a way to success and pros
perity."
The editor put in the last words

"If the government through

these resettlement projects will . . . inculcate in the minds

25paily Graphic/ November 12, 1936.
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of the residents the principles of the Golden Rule in busi
ness and in life as illustrated by Dr. Niven[,] the effort
will stand for years to come as a memorial to the present
administration.
With full operations beginning in the spring of 1937,
the Resettlement Administration's next step was the develop
ment of legal organization.

Plum Bayou had two cooperative

associations, not one as did most later community projects.27
On March 2, 1937, the regional office incorporated the Plum
Bayou Cooperative Association under the laws of Arkansas for
a period of fifty years.

According to its articles of

incorporation, the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association could
issue up to $500 worth of capital stock with a par value of
one dollar per share.

The stockholders consisted of indi

vidual family heads at Plum Bayou, each buying five shares
of stock but having only one vote.

No stockholder was

allowed to own more than five per cent of the capital stock
of the association.

The president of the first board of

directors was Stanley W. Rhodes, newly appointed community
manager at Plum Bayou.

With one of its own employees as

president, the Resettlement Administration could more easily

2

®Ibid., February 22, 1939.

^ A c t i n g Regional Cooperative Specialist [?] to
Assistant Regional Director [E. B. Whitaker], n.d., R. G. 96,
National Archives; T. Roy Reid to Rexford G. Tugwell, n.d.,
ibid.; Edward Stone to J . O . Walker, May 27, 1937, ibid.;
Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Economic Justification,
n.d., ibid.
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influence the board's decisions as well as guarantee the
experience necessary for successful operation.28

on April

9, 1937, regional officials set up a second cooperative
association, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association, this one
for a period of perpetual existence.

The Plum Bayou Home

stead Association was organized as a benevolent corporation
rather than a business corporation as in the case of Plum
Bayou Cooperative Association.

Under this form of organiza

tion, it could operate without issuing capital stock or
OQ
paying dividends.
If Plum Bayou had followed the Resettlement Adminis
tration's standard practice, the function of the Homestead
Association would have been to borrow funds for development
work, construct the individual farm units and all coopera
tive facilities, lease the land and the improvements, then
manage the project, while the Cooperative Association
operated the necessary community and cooperative services.
Plum Bayou, however, deviated from this pattern in small
details.

Since the Construction Division erected the home

steads, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association had no loan, no

28By-Laws of the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association,
n.d., ibid.; Audit Report, Plum Bayou Cooperative Associa
tion, near England, Arkansas, For the Period March 2, 1937
to June 30, 1938, ibid.; Articles of Incorporation of the
Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, March 2, 1937, ibid.
2®Audit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association,
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9,
1937 to June 30, 1939, ibid.? Petition for the Incorporation
of the Plum Bayou Homestead Association, April 16, 1937, ibid.

lease, and no part in the development of the Wright planta
tion.

Instead, the Resettlement Administration simply trans

ferred the completed units to the Homestead Association,
which became the "landlord organization" for the entire
project.

For example, the association's board of directors

assumed responsibility for paying taxes, insurance premiums,
repair and maintenance bills, and repaying all obligations
due the Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security
Administration.

Eventually, Plum Bayou Homestead Association

was to take over the government's title to the Plum Bayou
project.30
In addition, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association had
the task of day-to-day management of the entire project, with
the advice of the community manager.

The association leased

the farm units to individual clients, collected their rent,
and passed it on to the Resettlement Administration.

At

Plum Bayou, each family paid rent on a share-crop basis:
one-third of the corn and feed crops and one-fourth of the
cotton and cotton seed,

under the terms of the RA's flexible

lease agreement, the actual payment would be lower in case of
a poor crop year due to adverse weather or other unavoidable
causes.

After a five-year trial period, farmers who had

proved their mettle became eligible to enter into a leaseand-purchase contract.

3®see Ghhpter V.

Then they had forty years in which
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to pay the association for their farms.

The association

also appointed a manager who supervised farm operations.
Plum Bayou's farm management plan called for each farmer to
plant thirteen acres of cotton, ten acres of corn, three
acres of alfalfa, with five acres devoted to the farmstead
itself,

five acres to pasture, and the remaining acreage to

truck and minor crops.

As on all projects, the farm plan

had its complement in the home management plan, a "live-athome" program designed to cut expenses to the bone and insure
that each farmer could meet his obligations.

P l u m Bayou

subjected clients to close supervision? but most important,
each Plum Bayou farmer worked a plot of land which he had
hope of one day owning.3^
The two associations played separate but complemen
tary roles in providing cooperative services for Plum Bayou
farmers.

On June 21, 1937, the Resettlement Administration

made a $65,966.05 loan to the Plum Bayou Homestead Associa
tion and a $32,095.00 loan to the Plum Bayou Cooperative
Association .

32

The Homestead Association's loan went for

construction of a store, warehouse, gin and cottonseed house,
personnel house, feed and grist mills, repair shop, and

3 ^E. B. Whitaker to C. B. Baldwin, August 7, 1940,
R. G. 96, National Archives.

32Acting Regional Cooperative Specialist [?] to
Assistant Regional Director [E. B. Whitaker], n.d., ibid.?
T. Roy Reid to Rexford G. Tugwell, n.d., ibid.; Edward Stone
to J. 0. Walker, May 27, 1937, ibid.
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breeding barns.

Then the association leased these facilities

from the government and in turn subleased them to the Plum
Bayou Cooperative Association.

The Cooperative Association

used its loan to operate these facilities.

In reality, this

association used the store, equipment, and other buildings
for two years without signing a lease or without paying any
rent for their use.

At Plum Bayou, suchlleases were some

times rather informal; apparently,, the Resettlement Adminis
tration held the Homestead Association so tightly in its
grip that at first an unwritten understanding was satisfac
tory.

But sooner or later, a formal arrangement had to

supersede the informal one.

On April 1, 1939, the Coopera

tive Association signed a five-year lease with an option to
purchase.3^
The community and cooperative services existed for
obvious purposes:

to furnish members with facilities which

they could not own individually and to provide the benefits
of bulk purchasing of certain items.

Only in this way could

the farm and home management programs actually succeed in
making Plum Bayou self-sufficient.

The Plum Bayou farmers

ginned their cotton in their own gin and bought farm supplies
at a store in which they owned an interest— all at cheaper
prices than they could get if they had acted individually.

33pium Bayou Economic Justification, n.d., ibid.;
Audit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association, Wright,
Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9, 1937 to
June 30, 1939, ibid.
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They also had hope of a partial return on the money they
spent in the form of patronage dividends.

Rather than

depend on outsiders, as members of the association they
operated for themselves such cooperative enterprises as a
livestock improvement service, feed and grist mills, and a
syrup mill? and they cooperatively marketed all farm produce,
from cotton to livestock.

Eventually, the Cooperative

Association added a meat curing plant and a potato curing
house.

An established farm community would already have

such facilities; but in the work of community building, there
was no time to wait on natural growth.^4
Plum Bayou farmers had one of the most elaborate com
munity centers in Region Six, second only perhaps to the
center at Dyess.

Costing $85,000, the community center com

plex included an eighty-by-one-hundred-foot gymnasium which
doubled as an auditorium, a three-room home economics build
ing, and a school building with seven twenty-two by thirtyfoot rooms.

The latter contained a library, conference

rooms, and a vocational shpp.

After construction was com

plete, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association turned the school
over to the Plum Bayou School District Number Sixteen.

The

school served all white children from the fourth to twelfth
grades in the district, whether or not their parents lived

^^Plum Bayou Economic Justification, n.d., ibid.?
Audit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association, Wright,
Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9, 1937 to
June 30, 1939, ibid.
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on the project.

The first three grades attended another

school nearby.35
In 1938, the Farm Security Administration expanded
Plum Bayou with the development of the so-called "Ferda
Addition."

The Resettlement Administration had acquired the

Ferda and Morrow plantations and several small tracts in 1936
at a total cost of $171,947.00.3®

Once part of Arkansas

Delta Farms, the Ferda addition consisted of 3,700 acres of
river bottom land with about 2,920 acres in cultivation, all
located within a few miles of the Plum Bayou project.

In

addition to the land, the original investment included a
store building, an old cotton gin, livestock barn, a resi
dence, and several other usable buildings, although the
tenant houses were valuable chiefly as salvage material.
When Plum Bayou took over, FSA rural rehabilitation clients
were farming the land under temporary arrangements until
definite plans could be implemented .

37

At Ferda, the Farm Security Administration followed
the pattern the Resettlement Administration had perfected
for developing community projects.

With $256,272 borrowed

^Resettlement Administration, "Resettlement Projects,"
ibid.; Arkansas Gazette. January 16, 22, 1938; Daily Graphic,
January 16, 22, 1938.
3^Arkansas Gazette, January 22, 1938; Daily Graphic.
January 16, January 22, 1938.
J. 0. Walker, Memorandum to Milo Perkins, June 29,
1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; Proposal for Development
of Ferda Addition to Plum Bayou Project, n.d., ibid.
37
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from the FSA, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association erected
the necessary housing units, improved the land, constructed
or repaired the necessary cooperative facilities, and leased
the Ferda property from the government.

Finally, the Home

stead Association subleased certain land, buildings, and
equipment to the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association and the
individual farm units to the clients.

The latter association

borrowed an additional $10,436 from the government in order
to operate a store, repair shop, livestock improvement
service, syrup mill, heavy equipment cooperative, and other
cooperative facilities on the Ferda addition.

As construction

started, project manager Stanley Rhodes supervised the task
of subdividing 3,111 acres into sixty-six units averaging
47.1 acres each.

This left 589 acres, part of which

afforded a community pasture and woodland and part of which
was scheduled for later development.

Rhodes had all of these

units filled in time for the 1939 crop season.

With the

Ferda and Morrow units, Plum Bayou had room for resettling
180 families with twenty units undeveloped .

38

Plum Bayou left a record of overall financial success;
but as the history of both cooperative associations show, it
was an uneven record.

The Plum Bayou Homestead Association

lost money from the start and never broke out of the red . ® 9

38

Ibid.

39Plum Bayou Homestead Association, Annual Financial
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943, ibid.
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Since it had no income from sales or patronage as did its
sister association, the Homestead Association's income con
sisted solely of rental payments, and the rents it collected
were not enough to cover the cost of maintaining and managing
the project.40

The Homestead Association leased a considers

able portion of its assets to the Plum Bayou Cooperative
Association but failed to collect any rent on this property
until 1939.41
improvement.

Even afterward, there was little financial
After making arrangements to liquidate its

assets, the Plum Bayou Homestead Association ceased opera
tions on December 31, 1943.42
On the other hand, the Plum Bayou Cooperative Asso
ciation built a reputation for profitable operation.

At the

end of 1939, for example, the board of directors disbursed a
patronage dividend totaling $4,445.00, and there were other
dividend payments' to follow.43

From 1937 to 1944, the

4^t . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 9, 1939, ibid.
4lAudit Report, Plum Bayou Homestead Association,
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period April 9,
1937 to June 30, 1939, ibid.
42pium Bayou Homestead Association, Wright, Arkansas,
Annual Financial Report, For the Fiscal Period-Ended March
20, 1945, ibid.
43t . Roy Reid to the Board of Directors, Plum Bayou
Cooperative Association, November 9, 1939, ibid.; J. T.
Holliday to Ben Ash, November 10, 1939, ibid.; Claude Woolsey
to Stanley W. Rhodes, November 10, 1939, i b i d . ; W . W .
Alexander to T . Roy Reid, September 21, 1949, ibid. See
Stanley W. Rhodes to A. M. Rogers, December 4, 1942, ibid.;
Claude Woolsey, Memorandum to E. B. Whitaker, March 16,
1942, ibid.
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Cooperative Association made a profit every year except one
(1940) due to crop failure.

In 1939, the board of directors

increased its authorized capital from $500 to $1,000 so that
clients on the Ferda and Morrow tracts could become m e m 
bers.^

On December 15, 1944, the Cooperative Association

actually made the final payment on its FSA loan, a milestone
that not many associations in Region Six reached.45

gu t

already, certain weaknesses had begun to catch up with the
association.

For one, some of the association1s enterprises

had long been merely dead weight.

By 1943, the syrup mill,

livestock improvement, repair shop, feed and seed mill,
heavy equipment, sweet potato plant were operating in the
red, while only the store and cotton gin turned a profit.
As a result, the association liquidated most of these acti
vities in 1944, retaining only three "departments"— store,
gin, and repair

shop.^6

The move strengthened the associa

tion financially but did not solve its basic problem:

not all

members were using the facilities to the fullest extent

^ A u d i t Report, Plum Bayou Cooperative Association,
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Six Months Ended
December 31, 1938 and the Calendar Year 1939, ibid.
45pium Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual Financial
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1944, ibid.
See Financial Condition of Plum Bayou Cooperative Association,
Inc., As of November 30, 1944. ibid.
4(5stanley W. Rhodes
Claude Woolsey, July 6 , 1942,
ibid.; Audit Report, Plum Bayou Cooperative Association,
Wright, Jefferson County, Arkansas, For the Period January 1,
1940 to December 31, 1943, ibid.
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possible.

In 1942, for example, eight tenants did not gin

any of their cotton at the cooperative gin.

The Board of

directors took a firm stand and refused to renew their
l e a s e s . S o o n the store, too, was in trouble.

Rhodes had

difficulty finding and keeping an experienced manager; in
one year

(1943) the store had three different managers, and

profits sagged.

The store was also hurting because two-

fifths of the membership of the association lived over five
miles from its location, and almost half of the members lived
nearer outside stores
to save time.48

(and cotton gins) and patronized them

without one hundred perccent participation,

the savings the association could provide were reduced for
everyone, good customers and bad.
In August, 1945, the board of directors went ahead
with a move they had been contemplating for the past y e a r .
For $27,000 they purchased from the government the coopera
tive facilities they held under lease— store, gin, feed mill,
shop, and several dwellings— and the land on which these were
AQ

located.

To make a $6,600 cash down payment, the associa

tion amended its by-laws to provude for a capitalization of

^ 7 Ibid.; Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual
Financial Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943,
ibid.; Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual Financial
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1942, ibid.
^8Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Annual Financial
Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1944, ibid.
49Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of
Directors of Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, Inc.,
Wright, Arkansas, held August 9, 1944, ibid.

$50,000

(1,000 shares of common stock at one dollar each,

and 4,900 shares of preferred stock at ten dollars

e a c h ) . 5 °

Hopefully, the members would be willing to invest more money
in the association in order to take care of their new
obligations.

In fact, they proved to be quite unwilling.

The board made the down payment, but could not meet its
first yearly payment due the FSA, on December 31, 1 9 4 5 . ^
What was wrong?

First, the purchase was a sound investment

but it was ill-timed.

When World War II ended in August,

the demand for cotton plummeted— just before harvest.
Taking a heavy loss, the cooperative ginned only 426 bales
of cotton instead of the 1,500 or more common in past years.
More than fifty per cent of the cotton raised on the project
and in the vicinity of it was still in the fields by the end
of the year, and there was no prospect for picking it. ^ 2
Second, the members of the association were no longer behind
their cooperative; ". . . lack of membership participation,”
explained regional cooperative specialist Claude Woolsey, "is
the contributing factor to the unsuccessful operations in
CO

1845."

By early 1946, the Plum Bayou Cooperative

50j. v. Highful, Memorandum to Elstner D. Beall,
July 27, 1945, ibid.
Slpium Bayou Cooperative Association, Wright, Arkansas,
Annual Financial Report, For the Fiscal Year Ended December
31, 1945, ibid.
52ibid.
S^Ibid.; j. v. Highful, Memorandum to Elstner D.
Beall, February 19, 1946, ibid.
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Association's financial condition had reached "an alarming
stage . "

It was unable to carry on operations for another

54

year.
In 1942, the Farm Security Administration began plan
ning the sale of individual units and community facilities
at Plum Bayou .

55

By 1943, regional director A. D. Stewart

had transferred all community buildings and facilities to
<

the Plum Bayou Cooperative Association, replacing the lease
with a sales contract.

He completed the sale of units to

individual farmers in 1945.

At Plum Bayou, the resettlement

agencies had poured $385,000.00 into land and $1,203,893.44
into homestead development, while the cost of community
facilities came to $373,919.49.

Each homestead represented

an average investment of $8,052.80, the highest unit cost in
Region Six by $2,000.

Plum Bayou, in fact, was the second

most expensive resettlement project in the region.

By June,

1945, Stewart had sold 141 out of 151 reorganized units for
a total of $636,333.00.

To that point, Plum Bayou had lost

$495,541.94 in the final sale of units; it had already fallen
behind $135,957.74 in operating expenses.
came to $631,499.58.

Its total deficit

Plum Bayou finished with the highest

losses of any resettlement project in Region Six.

No other

project, either community or infiltration type, came within

54

Ibid.

5 5 A.

ibid.

D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, October 1, 1942,
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$300,000 of Plum Bayou's sorry record.5®
Wien liquidating a resettlement project, the Farm
Security Administration had each unit appraised separately
by an impartial committee which based its recommendations on
the fair market value of the land and of the buildings on
the land.

The results of this final appraisal explain a large

part of Plum Bayou's deficit.

Although the PSA had invested

an average of $8,052.80 in each unit, Plum Bayou settlers
paid an average price of only $4,214.12 per unit, according
to t h e ’appraised market value.

Thus the difference between

unit investment and appraisal value was $3,838.68.

57

At

Plum Bayou, regional officials fell into perhaps the dead
liest trap of the resettlement program:
the project families.

over-capitalizing

Since it was the first project in the

region, they ambitiously invested more money in the Plum
Bayou farmsteads than the clients;could ever hope to repay,
raising the cost of the units far beyond their true value.
The regional office soon acquired enough experience in com
munity building to avoid this mistake— or at least a mistake
of this size.

5®House Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department (
Appropriation Bill for 1947. 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, pp.
1392, 1404, 1412.
57Ibid.
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II
In Louisiana, the Crew Lake project was the earliest
New Deal experiment in creating a new community of family
sized farms.

Located in the flat cotton fields of the delta,

the Crew Lake community was part of a larger multiparish
undertaking known as the Louisiana Farm Tenant Security pro
ject.

In February, 1936, E. B. Whitaker, assistant director

of Region Six, announced that the Resettlement Administration
wanted to buy land to convert into ’'resettlement projects in
which clients will be placed on small farms of from 20 to 40
acres."

While he showed particular interest in large tracts

of 2,000 acres or more, Whitaker was seeking land units of
all sizes.
About the same time, Lee 0. Sumrall, as manager of
the Farm Tenant Security project, began getting in touch with
landowners in northern Louisiana who had improved farm land
for sale.

"These farms," he said, "must be well located as

regards to school facilities, mail routes, churches, and
gravel or hard-surface roads.

The Resettlement Administra

tion demanded the land meet certain standards of soil fer
tility, market value, and price.

Sumnail examined offers of

several hundredstracts of land of all sizes from small

58Madison Journal (Tallulah), February 14, 1936; T.
Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, February 2, 1937, R. G. 96,
National Archives.
S^Richland Beacon-News

(Rayville), March 7, 1936.
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individual farms to at least one delta plantation, but found
only tfaenty-three good enough to submit to the regional
office at Little Rock, Arkansas.®®

The Millsaps plantation,

purchased in 1937 for $103,000, was the largest land deal on
the Farm Tenant Security project.

In all, the Resettlement

Administration paid $223,540.67 for 7,165 acres of rich
alluvial farm land in Caldwell, Richland, St. Landry, Natchi
toches, Morehouse, Tensas, and Bossier parishes.®^
As a scattered farm or "infiltration" type of resettle
ment, the Farm Tenant Security project fit easily into the
existing pattern of small family farms in the Louisiana hill
country.

From his headquarters at Columbia in Caldwell

Parish, Sumrall supervised 110 family farm units that were
widely scattered through eight parishes.

Some of them were

single, isolated farms; but others, like those at Crew Lake,
were clustered together on contiguous tracts of land.®2

^

SOMadison Journal. July 3, 1936; Weekly News (Marksville), July 18, 1936; see Madison Journal. December 4, 1936;
Caldwell Watchman (Colombia), Septembers, 1937, January 8 ,
1937.
®^-Richland Beacon-News. April 3, 1937; Farm Security
Administration, "Resettlement Projects," R. G. 96, National
Archives; Lewis E. Long to E. R. Henson, September 22, 1936,
ibid.
®^With forty units, Crew Lake was the largest center
of activity on the Farm Tenant Security project, but there
were also nineteen units in a tract at Indian Village, thir
teen units in a tract in St. Landry Parish, and thirty-eight
scattered units, including one eight-unit tract, two tracts
with six units each, one five-unit tract, two tracts with
three units each, one tract with two units, and seven iso
lated units. Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement
Projects," ibid.
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E. C. Mclnnis, RA director in Louisiana, explained?

"We've

kept away from any idea of setting up 'colonies, ' apart from
other farmers.

The farms are individual ones, located near

others and among others.

These families won't feel them

selves in any special class, but farmers like the others."6*^
The acquisition of the 3,000-acre Millsaps plantation made
possible the resettlement of many families at one location
to form a new community.

The plantation was broken up into

forty adjacent family-sized units; the settlers, though
grouped together, owned their own farms and operated them
individually like all other farmers on the Farm Tenant
Security project.

Crew Lake was an experiment which com

bined cooperative effort with the goals of farm ownership
and rural rehabilitation.
At Crew Lake, the Resettlement Administration stressed
cooperative enterprises, not because of any philosophical
distaste for competition or individualism, but to help groups
of small farmers operate with the efficiency of large com
mercial farms.

The Crew Lake Cooperative Association, incor

porated on September 22, 1937, was a self-governing body
operating under a president and board.of directors elected
by project families, who made up its membership .

6 ^Morning Tribune

64

The

(New Orleans), May 30, 1937.

6 4 "certification of Incorporation of the Crew Lake
Cooperative Association, Inc.," Secretary of State's Office,
State Capital, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Crew Lake families
also formed a. cooperative medical association which functioned
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member families attended the association's meetings where
they each had one vote and participated in minor decision
making, although the community manager maintained actual
control of Crew Lake activities.

With headquarters at

Rayville, the Crew Lake Association operated cooperatives
for purchasing registered livestock and heavy farm equipment.
Through community cooperation, the project families had the
advantage of using costly farm machinery for their heavy work
that none of them alone could have afforded.

The association

cooperatively ginned and marketed cotton grown at Crew Lake.
The Crew Lake Association was incorporated for a term of
fifty years and is still in legal existence.
In July, 1937, Sumrall began breaking up the Millsaps
plantation into individual farm units, tearing down tenant
shacks, and building each family a new

h o m e s t e a d .

The

Resettlement Administration's Construction Division erected
a complete village of farm homes, styled after modest sub
urban dwellings, along the banks of Crew Lake.

Costing about

$1,650 each, the new'homes were wood-frame structures with
one or two bedrooms, living room, kitchen, dining room, and

as a kind of health insurance. Lewis E. Long to John J.
Riggle, July 26, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives.
^ Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 1938. For descriptions
Of the homesteads, see also Morning Tribune. May 30, 1937;
Richland Beacon-News. April 3, 1937; The Progress (Hammond),
June 2, 1939; for the building program in Region Six, see
"FHA [FBA] Helps Construction," Construction News. V
(September 28, 1938), 5, 6 .
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screened front porch.

In addition to the dwelling, each

homestead included a barn, poultry house, smoke house, and
outhouse.

The homes were all painted white, the barns and

other structures dark red.
varied from forty to
acres.

100

The Crew Lake homestead units

acres? the average was fifty-two

Sumrall provided each family with about seven acres

of pasture, laid out roads through the project, and cleared
land where necessary.

Crew Lake families had access to a

three-building community center for meetings, lectures,
movies, dances, and other recreation? they could also take
advantage of community services such as a cooperative store,
repair shop, feed mill, and syrup mill.®®
After developing the land, the Farm Security Adminis
tration resold the Crew Lake homesteads to individual farmers.
The homesteader entered into a lease-and-purchase contract
with the government, agreeing to pay for his farm over a
forty-year period at three per cent interest with annual
payments of about $185.

These were low-income families who

under ordinary circumstances would be unable to obtain credit
on reasonable terms and who could not put up any security for
a loan.

The FSA used the lease-and-purchase contract as a

®®Farm Security Administration, "Resettlement Pro
jects, " R. G. 96, Natxonal Archives? A. D. Stewart to C. B.
Baldwin, December 23, 1941, and attached data, ibid.? Walter
E. Packard to T. Roy Reid, July 13, 1936, ibid.? Select
Committee of the House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings on
the Farm Security Administration. 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1943-44, pt. Ill, p. 1062.
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device to protect the government's investment by insuring
control and technical supervision.

In addition, each family

came on the project for a trial period of five years; and
during that time they were required to pay back at least
fifteen per cent of the homestead cost and to demonstrate
that they had the qualities to achieve success as farm
owners.

To prevent speculation, farmers could not resell

their land without FSA approval, though this condition was
never enforced.

After the trial period, the FSA established

a final resale price for the units based on their produc
tivity; and the contracts were converted into fee simple
deeds which for practical purposes eliminated government
control of the project . ® 7
In 1937, the Resettlement Administration began selec
ting the Crew Lake [families. ® 8

After field workers thoroughly

investigated each applicant, a family selection board in the
Little Rock regional office gave final approval to the fam
ilies that met certain criteria.

The screening process was

®7Cloyd 0. Hopkins, project manager at Crew Lake after
1939, interview with the author, November 1, 1963; Richland
Beacon-News. April 3, 17, 1937; Monroe Morning World. May 6 ,
1938; Claude Woolsey, head of the Cooperative Section in the
Little Rock regional office, interview with the author,
January 19, 1968.
®8Monroe Morning World. May 6 , 1938; Paul K. Conkin,
Tomorrow a New W o r l d s The New Deal Community Program
(Ithaca, N. Y . , 1959), 187, 188; see John B. Holt, An Analy
sis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for
Colonization Proiects. Social Research Report No. 1, u. S.
Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Administration, and
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (Washington, 1937), 6-10,
13-15.
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designed to pick out families most likely to be serious
about putting down permanent roots in a farm.

Like all

resettlement communities, Crew Lake was to be a culturally
homogeneous community of people who could cooperate together
and identify with one another's problems.

The RA wanted

couples between twenty-five and forty years of age, having
up to five or six children.

"They must measure up to several

standards," Mclnnis said.
They must, first of all, undergo a physical examina
tion and be free from disease and physical handicaps.
. . . They must show us that they have thrift and
integrity, that they know enough about the job of
getting along in farming, to warrant this new help.
We have to be sure that they w o n 't fail through sheer
lack of knowledge or experience in farm work.°9
In other words, applicants had to be outstanding tenants—
tenants who were not on relief rolls, who had initiative,
but who had been too poor to buy their own farms.

They

brought with them their personal property, including furni
ture, farm implements, and livestock.

There was no difficulty

in finding qualified families to fill the forty units at Crew
Lake •
The tenant families selected for the Crew Lake project
had all moved into their new homes by early 1938.

The new

settlers were usually not shifted long distances or moved
into drastically different environments.
residents of the Crew Lake region.

Most were already

One family, after having

^ M o r n i n g Tribune. May 30, 1937; Madison Journal.
February 26, 1937.
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been tenants on the Millsaps plantation, were potential
owners of the same land they had rented for the past eight
years.

Across the highway from their new home stood the

house they had occupied— a square, unpainted cabin, which
was later torn down .

70

Another family had moved to Crew

Lake in December, 1936, and farmed the land as clients in
the RA's rural rehabilitation program.7^

Before time for

spring planting in 1938, the settlers performed for them
selves some of the unskilled tasks in developing their home
steads.

They built picket fences around their homes, dug

irrigation and drainage ditches, and constructed out
buildings? some built wagonsheds and storehouses.7^

rp^e

Crew Lake settlers had more reason to work with hope and
self-confidence than in many years; they had a chance at last
to realize their dream of landownership.
The rural resettlement program went far beyond merely
setting up a tenant family in the

farming business with land,

homestead, and equipment.

and FSA supervised the

The RA

actual operation of the farm.

Working under Douglas Robinson,

Richland Parish F S A supervisor, experts on both scientific
farming and Louisiana agriculture consulted with all Crew

70Monroe Morning World, May

6

, 1938.

7^The Progress, June 2, 1939.
7^Lewis E. Long to John J.
Riggle, July 26,
G. 96, National Archives ? Monroe Morning World. May
Morning Tribune. May 30, 1937.

6

1938,R.
, 1938 ?
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Lake settlers and gave them the benefit of the best tech
nical advice.

Together each farmer and his counselor worked

out a detailed farm plan— what crops to plant, how much
acreage to devote to each, what livestock to keep, what
garden crops to raise.

The purpose was to provide the farmer

with a cash income and to enable him to pay off'his loan.
At Crew Lake, the principal cash crop was cotton? at Terre
bonne it was sugarcane.

But without exception, the old

one-crop system so common in the South was abandoned.

Crew

Lake families, for example, relied on sweet potatoes and
livestock for additional cash crops? the project's farm plan
included the soil conservation practices recommended by the
Louisiana extension service and participation in AAA crop
reduction programs.
The Crew Lake families followed a ”live-at-home" pro
gram of home management.

Stressing self-sufficient farming,

the PSA encouraged project residents to supply most of their
own food, especially milk, poultry, and pork.
essential,” Mclnnis contended.

"That's an

"Forty-four per cent of farm

living expenses come under these three items, and the farmer
that doesn't provide them for himself is at a terrific dis
advantage. "74

The farm wife naturally played an important

73Lewis E. Long to John J. Higgle, July 26, 1938,
R. G. 96, National Archives? Monroe Morning World. May 6 ,
1938? Morning Tribune. May 30. 1937.
74ibid.

241
role in every resettlement project.

Joyce Mullins, Richland

Parish home demonstration agent, worked with the women in
planning a budget for household expenses.

The key to the

RA—FSA home management program was the pressure-cooker; the
women learned how to can the fruits and vegetables they
raised in their gardens and to provide a balanced diet during
the winter m o n t h s . T o

a large degree, the resettlement

communities were adult education courses in scientific farm
ing, food preservation, nutrition, sewing, health care,
sanitation, and personal hygiene.
In 1943, the Farm Security Administration began dis
solving the Louisiana Farm Tenant Security project.

This

meant simply that the FSA phased out its participation in
the project and transferred title and mortgage to the families
living on the individual farm units.

The object of the

experiment from the beginning had been to promote independent
farm ownership.

By 1945, the RA. and FSA had spent $233,540.67

to purchase the land and $379,211.17 to develop 110 individual
homesteads.

The average investment per unit— to develop and

maintain for five years— was $5,416.94.

But Crew Lake and

Farm Tenant Security settlers paid an average price of
$4,316^73 per unit according to the appraised market value.
Thus the difference between unit investment and appraisal

...... 75Joyce Mullins, "Some Facts About Resettlement,"
Caldwell Watchman, May 21, 1937; Richland Beacon-News, Novem
ber 14, 1936.
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value was $1,100.21.

By June, 1945, the FSA. had sold all but

one unit for a total of $435,990.00, leaving the Farm Tenant
Security project with a deficit of $110,858.41 in land and
development costs.

This figure, however, does not include

$60,223.46 invested in community facilities, or an accumu
lated net loss of $27,202.90 in operating expenses over
income.

Since both items were written off, the project's

total deficit was $198,284.77.^
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake were typical of most pro
jects established by the Resettlement and Farm Security
Administrations in Region Six.
and unprecedented.

They were both experimental

But what happened there from day to day

was undramatic, unromantic, unexciting, and completely un
newsworthy.

They were in fact rather boring projects.

Life

at Plum Bayou and Crew Lake was the same as life anywhere in
the Southern cotton belt— getting up before daybreak,
hitching teams, plowing, hoeing, chopping, picking.

It was

the hard life of small farmers living on the edge of want.
Plum Bayou and Crew Lake did, however, offer renewed hope for
a few families.

This hope was the most important part of

everyday living and working.

Perhaps for the first time,

these tenant farmers had the hope that all their work was not
for someone else.

It was for themselves.

It was for their

future.
*

7fi
House Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department Appro
priation Bill for 1947, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, pp. 1505,
1413.

CHAPTER VIII
THE TERREBONNE COOPERATIVE FARM
Terrebonne Parish has every characteristic of Southern
Louisiana.

The Creole and Cajun population, the French and

Spanish names, the old plantation homes, the lazy bayous,
the live oaks heavy with Spanish moss all suggest strong
ties with the past, rich traditions, and a certain timeless
ness.

Thirty years ago as today, Houma, the parish seat,

was famed for shrimp, oysters, and, above all, sugar cane.
Terrebonne's rich, black soil— the "good earth" for which
the parish was named— had made it one of the most important
sugar cane producing parishes of Louisiana.

Even in the

Depression, its citizens liked to think of Terrebonne as a
"modern garden of Eden."-*-

Yet Southern Louisiana was hardly

a paradise for farmers, especially small owners and tenants.
In 1935, slightly more than half of all Terrebonne Parish
farmers did not own their own land .

41

Young families found

it difficult to get a start in farming.

% o u m a Courier, August

2691

The Depression and

1938.

2u . S. Bureau of the Census: United States Census of
Agriculture: 1935. General Report. Ill (Washington, 1937),
161.
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low sugar cane prices forced many small operators to fall
back on mere subsistence agriculture, while large numbers of
farmers completely lost their hold on the land.

In Terre

bonne Parish, the New Deal tried an approach to rural relief
and rehabilitation that made the old and the new, the tradi
tional and the experimental, stand out in sharp relief.

The

Farm Security Administration's project near Schriever, three
miles south of Thibodaux, was an experiment in collective
farming.

No community project in Region Six made a greater

departure from traditional farm practice.^
The Terrebonne project, along with Lake Dick (Arkansas)
and Marcella (Mississippi), were the only resettlement pro
jects in Region Six which ran counter to the traditional
pattern of individually-owned family farms.

The most impor

tant promoters of such projects were Rexford G. Tugwell,
M. L. Wilson, and others in Washington who considered largescale cooperative farming to be a valuable social and economic
pattern, one that could become the wave of the future.^

The

family farm, they believed, could not compete with newer
larger-scale commercial agriculture.

But farms were not

3Unlike Arkansas and Mississippi, Louisiana was the
only state in the region with previous experience in coopera
tive farming. The New Llano colony, near Leesville in Vernon
Parish, operated from 1917 to 1937. See Henry Edward Wilson,
"The History of the Llano Cooperative Colony" (unpublished
M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 1951).
^ J o s e p h w. Eaton, Exploring Tomorrow 1 s Agriculture
(New York and London, 1943), 80-85.
See Chapter I.

\
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only getting larger? machinery and hired labor were replacing
sharecroppers, tenants, and even small owners.

Perhaps the

cooperative farm could help farmers readjust to the agricul
tural revolution without sacrificing economic democracy.

In

Region Six, however, most resettlement officials were not
enthusiastic about cooperative farming, since it called for
fundamental changes in agricultural structure and social
values.

As land grant college graduates or former county

extension agents, they had always taken for granted the
traditional values associated with individual land ownership.
They believed that the family farm had a place even in a
world of large-scale mechanized agriculture.

Regional

officials went along with such experiments as Terrebonne
because they had to, but they also twisted the philosophy of
cooperative farming enough to make it more palatable.

Reset

tlement Division director E. B. Whitaker, for example, saw
Terrebonne primarily as a training school program for lowincome farm families who could not as yet measure up to the
responsibilities of individual ownership or even of tenancy.
Here, these families could gain practical experience, under
trained supervision, in running a farm.

After a few years,

they could probably "graduate" to individual farming .

5

These two points of view were basically incompatible, but in
the short run they did not conflict.

5E. B. Whitaker, interview with the author, April 19,
1968.
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In June 1937, E. C. Mclnnis, Resettlement Adminis
trator in Louisiana, announced the purchase of three adjacent
plantations

(Waubun, St. George, and Julia) near Schriever in

Terrebonne Parish? in August, the RA acquired the Isle of
Cuba plantation located away from Schriever toward Houma.^
All together, the Resettlement Administration paid $147,346.60
for 5,960 acres of gummy sugar cane land .

7

The Farm Security

Administration inherited the Terrebonne project in September,
1937, and made plans to put it into operation.

George S.

Harmount, as community manager, built a village of farm
homes near Schriever, developed the land with new roads,
fences, and drainage ditches, and organized the project into
a collective farm large enough to support eighty families.
Terrebonne colony has a history of controversy, dis
appointment, and delay.

The Resettlement Administration

began planning the project in 1935? but Terrebonne did not
officially open as a Farm Security Administration project

^Times-Picavune (New Orleans), June 23, 1937? Morning
Tribune (New Orleans), August 6 , 1937? see Times-Picavune.
October 9, 1938? Caldwell Watchman (Columbia), January 29,
1937? Louis J. Rodriguez, "The Terrebonne Project:
Ideolo
gical Revolution or Economic Expediency," Louisiana Studies,
VI (Fall, 1967), 267-77.
'U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security
Administration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of
Acquisition, Also Status of unit Development, Vendor, Acre
age and Number of Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region
Six," January 1, 1941, mimeographed, Record Group 96, Records
of the Farmers Home Administration, National Archives (to be
cited hereafter as R. G. 96, National Archives).
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until 1939.

During part of the interim period, the FSA

leased its land in Terrebonne Parish to the Louisiana Rural
Rehabilitation Corporation, an organization formed by the
Emergency Relief Administration in Louisiana to carry on its
rehabilitation program for low-income farmers.

Using relief

labor, the Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation Corporation operated
Terrebonne as a sugar cane plantation for the next two years.
After a freeze destroyed the project's cane crop in 1937,
the Louisiana corporation was unable to meet the terms of
its lease; by the end of 1938, its losses amounted to
$24,276.

On January 1, 1939, the FSA took over the operation

of Terrebonne .

9

The work of the Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation Cor
poration kept alive interest in a resettlement project at
Schriever, but local community and civic leaders from Terre
bonne and Lafourche parishes were anxious to see it developed
on a permanent basis.

For months the Schriever project,

according to the Houma Courier, was "a hot and cold proposi
tion . "

^ 9

In November 1937, the presence of a FSA engineering

crew at Schriever raised the hopes of the Thibodaux Rotary
Club, which made inquiries about the project's f u t u r e . ^

^Resettlement Administration, "Project Description
Book," March-December, 1936, mimeographed, ibid.
9Henry A. Wallace to Allen J. Ellender, February 1,
1940, Record Group 16, Records of the Office of the Secretary
of Agriculture, National Archives.
l°Houma Courier, April 5, 1938.
lllbid., November 19, 1937.

But at that time no further work was done.

The following

spring, the Farm Security Administration began preliminary
work on Terrebonne.

In April, 1938, George Harmount announced

a meeting in Thibodaux for anyone interested in the Schriever
resettlement project .-*-2

Before launching any resettlement

community, the RA and FSA always secured not only the backing
of local leaders but even that of property-owners whose land
was adjacent to the project.

Those who met in Thibodaux

were supporters of the project, but were probably primarily
concerned with having Federal money spent in their parish.
At the meeting, T. Roy Reid, Farm Security Adminis
tration director of Region Six, explained why the Schriever
project had been delayed.

The time required to investigate

the titles to the land purchased for the project, Reid said,
had thrown Terrebonne far behind schedule.

When the land

was finally transferred to the government, the end of the
fiscal year

(July 1, 1937) had arrived, and the funds appro

priated for developing the project had to be returned to the
United States Treasury.
be made.

Consequently, no improvements could

This was the practice, he said, at the end of each

fiscal year with money appropriated but notvyet used for any
project.

But now, according to Reid, money was again avail

able, and the project was going to be carried out as planned.-*-3

3-2Ibid., April 8, 1938.
13Ibid.

249
What Reid did not discuss was the indecision within
V

the Farm Security Administration itself during 1937 and
1938 over how to organize Terrebonne.

"The Terrebonne pro

ject," wrote J. 0. Walker, Director of the Resettlement
Division,

"has been the subject of considerable difference

of o p i n i o n . T h e

central issue was whether the ultimate

aim should be to operate Terrebonne as a cooperative farm or
"to have each homesteader own and operate a family size
farm."

1

^

Reid's Little Rock office was apparently not

anxious to have a project that critics could compare to a
Soviet collective f a r m . ^

But as they knew, cane production

was a type of agriculture requiring a large outlay for heavy
power equipment and as a general rule had been carried on
more successfully by large-scale operators than by family
sized farmers.
About the same time the decision was made in favor of
cooperative farming, the Farm Security Administration assigned
George Harmount to Terrebonne as project manager.

He had

been FSA parish supervisor before his promotion and was

•^J. 0. Walker, Memo to Edwin G. Arnold, March 30,
1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; see E. B. Whitaker to
C. B. Baldwin, August 1, 1941, ibid.
^5Mastin G. White, Memorandum for W. W. Alexander,
March 26ija 1938, ibid.
l^Whitaker, interview with the author^ April 19, 1968;
Horace E. Thompson, Community manager at the Lake Dick pro
ject, Arkansas, interview with the author, January 19, 1963;
Little Rock Arkansas Gazette. January 3, 1939.
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identified with the diversified farming movement in Terre
bonne Parish.

Although a graduate of Yale, Harmouht had no

formal agricultural training.1 7

Since most FSA personnel in

Louisiana backed individual farm ownership, Harmount's
enthusiasm for trying a cooperative farm in the state more
than qualified him for his job as Terrebonne project manager.
He was the man most responsible for developing the Terre
bonne colony.
Claude Woolsey, as chief of the FSA's Cooperative
Section in Region Six, formed the project into a cooperative
association known as Terrebonne Association, Inc., filing
its papers with the Secretary of State's office on November
8

, 1 9 3 8 . Conrad M. LeBlanc, Sr., one of the project

■^Times-Picayune. April 9, 1939.
■^"Articles of Association of Terrebonne Association,
Inc.," Secretary of State's Office, State Capital, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana; Claude Woolsey, interview with the author,
January 19, 1968. Since Louisiana laws did not authorize
cooperative associations to engage in agricultural production,
Terrebonne had originally been incorporated under a 1922 law
regulating business corporations. Organized on May 10, 1938,
Terrebonne Farm, Inc., issued eighty shares of capital stock
worth fifty dollars each; the corporation1s membership con
sisted of owners of one share of stock. If families selected
for the project could not afford to buy their own share, the
FSA loaned them fifty dollars to meet this initial expense.
On June 13, the Louisiana Legislature approved Act No. 40 of
the 1938 session permitting the organization of cooperative
associations without capital stock but with all the powers
possessed by Terrebonne Farm, Inc. as well as substantial tax
advantages. As a result, Terrebonne Farm was reorganized as
Terrebonne Association. T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander,
April 13, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives; Mastin G. White
to W. W. Alexander, March 26, 1938, ibid.; Mastin G. White,
Memo for W. W. Alexander, September 26, 1938, ibid.; Louisi
ana Revised Statutes of 1950. Vol. 1, Title 3, Chapter 2,
pp. 42-62.
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members, served as president, and Harmount himself was a
member of the four-man board of directors.

Every Terrebonne

family was a member of the association and had one vote in
its business meetings.

The Farm Security Administration

gave the Terrebonne Association a ninety-nine year lease on
all project land and financed its activities with an initial
loan of $415,619.

Of this sum, the association used $280,659

in constructing the individual farm homes, barns, poultfcy
houses, fences, roads, and renovating the community center.
The balance, $134,980, was invested in farm implements,
mules, and equipment used in the production of sugar cane.
Under its lease with the government, the Terrebonne Associa
tion's annual rent for the use of FSA land was a fifth share
of the sugar cane and a fourth share of all other crops.

The

Terrebonne project relied upon subsidiary cooperatives to
carry on special tasks such as marketing produce and pur
chasing heavy machinery and equipment.

The association

became part owner of the Magnolia Sugar Refinery for use by
1Q
the colonists. ^

To qualify for membership in the Terrebonne colony
was somewhat different from most community projects.

At

Terrebonne, special preference was given to young married
couples with reasonable education who had reached adulthood

19
Economic Justifications Proposal for Development
of Terrebonne Project, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives;
Times-Picayune. October 9, 1938; New Orleans Item-Tribune,
June 25, 1939.
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since the beginning of the Depression, although heads of
families between twenty-one and fifty years of age could
q u a l i f y . 20

a. D. Roberts, family selection specialist,

stressed that applicants should be enthusiastic about the
cooperative idea, because a person with strong individual
istic tendencies would not fit into the program.

Even in

the face of a shortage of project families, Roberts' office
refused some applicants because they showed signs of being
"rugged individualists."

21

"The plan for the development of

this project," a news release said, "is something new and it
will be up to those families who first enter [Terrebonne] to
make it a success; therefore, it is necessary that families
be capable of understanding and adapting to these new conditions."

pp

The family selection staff was looking for

families in good financial condition, with reputations for
sobriety, honesty, and diligence, and who were well recom
mended by the business and professional men in their home
communities.

Experience with sugar cane production was

eddential; finally, no family was considered unless they were
engaged in farming at the time of selection .

23

20Times-Picavune, October 9, 1938; Item-Tribune.
January 25, 1939; Houma Courier, August 5, 1938.
2 ^Times-Picavune. April 9, 1939; Item-Tribune.
January 25, 1939.

22Houma Courier, August 19, 1938.
22Ibid., August 5, 1938; August 19, 1938.
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When the selection process was begun in April, 1938,
Harmount planned to settle eighty families, the optimum
number Terrebonne's size could support with a satisfactory
standard of living.2^

Paul N. Mayeau, FSA supervisor in

Terrebonne Parish, advised those interested in getting on
the project to make application at his office in Houma .
On April

8

26

, Mayeau organized a meeting to discuss the pro

ject with interested families in Houma and a second one in
Thibodaux the following day .

26

He scheduled trips to the

project site at Schriever for those wanting to go.

Soon he

had about 300 family applicants on file; yet he was never
able to get enough qualified families to fill all the pro
ject units. 2^

By August 5, 1938, the Houma Courier

announced that the "final selection" of all tenant families
for the project was underway.

But on August 19 the Courier

reported that "additional applications" were being sought.
On September 9, "complete final arrangements" were again
being made at Schriever, but more families for the project
were needed.2®

After a year's operation, in July 1940, only

24Resettlement Administration, "Project Description
Book," R. G. 96. National Archives; Houma Courier. August
19, 1938, September 6 , 1938.
25||guma Courier. August 5, 1938, July 22, 1938.
26lbid., April

8

, 1938.

2 7 Times-Picavune.

April 9, 1939.

28Houma Courier. August 5, 1938, August 19, 1938,
September 9, 1938.
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sixty families were living on the project— twenty short of
what had been planned for; and since only seventy-two units
were built, twelve new houses, having never been occupied,
were still standing e m p t y . ^
On Saturday, January 13, 1939, Mrs. Allen J. Ellender,
wife of the Louisiana Senator, came to Schriever to attend
the ceremony officially opening the Terrebonne project.

The

general public was invited; and scores of interested spec
tators , including many of the families already selected to
become colonists, flocked to the community center.

Acting

as master of ceremonies, George Harmount presided over a
series of nine speeches given both by PSA officials and
civic leaders from Houma and Thibodaux.

E. C. Mclnnis, PSA

director in Louisiana, outlined the organization and opera
tion of the Schriever project, recounted its history and
gave details of other FSA activities in Louisiana.

E. B.

Whitaker, representing the PSA's regional office at Little
Rock, stated that the success of the Schriever experiment
would lead to the application of private capital to similar
projects.
evident.

That the project had much local support seems
Among other speakers, for example, Colonel Julius

Dupont, president of the Houma-Terrebonne Chamber of Com
merce, discussed the educational benefits of the project;
and R. L. Caldwell, president of the Lafourche Parish police
jury, said, "The people of Lafourche parish are behind the

29 .
.
Times-P icavune. July 15, 1940.
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project

100

per cent and expect to do everything in their

power to assist."

After the speeches, Mrs. Ellender turned

over the first shovelful of earth to begin construction work
at Terrebonne .

30

Once underway the development of Terrebonne was rapid.
In September, 1938, the Farm Security Administration had
asked for bids on the construction of seventy-three home
stead units

(219 separate structures)! in January 1939, the

contractor with the lowest bid began work.

31

The homes were

light frame structures built according to FSA specifications.
They had two to three bedrooms, living room, kitchen, dining
room, and screened side porch.

The house plans did not

include indoor plumbing, but they contained a storeroom which
could be converted into a bathroom later.

Although erecting

the structures on a mass production basis, the FSA sought to
avoid a monotonous "tenement" atmosphere by Building several
l i f e r e n t types of houses ranging in cost from $1,495 to
$1,732.

Including house, barn, poultry house, water cistern,

two mules, two cows, corn crib, tool shed, and fencing, the
cost of each homestead averaged about $2,600.
work had been completed on the project.

30

By July, 1939,

32

Ibid.. January 15, 1939; Houma Courier. January 17,

1939.
^ H o u m a Courier. September 6 , 1938, September 27, 1938,
January 13, 1939; for additional delay in accepting awarding
bids, see ibid., October 25, 1938, October 28, 1938, November
4, 1938; J. 0. Walker, Memorandum to Edwin G. Arnold, Decem
ber 12, 1938, R. G. 96, National Archives.
3 ^Item-Tribune, June 25, 1939; Houma Courier.
September 6 , 1938.
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Even before construction crews left, Terrebonne Asso
ciation began cooperative operations on 3,140 acres of crop
land and 640 acres of pasture land leased from the govern
ment.

In other words, the client families farmed the land

as one big farm and shared in the profits as members of the
association.

The Terrebonne cooperative association entered

into "Work and Occupancy Agreements" with its members, fur
nishing them rent free two acres of land, house, barn,
poultry house, toilet, water cistern, and livestock.

In

return the head of each family worked on the cooperative
acreage as a day labourer.

The PSA anticipated that work

would be available at Terrebonne during most of the year for
about eighty men.

At harvest time, the association employed

additional laborers from outside sources.

During the

development stage at Terrebonne clients who had already been
chosen were employed on construction work as much as pos
sible. ^
Under PSA supervision, the association's president
and board of directors laid out a farm program for each year
and appointed a foreman to take charge of farming operations.
He in turn assigned the men work for which they were best
suited.

Some worked as tractor drivers, others as plow

hands, still others took care of the stock.

The association

paid each family head for his work at the same rates he could

33]2conomic Justifications Proposal for Development
of Terrebonne Project, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives.
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get from private sugar cane planters.

In 1939, for example,

the current rate for cultivating cane was $ 1

.2 0

a day and

$1.50 a day for harvesting, plus overtime.

At the end of

the year, the association paid its expenses— overhead costs,
installment on F S A loan, lease payment, and reserve fund—
and divided the balance, if any, among the members according
to the number of hours of work each had put in during the
year.

The project families, therefore, had two main sources

of incomes

their daily wage, which should have covered day-

to-day living expenses, and a dividend paid at the end of
the year out of profits on the cane and other cash crops.
In reality, however, the Terrebonne Association was never
successful enough to pay a dividdndd.. Project families had
to depend on their income as day laborers on the project
rather than on dividends as part-owners in the cooperative
association.
Harmount subdivided 480 acres of project land into
eighty homestead units of six acres each, two acres of which
served as the homestead site, while the other four were
devoted to garden vegetables, poultry, and livestock.
Although project members occupied their individual homestead
units rent free, each family paid thirty dollars a year rent
on the four-acre tract? they could either keep its produce
for their own use or sell it and keep the profit as

■^^Item-Tribune. June 25, 1939; Houma Courier. Septem
ber 13, 1938.
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supplemental income.

Terrebonne's remaining 2,148 acres

included space for roads, ditches, community center, comO C

munity pasture, and uncleared land.
Since the Terrebonne project was located in the heart
of the sugar bowl of southern Louisiana, the major portion
of its arable acreage was planted in sugar cane.

I. C.

Borland, as farm management supervisor, designed the pro
ject's farm program to comply with recommendations made by
the Louisiana Experiment Station; thus besides cane, the FSA
program included corn, soy beans, Irish potatoes, truck
crops, and livestock .

^6

At Terrebonne, the Resettlement Administration had
originally planned to imitate the so-called European village
style of agriculture.

The homesteads were to be grouped

together to form a village in the center of the project,
while the fields would stretch out all around in the dis
tance.

But when developing the project, the Farm Security

Administration scattered the homesteads and despite plans
for communal farming, broke up the cultivatable land into
seventy-two units of forty acres each.

The most important

reason for this change was the fear, on the part of Little
Rock officials, that plans for operating Terrebonne as a

• ^ E c o n o m i c Justifications

Proposal for Development
of Terrebonne Project, n.d., R. G. 96, National Archives;
Item-Tribune, June 25, 1939.
36ibid., Times-Picayune. April 9, 1939.
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collective farm would not be practical.

Whitaker, for

example, wanted to be prepared to split the community into
individual family units if collective operations should
fail .

Thus the Schriever land was divided into forty-acre

37

units which at first seemed to serve no real purpose.

At

the same time the FSA found it expedient to group together
dwellings in t w o 's and three 1 s so that more than one family
could use the same well, thus cutting costs and encouraging
informal cooperation .

38

The communal organization at Terrebonne was the main
source of controversy.

One outspoken local critic was Edward

A. Ford, Presbyterian minister at Thibodaux.

Addressing the

Houma Rotary Club on September 20, 1939, Ford offered several
objections to the project's operation.

As planned by the

FSA, he asserted, Terrebonne was in grave danger of failing.
The spirit of the resettlement program was to permit people
to own land of their own.

But at Schriever tenants could

never own the land as individuals.

Since ownership was not

possible, he contended that personal initiative would be
destroyed and a less desirable type of farmer would be drawn
qq

to the pro 3 ect. ^
The following week, George Harmount and John Lynch,

3 7 Whitaker,
3 8 Eaton,

interview with the author, April 19, 1968.

Exploring Tomorrow* s Agriculture. 79.

OQ

Houma Courier. September 23, 1938.
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one of his colleagues, appeared before the Rotary Club to
answer Ford's criticisms.

Did the project fail to provide

incentive for families since it did not anticipate eventual
ownership?

The answer, Harmount explained, was not as clear

as Ford believed.

Harmount contended that it was difficult

to find people who were capable of operating their own farms,
and that the cooperative plantation provided a means of dis
covering people with the qualities for gaining farm ownership
He explained that if a man had to buy livestock, equipment,
and other needs for a modern farm, it would require several
thousand dollars, while at Terrebonne a man can get started
for fifty dollars.

The fact that the land had been divided

into forty-acre tracts indicated, Harmount suggested, that
the FSA may have in mind actual tenant ownership at a future
date.

Lynch argued that from a practical standpoint sugar

cane lent itself better to large-scale cooperative farming
than to small family farms.f^
On an earlier occasion, Harmount made an interesting
defense of the operation of the Schriever project.

The

farmers there were not merely clients on another government
project; they were, he said, stockholders in a business
proposition.

What of the charges of radicalism that were

sometimes made?

"Socialized farming?

Communistic?

Radical?

^ I b i d .. September 30, 1938. Fifty dollars was the
price of one share of stock in Terrebonne Farm, Inc. See
Footnote No. 48.
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mused Harmount.
apply here.
ness. "

"I don't like those words.

We are operating a business.

They do not
Strictly busi

In Louisiana and other Southern states, the FSA

^ 1

could also present its cooperative plantation projects like
Terrebonne as a continuation of the.Sofcth's large plantation
system.

AO

But most FSA personnel in Region Six viewed

Terrebonne as a place where inexperienced tenant families
could receive practical training in farm and home manage
ment .
Community facilities were part of every resettlement
project, whether based on individual ownership or coopera
tive ownership.

At Schriever, Harmount converted the old

Waubun plantation mansion into a community center contain
ing his office and space for group meetings, social and
educational activities; an athletic field was laid out near
the building.

In addition, the FSA built a school on the

project and turned it over to the Terrebonne Parish school
board.

Local physicians and the parish health unit worked

through the association's medical cooperative to provide
medical attention and health education for project resi
dents . 4 3

4 1t jmes-Picavune. April 9, 1939.
4 2ibid.. October 9, 1938; Conkin, Tomorrow a New
World. 210.
43Houma Courier. September 20, 1938, see Richard
Heilman, "The Farmers Try Group Medicine, " Harper's Magazine.
CLXXXII (December, 1940), 72-80.

One of the idealistic arguments for Terrebonne was
that it would afford farm families a full community life.
Living and working together as members of the community, the
Terrebonne settlers and their families would derive special
benefit from their cooperative effort toward social and
economic security— benefit they would miss if it were every
man for himself in competition as individual farmers.

Such

community fellowship would supposedly appeal to young farm
families and keep them from drifting into the cities.£4
While the FSA encouraged project residents to be "coopera
tively minded," most were unable to readjust their values
and work together as a team.4 5

Many settlers were anxious

to work their own plots on good days, but ready to work the
association's land only on rainy or otherwise bad days.46
While the cooperative system did not suffer from a complete
breakdown, it was not the success that Harmount expected.
Most Terrebonne farmers were probably still not convinced
that community property rather than private ownership was
the answer to their problems.

"I guess every man would like

to own land," one farmer observed.

"But it's pretty hard to

raise a family and acquire land as a farm worker or tenant.

44Houma Courier, September 20, 1938.
45item-Tribune. June 25, 1939.
46p. l . Spencer, farm management supervisor in Region
Six and project manager at Mounds, interview with the
author, December 2, 1963.
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I think this project gives m y family more security.
we'll eat better."47

I know

Like most others, his attitude was

based on economic expediency; he stayed because Terrebonne
meant steady work, temporary security, and perhaps a chance
to save up enough money to buy a farm of his own.
The Farm Security Administration wanted every reset
tlement project to stand up on its own feet financially and
repay the government 1 s investment.

Few communities were

immediately successful in a business way, however, and the
FSA found itself having to carry projects operating in the
red.

Terrebonne was one of the FSA's most unsuccessful

cooperative plantations.
net loss of $42,684.

In 1940, the project suffered a

In 1941, Harmount cut the loss to

$16,582— a clear indication of financial improvement.

Terre

bonne's total income for 1942 was about $15,000 more than in
1941, but it was still $24,700 short of the project budget.
Brice M. Mace, Jr., chief of the FSA's Farm Management
Division, estimated that Terrebonne could "operate at a
profit" by 1944; even then, it would still be a year behind
any other cooperative farm project.

Mace would not venture

a guess as to when Terrebonne would be able to wipe out its
deficit.

The future of Terrebonne, Mace said, was "highly

47Item-Tribune. June 25, 1939.
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problematic."4Q
In 1943, C. Stott Noble, assistant Farm Security
Administrator in Washington, took charge of liquidating the
Schriever project.49

He first canceled the Terrebonne Asso

ciation's ninety-nine year lease by mutual agreement with its
membership.

Under incessant Congressional prodding, Noble

quickly made plans to sell the land.

Making use of the fact

that Terrebonne was already broken up into individual farms,
Noble offered project residents a chance to buy the units
they occupied; he was also willing to sell units to eligible
farm families who were not Terrebonne residents.

By June,

1945, he had sold fifty-two qf the fifty-five operating
units at an average price of $4,312 each; this included all
but 214 acres of the project's land.

The FSA recovered

$224,200.00 through sales of individual units, while it had
invested $300,389.67 to purchase the land and develop the
homesteads.

In land and development costs, the Terrebonne

project closed with a deficit of $59,804.78.

In addition,

Terrebonne had invested $205,270.25 in community facilities;
and after five years Its accumulated operating expenses were

48 Eaton. Exploring Tomorrow's Agriculture. 163, 154;
U. S. Senate, Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department
Appropriation Bill for 1943. 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1942,
pp. 656-59.
49senate Agricultural Subcommittee of the committee
on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department
Appropriation Bill for 1946. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945,
p. 287.
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$47,769.47 more than its income.

Since neither amount was

recoverable, the total deficit was $307,871.50.^°
Terrebonne1s losses were due in part to handicaps
over which it had little control.

At first, Terrebonne was

crippled by restrictions on the amount of cane and other
crops that could be produced under AAA regulations.

Harmount

had originally intended to divide his cultivatable land into
700 acres of cane, 1,000 of corn, 100 of potatoes and vege
tables, and 640 of pasture land for livestock.

But AAA

quotas limited Terrebonne to 398 acres of sugar cane, ninety
of potatoes, and sixty acres of "truck" garden vegetables— a
total of 548, or about nine acres for each of the sixty
families living on the p r o j e c t . T h e A A A had initially
based Terrebonne's sugar cane allotment on the fact that the
project was operated as a single plantation; to have the
acreage increased, the FSA asked for cane quotas for seventytwo individual family farm units rather than for one large
plantation operated by a number of day laborers.

As a result,

Terrebonne received permission to cultivate a maximum of ten
acres of cane per family, thus increasing the entire cane

^ H o u s e Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural Department
Appropriation Bill for 1947, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, pp.
1393, 1413; see A. D. Stewart, Memo to Frank Hancock,
October 27, 1944, R. G. 96, National Archives. The Terre
bonne Association discontinued operations as of December 31,
1943. A. D. Stewart, Memo to Frank Hancock, January 14,
1944, ibid.
5-j-Times-Picayune. July 15, 1940.
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acreage possibly to 710 acres.

The AAA did not revise its

allotments for other crops at Terrebonne until wartime needs
caused allqquota restrictions to be d r o p p e d . 53

if Terre

bonne had been allowed to cultivate half of its arable acre
age (about 2,700 acres), as Harmount wished to do, that
would still have been only 22.5 acres per family .

53

Harmount offered a steady stream of apologies for
Terrebonne's record in his "Annual Financial Reports."
Despite growing losses, he never waivered from his claim
that project operations showed consistent improvement.
After Terrebonne was ordered to liquidate, he wrote:
[In 1939] The Association took over this property,
which was then made up of four old run down plan
tations, [with] poor drainage, insufficient cane,
potato or vegetable quotas . . . , and for the
last five years, at great sacrifice to themselves,
fought their way upward, overcoming handicaps of
floods, freezes, droughts, crop diseases, failures
and faulty farm planning forced upon them. 54
In 1943, Harmount claimed, the members of the association
"felt they were achieving their goals and could see success
in the future . "

35

Claude Woolsey, regional chief of the

52John j. Riggie, Memorandum for Brice Mace, Jr.,
April 15, 1940, R. G. 96, National Archives; see E. B.
Whitaker to W. W. Alexander, June 24, 1939, ibid.; C. B.
Baldwin to Joshua Bernhardt, May 28, 1940, ibid.; T. Roy
Reid to W. W. Alexander, April 6 , 1940, ibid.; J. 0. Walker
to T. Roy Reid, May 6 , 1940. ibid.
5 3 Times-Picavune.

July 15, 1940.

5^Annual Financial Report, Terrebonne Association,
Inc., for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1943, R. G. 96,
National Archives.
55ibid.
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Cooperative Division# believed Harmount was over optimistic.
He blamed weak management for Terrebonne's failure to work
out its problems.56
During the Depression, the rural resettlement program
sought to stabilize tenancy by taking low-income farmers off
poor land and helping them get a new start as independent
farmers with better land.

On all except three projects in

Region Six, the Resettlement Administration and the Farm
Security Administration stressed the family-size farm of
forty to sixty acres, enough land to keep one farmer and his
family busy and give them a good living.

The home manage

ment program encouraged each family to strive for economic
self-sufficiency.

Most resettlement projects centered around

a cooperative association which subleased land to its members
in family-size units for individual operation.

The Farm

Security Administration, in contrast, converted Terrebonne
into a collective farm.

In making a wide departure from

traditional farm practice, Terrebonne illustrates the radical
side of the rural resettlement program.

Bad weather, faulty

planning, and mismanagement doomed Terrebonne to failure,
despite the optimism of Harmount and some of the project
members.

"I think we are going to put it over," said one

settler soon after the project opened.

"I think everybody

5®Annual Financial Report, Terrebonne Association,
Inc., for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 1942, ibid.

will get together and work hard and put it across."^

But

everybody would not get together and work hard in a com
munity effort.

Most had still not given up hope of owning

their own land.

5?Times-Picavune. April 9, 1939.

CHAPTER IX
PUBLIC RELATIONS, POLITICS, AND RESETTLEMENT
The New Deal resettlement agencies were anxious to
present a favorable image of their activities to the general
public.

The short-lived Division of Subsistence Homesteads

engaged in public relations work to promote its community
program, as did the Rural Rehabilitation Division of the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration.

But neither of

these agencies seemed more conscious of the power of public
opinion or more determined to gain support for its programs
than did the Resettlement Administration and its successor,
the Farm Security Administration.

In fact, public relations

probably consumed more of the regional office's time than
any other one task outside the immediate supervision of its
rehabilitation and resettlement programs.

Regional offi

cials probed public opinion, molded it, and occasionally
yielded to it, but they were always alert to what people
were thinking and saying about resettlement.

No public

expression of disapproval escaped their notice; when facing
opposition, they generally tried to clear up misunderstand
ings, compromise differences, or at least present the
government's side to the public.
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Nor did the regional office
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fail to note any expression of favorable opinion, especially
if uttered by some influential citizen or organization and
published in a newspaper or periodical.

The RA and FSA also

sought the support of all political leaders in Region Six—
senators, congressmen, governors, state and local officials—
but avoided political alliances with any group that would
cut them off from rival factions.
I
The Resettlement Administration did not operate as if
it were in a political vacuum, going about nobly uplifting
the rural poor and blithly ignoring the realities of power.
From the start, Administrator Rexford G. Tugwell consulted
with congressional leaders when appointing men to top posi
tions.

In 1935, for example, Tugwell wrote President Roose

velt that T. Roy Reid was "a democrat and acceptable to
Senator [Joseph T.] Robinson."^

Before A. D. Stewart took

over the regional directorship in 1941, Farm Security Admin
istrator C. B. Baldwin cleared the appointment with Senators
Pat Harrison and Theodore G. Bilbo of Stewart's home state.
As majority leader in the Senate and Senator from Arkansas,

•^Rexford G. Tugwell to the President, July 10, 1935, .
Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers' Home Administration,
National Archives (to be cited hereafter as R. G. 96, National
Archives).
^C. B. Baldwin to R. W. Hudgens
7, 1941, ibid.

(telegram), February
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Robinson could presumably have exercised a powerful veto over
resettlement activities in his home state if he had wished;
but he apparently approved of the RA and FSA's programs,
although perhaps reluctantly.

After a conference with

Robinson in 1936, Reid reported that he held a favorable
attitude toward resettlement work;

"he seems," Reid wrote,

"to be pleased that he helped push the passage of the Bank
head-Jones Bill through the S e n a t e . B u t

the RA and FSA

also had the support of other members of the congressional
delegations of the three states.

In 1936, Senator Harrison

wrote Tugwell that he had "followed the Resettlement Adminis
tration one hundred percent."^
Mills, wrote Baldwin in 1939,

Arkansas congressman Wilbur
"is very much infeferesfceddin our

program, and was to a large extent responsible for the fact
that our part of the program did not strike any snags in
5
[the House Banking and Currency Committee]."
The same year,
A. Leonard Allen, congressman from Louisiana, told a constitu
ent:

"I think I have often said that I was as much interested,

or perhaps more, in the work this department [FSA] is doing,
than any other agency created by the Roosevelt Administra
tion.

. . . This is one New Deal Agency that I would like to

3t. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, December 23, 1936,
ibid.
^senator Pat Harrison to R. G. Tugwell, July 16, 1936,
ibid.
5C . B. Baldwin to T. Roy Reid, August 25, 1939, ibid.
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see continued and I have no hesitancy in voting funds for
it."6
Reid wanted to build up support among state political
leaders, but he met widely different attitudes toward the
plight of farm tenants and sharecroppers.

In 1936, with the

Southern Tenant Farmer1s Union nipping at his heels, Governor
J. M. Futrell appointed a farm tenancy commission to study
tenant problems in the state and to recommend a program of
reform.

He apparently recognized the seriousness of the

South's sharecropping system? "the evils arising from it
have become so serious," he said, "that the problem must be
met if Arkansas is to have peace among its citizenship and
if agriculture is to continue to hold its rightful place as
the state's chief resource . "

7

Futrell hoped other states in

the South would set up their own commissions to examine
tenant problems.

Governor Richard Leche of Louisiana com

mented that "it never hurts to discuss a situation."

Governor

Hugh White declared "we have no sharecropping problem in
Mississippi that I know anything about."®

Neither Louisiana

nor Mississippi ever showed as much official concern for
croppers and tenants as did Arkansas.

Assuming that Governors

&A./Leonard- Allen to Colonel A. L. Smith, May 13,
1939, ibid. Reid often met with congressional delegations
from Region Six. See T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, March
14, 1939, ibid.
7Arkansas Gazette
^Ibid.

(Little Rock), August 16, 1936.
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Futrell, Leche, and White accurately reflected public opinion
in their respective states, one would not be surprised to
find Arkansas more receptive to the New Deal resettlement
program.

Indeed, this may in part explain why the Resettle

ment Administration started eleven projects in Arkansas, four
in Louisiana, and three in Mississippi.
Of all the political problems the RA and FSA had to
face in Region Six, perhaps none was more difficult than
Senator Huey P. Long and his political machine in Louisiana.
Huey Long was a charter member of the FRBC group

("For Roose

velt Before Chicago”), but he broke with Roosevelt during
the first Hundred Days.

In the summer of 1935, while Long

was voicing his determination to control all Federal relief
spending in Louisiana, Tugwell established the offices of
the Louisiana and Mississippi directors in Little Rock
rather than in their own states .
directly at Long.

9

It was a blow aimed

R A leaders also worried about how to set

up a resettlement and rehabilitation organization in Louisi
ana, an organization that would have to go down into every
rural parish in the state with hundreds of Federal jobs to
fill.
After touring Louisiana, Robert W. Hudgens and George
M. Reynolds, trouble shooters for the Washington office, sub
mitted a report to Tugwell outlining three possible options

^Arkansas Gazette. July 22, 1935.
1935; and Chapter II.

See ibid., July 20,

for organizing the R A in Huey Long's state . - 1-0

First, they

said, the Louisiana organization could be made in cooperation
with the Long machine, an unthinkable choice since Long
opposed New Deal programs at practically every turn.

Second,

it could be set up in alliance with the anti-Long forces in
Louisiana.

This was what the Louisiana Emergency Relief

Administration had done, reported Hudgens and Reynolds, and
it had cost the ERA much in independence and efficiency,
besides diverting it from its relief work.

The Resettlement

Administration should not, they advised, allow itself to be
used as part of an anti-Long machine, especially if this
would defeat the purpose for which the R A was set up.

Third,

the RA could form a non-political organization, keeping it
independent of any political faction.

The latter was the

best, most practical course, they argued; this approach was
not expected to incur the wrath of the Long machine

(Reynolds

and Hudgens believed that the most Long hoped for was to
neutralize the political effect of Federal spending in Louisi
ana, not actually control it) .

But they anticipated opposi

tion from the anti-Long faction since the latter believed
the RA's purpose was to help them build up an anti-Long
machine.

Ironically, the report ended:

"to follow the third

course and do an excellent piece of work is . . . in the long
run the most effective opposition to Senator Long."

Long's

•^Robert W. Hudgens and George M. Reynolds, Memorandum
to R. G. Tugwell, July 15, 1935, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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death in September relieved the RA of its dilemma.
1936, Reynolds wrote:

In May,

"The Long faction has made peace in

Washington— they evidently are taking the attitude they will
vote in accordance with the wishes of FDR on any measure."
He further reported that Governor Leche was favorably in
clined toward the RA, as was Mrs. Huey P. Long.-*--1- In 1936,
Reid moved the Louisiana director's staff to New Orleans and
the Mississippi office to Jackson.
II
The Information Division of the regional office served
as Reid's liaison staff between the operating divisions

(like

Resettlement or Rehabilitation) and the general public.
0. E. Jones was the first Information advisor, followed by
George Wolf and J. Lewis Henderson; all were professional
newspapermen.

The Information Advisor became in effect the

press secretary for the regional office.

The most important

service he performed was to establish and maintain cordial
relations with the public in Region Six.

To do this, he had

at his command an organization that included radio, photo
graphic, correspondence, and editorial sections. ^

The

Information Division found the best and friendliest medium
for conveying information to the public to be daily and

H - G e o r g e

M. Reynolds to W. W. Alexander, May 22, 1936,

i b i d.
l^see John Fischer, Memorandum for 0. ,A. Simmes,
July 19, 1941, ibid.
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weekly newspapers.

Its staff wrote everything from simple

press releases to feature stories for metropolitan Sunday
magazine sections, distributing them through a network of
450 newspapers on a regular mailing list.

They supplied the

public with pamphlets on resettlement in Region Six, worked
up exhibits for county and state fairs, and handled arrange
ments for dedicatory ceremonies at resettlement projects
Where possible, the Division worked through civic clubs,
churches, fraternal groups, chambers of commerce, labor
unions, farm organizations, schools and colleg e s . ^

From

January to August, 1939, for example, Wolf estimated that
local personnel had given 884 luncheon dlub talks, regional
and state personnel 150 t a l k s . ^
As long as depression hung over the countryside, the
resettlement agencies enjoyed their greatest public support
in Region Six.

In December, 1936, according to a Gallup

poll, public opinion in the South strongly favored government
help for low-income farmers.

Gallup's question was,

"Would

you favor government loans, on a long-time and easy basis,
to enable farm tenants to buy the farms they now rent?"

In

Arkansas, eighty-nine per cent of those polled answered y e s ,
as did eighty-eight per cent in Mississippi, and eighty-four

l^Report of Activities of Information Division from
July 1, 1935 to December 31, 1936, ibid.
1-4J o h n Fischer, Memorandum to all Information Advisors,
December 10, 1940, ibid.
l5George Wolf to John Fischer, August 16, 1939, ibid.

per cent in Lotiisiana.1®

But whether these majorities

favored the resettlement program specifically is another
question.

In his first annual report

(1936), Reid stressed

the good public relations enjoyed between the Resettlement
Administration and the general public in Region Six.
press," he wrote,

"The

"has been favorable and generally anxious

to carry information about Resettlement."

Such local groups

as civic clubs, farmers organizations, and home demonstration
councils were giving their support.

"There have been no

opposing organizations, and the public, generally, seems to
be very favorable to the work which Resettlement is doing.
There is, occasionally," he admitted,

"criticism of pro

cedures or of delays in activities, but the general objec
tives of the work seems to be meeting with strong public
favor . "

17

Almost a year later, John Fischer, national

information director, reported!

"Newspapers continue to be

extremely friendly both to work undertaken by R A and the new
work of FSA.

The opening of projects in Arkansas and the com

pleted projects in Mississippi received wide and laudatory
comment."1®

Not all favorable comments went as far as that

ISBirminqham News (Alabama), December 13, 1936;
Arkansas Gazette. December 12, 1936.
17Annual Report, Resettlement Administration, Region
VI, As of December 31, 1936, R. G. 96, National Archives.
18John Fischer, Memorandum for W. W. Alexander,
November 20, 1937, ibid.
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of a farm wife in West Carroll Parish, Louisiana, who told a
home demonstration supervisor:
God Himself .

"The RA was thought of by

" 19

Occasionally, regional officials had to deal with
situations that might have caused an unfavorable influence
on public opinion.

Reid wanted to make sure good news got

spread around, but he was equally determined to keep the lid
on bad news.

On June 9, 1939, the Lake Providence, Louisiana,

Banner Democrat carried a brief story on the front page of an
/

automobile accident near Tallulah in which two men and a girl
were killed and another girl was hurt.
details were given.

No names and few

George Wolf, regional information

advisor, had persuaded the Banner editor to make no mention
of the fact that the two men were FSA personnel assigned to
the nearby Transylvania project— plus the fact that they were
both drunk at the time of the accident.
trouble down there," Wolf wrote,

"We have had so much

"I was afraid the crowning

touch would be the project getting the reputation of hiring
a bunch of drunks .

" 20

His attempt to cover up the facts

almost worked, as it doubtless did in other cases, but the
Banner editor apparently forgot to tell the society page
editor about his agreement with the FSA.

There it w a s ,

printed on an inside page of the same issue, the story Wolf

19Martha D. Dinwiddle to R. G. Tugwell, July 23, 1936,
ibid.
20George Wolf to Jack [John Fischer], June 27, 1939,
ibid.
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wanted suppressed, and written with a strong dose of moral
disapproval.

This version of the accident told what the men

did for a living, their names, Leroy Haggerty and J. G.
Enright, but not the names of the girls

(they were from u p 

standing local families presumably), and called attention to
the fact that both men were forty years of age, the girls
twenty or less, and that one man was married.

The accident

took place, the society editor further revealed, at four
o'clock in the morning after the couples had just left the
"Cat Head" club at Tallulah.

The men "had no less than ten

drinks each," but the girls, she assured the readers, had
not been drinking at all.
One of the most dangerous public relation
in Region Six was race.

problems

"At the risk of its political life, "

writes William E. Leuchtenburg,

"the PSA was scrupulously

fair in its treatment of Negroes."2^

The Division of

Subsistence Homesteads had plans for a Negro project at
Camden, Arkansas ;

22

but it was the Resettlement Administration

that built the first community projects for Negroes in Region
Six:

the Lakeview community in Phillips County, Arkansas;

the Townes project near Earle in Crittenden County; and the
Mounds community in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana.

For a

^ W i l l i a m E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the New Deal. 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 141.
22See Glenn E. Riddell to Bruce L. Melvin, March 1,
1934, March 4, 1934, R. G. 96, National Archives.

280
time, the FSA supervised farm operations at Mound Bayou,
Mississippi, an all-Negro rural community of long standing.
In addition, Negroes became members of predominantly white
projects throughout the region.

By 1941, the FSA had

developed 791 units for Negro farmers in the Region Six
resettlement program, or about thirty-two per cent of the
total units .

33

The Farm Security Administration's policy of fair
treatment for Negroes meant public relations trouble— trouble
from blacks as well as whites, with the regional office
caught in the middle.

Some Negroes were quick to protest

what they believed to be racial discrimination in the reset
tlement program.

Region Six officials, for example, ran into

Negro protests over its handling of the Transylvania project
in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana.

When the RA made the

Transylvania purchase, about 250 Negro families were farming
the land under private ownership.

But the F S A developed

Transylvania as a white project, meaning that all 250 Negro
families moved off and white families took their places. The
American Negro Press, a wire service for such papers as the
Pittsburgh Courier, the Kansas City Call, and the Louisiana
Weekly

(New Orleans), challenged this action on the ground

3 3 U. s. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security
Administration, "Resettlement Projects, Land and Source of
Acquisition, Also Status of Unit Development, Vendor, Acreate and Number of Units Developed or Undeveloped, Region
Six," January 1, 1941, mimeographed, ibid.
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of racial discrimination.24

in response, Region Six offi

cials appeared anxious to keep the confidence of the N e g r o ■
press.

In early February, 1939, E. B. Whitaker (assistant

regional director), E. C. Mclnnis
0. E. Jones

(Louisiana director), and

(regional information advisor), and others spent

two hours in New Orleans with Leon Lewis, Pittsburgh Courier
reporter.25

Specifically, Whitaker and Mclnnis presented a

plan to ensure fair treatment for Negro farmers.

The Mounds

project, Lewis learned, would take care of qualified Negro
families displaced at Transylvania.

Lewis "was not only

satisfied— he was enthusiastic,” according to Jones' report
of the meeting? his personal investigation convinced him
that his race "was, if anything, getting the best of the
bargain there."26

jn reality, Lewis was still skeptical.

There was no discrimination in the incident, he reported to
his paper.

"The same thing that is being done to Negroes is

being done to whites, and they are complaining as much." 2 ?
The Information Division afterward made a conscious effort
to keep the ANP informed of progress at Mounds.

When the

2%fathan W. Robertson, Memorandum for W. W. Alexander,
n.d., ibid.; George Fischer, Memorandum to C. B. Baldwin,
n.d., ibid.
25o. E. Jones to Nathan Robertson, February

8

, 1939,

ibid.
26ibid.
27Leon Lewis to Claude Barnett, February 4, 1939,
ibid.
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construction contract was awarded, Jones wired them full
details of building plans.

As a result, the ANP let up on

its criticism.^®
At the same time, the Farm Security Administration
was sensitive to the danger of alienating whites in the
region.

Regional officials always sought the support of the

white majority before going ahead with proposals for Negro
resettlement.

On the Louisiana Farm Tenant Security project,

for example, community manager Lee 0. Sumrall not only
sounded out local opinion on plans for resettling Negroes on
some of the units, but asked reputable citizens and land
owners to write letters expressing their approval of the
idea.

29

This request was standard procedurey without their

support, no Negroes would have been placed on the project.
Despite all precautions, however, white racism was a problem
in Region Six.

Concerning Negro participation in F S A p r o 

grams, a Mississippi woman wrote:

"I know that the aim of

this Administration is to force racial equality on us here
in the South, and the farm program is the biggest weapon they
have.

Government lending without security and wastefulness

in general," she said, "is killing what little thrift and

^ D i v i s i o n of Information, Farm Security Administra
tion, to Associated Negro Press (telegram), February 7, 1939,
ibid.
29Lee o. sumrall to E. B. Whitaker, August 31, 1936,
ibid.; T. Roy Reid to W. W. -Alexander, December 11, 1937,
ibid.
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initiative our Negroes had to start w i t h . " - * 0
Perhaps more important, the P S A in Region Six en
countered the race issue in its personnel policies.

Negroes

were employed at lower levels of the regional organization.
Most Negro employees were women serving as home management
supervisors on Negro projects, with a few in charge of home
management work for an entire project.

A few Negro men

worked as farm management advisors and as field representa
tives in the rural rehabilitation or tenant purchase pro
grams. 3^

in 1939, the PSA had eleven Negro workers in

Arkansas, seven in Louisiana, and fourteen in Mississippi.3^
Despite this meager number, a group of Adams County, Missis
sippi, citizens decided in October that the FSA had gone too
far.

They drew up a resolution protesting the employment of

a Negro in the FSA office at Natchez.3 3

(He was serving as

assistant rural rehabilitation supervisor for Adams County.)
They called attention to the fact that the FSA office was in
the courthouse, that "young white ladies" were employed in
the office and came into contact with the Negro employee.

30Ruby Pugh (Mrs. J. J. Pugh) to George Mitchell,
September 9, 1941, ibid.
31william F. Littlejohn, Memorandum for George S.
Mitchell, November 14, 1940, ibid.
32gee T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, April 26, 1940,
ibid.; Roy Hendrickson, Memorandum for George Mitchell,
May 24, 1940, ibid.
3^Dan R. McGehee to C. B. Baldwin, October 31, 1938,
ibid.
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Senator Theodore G. Bilbo also strongly protested this "out
rage."

"You,” he wrote Mississippi director M. T. Aldrich,

"as a good Mississippian, should clean out this situation at
once.”

''Mississippi is still a white man's country," he said,

"and we do not want Negroes bumping up against our white
girls in the official life of the state."34
The F S A quickly yielded to prejudice.

There were 133

Negro clients in Adams County, Reid explained; "it is neces
sary for someone to contact them and go into homes and work
intimately with them in the home and farm planning opera
tions."

The Negro employee "does not have an office with

white people . . . ," Reid added,

"it is not the desire of

this office to place a Negro worker where it is objectionable
to the

people.

"35

FSA Assistant Administrator Milo Perkins

thought the F S A had acted in accordance with a "well estab
lished principle throughout the South"— that of letting
Negroes work with Negroes.

In addition, Perkins noted, the

Adams County assistant supervisor "was to operate entirely
under the immediate supervision of the white rural rehabili
tation supervisor and was to spend all his time in the field.
Consequently, he would have had no occasion to enter into
office relationships with the other employees of the county

34rpheodore Gm Bilbo to M. T. Aldrich, October 29,
1938, ibid.
35t . Roy Reid to Theodore G. Bilbo, November 4, 1938,
ibid.
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unit."3®

The unfortunate man was transferred out of Adams

COunty, presumably to a more congenial location.

Later,

regional director A. D. Stewart expressed a desire "to employ
Negro personnel when it can be done without creating a situ
ation that would injure rather than improve the advancement
of the colored people .

”37

In truth, the PSA had all the

problems it could handle without getting involved with a
crusade for racial justice.
Ill
Prom the beginning, the Resettlement Administration
encountered skeptics and critics in Region Six.

Free-lance

writer Oren Stephens once told the story of a sociologist
visiting Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

He stopped a native Pine

Bluffian on a street corner and asked him what he thought of
the Farm Security Administration.

"Well, it's this w a y , ”

said the native:
The government spends a million dollars or so to buy
a forty-acre farm for a down-and-out sharecropper.
They give him a mule, a bathtub, and an electric
shoelacer. They lay a railroad track to his house to
carry the tons of forms he has to fill in. A bunch
of experts figure his milking I.Q. Lo and behold,
they teach his wife how to hook rugs and can beef and
spinach, and they show the feller how to plant soybeans
and prune an orchard— and by darn, Luke, them govern
ment people can actually do it! After we poke fun at

3®Milo Perkins to Pat Harrison,, November 18, 1938,
ibid.
37A. D. Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, December 10, 1941,
ibid.
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their red tape for a year or two, they ups and
proves their experiment is self-liquidatin'—
that the feller is makin' his payments and
raisin' a family, too. And I don't know who's
more surprised, me or the ' c r o p p e r . 38
The native correctly stated the pro and con arguments over
the resettlement (cost, frills, red tape), but not all critics
were so open-minded.

When Lakeview, a Negro project in

Phillips County, Arkansas, was announced, the Helena World
was openly skeptical;

"We want to see how many families will

succeed in becoming independent when the means to do so come
handed out on a platter from a bountiful government . "

39

In

1937, an El Dorado, Arkansas, man complained that government
assistance to low-income farmers was an unfair advantage to
hard-working citizens, presumably like himself.

"I believe

we have too many farmers already . . . ," he told Secretary
of Agriculture Wallace.

"You or our National Government want

to buy land and place more farmers to farm against each
other."

"The old pioneer citizen and taxpayer of the country

[is] trying to live, and pulling himself up by his boot
straps, while his neighbor [is] supported by the Govern
ment. "

^ 0

Two years later, several members

(not a majority)

of the Arkansas General Assembly signed a statement protesting

3 8 0ren Stephens, “PSA Fights for Its Life." Harper's
Magazine, CLXXXVI (April, 1943), 479.

3H e l e n a World (Arkansas), November 11, 1935.
40 b . Justiss to Henry Wallace, December 26, 1937,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
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the FSA's policy of operating farms in "direct competition
with private f a r m e r s . "41

Much of the early criticism was

sporadic, unorganized, and without any real consequence; but
by the late thirties, FSA policies had antagonized certain
interest groups, and opposition increased.
In a 1939 meeting at Biloxi, the Mississippi Bankers
Association passed a resolution condemning FSA credit poli
cies. 42

ijjhe bankers' association was critical of government

lending agencies for making loans in competition with private
bankers.

The FSA responded by sounding out the extent and

nature of opposition among Mississippi bankers and by
attempting to clear up any misunderstanding about FSA programs.
Mississippi state director Marvin T. Aldrich contacted
several bankers; and with some, he ran up against solid oppo
sition.

Frank Allen of Canton, one of the leaders behind

the resolution,

"was not in favor of any of the New Deal

governmental agencies," an FSA official reported.

"In his

opinion the Farm Security Administration was not making any
loans that the bank [sic] cared to make but [it] interfered
with the banks' loans to the landlords, who were to furnish
the tenants."43

But Aldrich found the banking community

41John E. Miller to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February
3, 1939, Official File 1568, Box 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde P ark, New Y o r k .
4 2 t. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 18, 1939, R. G.
96, National Archives.
43Sidney J. Johnson to Marvin T. Aldrich, June 17,
1939, ibid.
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badly split over the resolution, with some of its members
anxious to make excuses for their association.

A. L. Rogers,

president of the bankers' association, had not been behind
the move to name the FSA specifically in the resolution.

The

bankers, Rogers told Aldrich, had directed their resolution
primarily at such agencies as the Home Owners Loan Corpora
tion, the Federal Housing Administration, the Farm Credit
Administration, and the Farm Labor Board.

They had included

the FSA because of the fear on the part of some bankers that
it might later encroach on the loaning functions of private
bankers, not because of any of its current activities.44
Information advisor George Wolf also found that the resolu
tion did not represent the feelings of rural bankers in
Mississippi; he reported "a sharp division— the city bankers
voting for the resolution and the country and small-town
bankers voting against it."45

R. L. Goodwin, vice-president

of the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Forest, wrote that the
FSA in his county handled a large volume of loan and long
term credit "which was not available for any local bank."
"You have helped a great many farmers who could not have
received this kind of help from any other source," he wrote
Alexander.

"I consider the Farm Security Administration the

44m . T. .Aldrich to T. Roy Reid, May 31, 1939, i b i d .;
Reid to W. W. Alexander, June 7, 1939, ibid.
4 5 G e o r g e Wolf to John Fischer, May 27, 1939,

ibid.
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finest New Deal project established by President Roosevelt."

4*6

With opinion divided, the FSA could count on support from at
least some Mississippi bankers for its credit programs.
In 1942, the Farm Security Administration became
involved in a different kind of controversy at Transylvania.
On February 11, the Police Jury of East Carroll Parish,
Louisiana, issued a statement sharply critical of the F S A as
a whole and the Transylvania project in particular.

With the

nation at war, every unnecessary expenditure must be cur
tailed, they asserted, but the FSA was spending money at
Transylvania that would never be returned to the government.
Under FSA management, moreover, Transylvania's cotton yield
per acre had dropped far below what the same land had pro
duced under private ownership, and the land had suffered a
reduction in its cotton acreage allotment simply because the
land was not kept in cultivation.

They backed this charge

with a display of research done at the local A A A office.

If

Transylvania was operated so inefficiently, they asked, how
could the government's investment be repaid?

The Police Jury

was even more disturbed over the fear, based on newspaper
reports of congressional hearings on the FSA, that Adminis
trator Baldwin "might favor" the exercise of eminent domain
or of expropriation against absentee owners in order to break
up large southern land holdings."

46 r .
ibid.

l

*^We are also advised," the

. Goodwin to Will W. Alexander, May 12, 1939,
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statement read, "that they . . . plan to dispossess absentee
owners of their holdings that they consider large enough to
use for F. S. A. projects."

This plan was "State Socialism,"

they asserted.47
The FS A faced the charges head-on, did some research
of its own, the prepared a defense of Transylvania's opera
tions.

Regional resettlement director E. B. Whitaker went to

Lake Providence and found that the statement was not an
official statement of the Police Jury, although it did
reflect the thinking of some of its members.

"It was drawn

up by several landowners," regional director Stewart reported
to Baldwin,

"and circulated over the state in such a manner

as to make it appear as though it were a statement from the
Police J u r y . "4®

Transylvania's Board of Directors answered

the charges in the Lake Providence Banner Democrat.49
cotton production was down at Transylvania.

True,

Under private

ownership, about 250 Negro families had occupied the Transyl
vania land, each farming about twenty-three acres devoted
exclusively to cotton.

But the FSA reduced the number of

47a Statement by the Police Jury of East Carroll
Parish, Louisiana, Regarding the Policies and Administration
of the F. S. A., attached to Newton V. Mills to C. B. Baldwin,
February 23, 1942, ibid.? Police Jury of East Carroll Parish,
Louisiana, to Claude Wickard, February 23, 1942, ibid.
4®a. D. Stewart to C. B . Baldwin, May

6

, 1942, ibid.

4 9Lake Providence Banner Democrat. March 20, 1942.
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families to about 150, gave each family about fifty acres,
and developed a diversified farm management program.

Rather

than have the settlers entirely dependent on a single cash
crop, the board of directors explained, Transylvania stressed
food and feed crops, pasture, garden vegetables, poultry,
milk cows, cattle, and hogs.

Transylvania settlers produced

cotton as their major cash crop, but they had a higher
standard of living and more security regardless of the price
of cotton.
At least two local citizens, a landowner and a Police
Jury member, supported the FSA's explanation.

Norris C.

Williamson, whose property was next to Transylvania, saw part
of the project almost every day, he said, and the FSA was
doing a good job operating the

l

a

n

d

.

But since many of

the settlers were used to the light sandy soil of the
Louisiana hills, they had to learn how to farm the richer
delta soil and how to combat the obnoxious grasses of that
area.

In addition, the project had suffered from heavy

rains during recent planting seasons; but despite its dis
advantages, he pointed out, Transylvania's cotton yield per
acre came up to about the parish average every year with one

5°see also R. W. Hudgens, Memorandum to EmeryyE.
Jacobs, September 4, 1942, R. G. 96, National Archives? A. D.
Stewart to C. B. Baldwin, November 7, 1942, ibid.
^ N o r r i s C. Williamson to E. B. Whitaker, February
15, 1942, ibid.
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exception.

P. W. Holt, a member of the Police Jury of East

Carroll Parish who was convalescing from an accident when
the statement was issued, wrote that he "did not agree with
his colleagues on the Police Jury or [with] those sponsoring
these charges of communism, socialism, or any other kind of
ism. . . ."

Transylvania settlers operated cooperatives for

their mutual benefit; but socialism, he contended, was a
bogus issue since each farmer worked his own land and was
striving toward individual farm
■

ownership.^

t

IV
The New Deal resettlement agencies ran into their
most serious opposition, both political and ideological,
from farm organizations in Region Six.

All major organized

farm groups operated in one or more of the three states.^3
In Arkansas, the Southern Tenant Farmers 1 Union, Farm Bureau,
and Farmers Union were active, as was the National Grange to
a lesser degree.

Louisiana farmers had to choose either the

Farm Bureau or the Farmers Union, while Mississippians had
only the Farm Bureau.

Since both the STFU and the Farmers

Union were dealing with basically the same class of people,
they reached an agreement in 1941:

neither would set up an

organization in territory where the other was already

52f .

vt.

Holt to H. B. Staples, March 10, 194-2, ibid.

53T . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 7, 1940, ibid.
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organized.5^

p or Region Six, this meant that the STFU would

continue unchallenged in most of eastern Arkansas but left
the rest of the state and all of Louisiana to the Farmers
Union.

Since the STFU tended to expand toward the newer

cotton regions of the southwest rather than to the older
)

lands of the east, the union never attempted to organize in
Mississippi . 5 5

The Farmers Union limited its efforts to

Arkansas and Louisiana.

Thus the Farm Bureau was the only

farm organization which functioned in all three states of
Region Six.
Regional officials tried to work with all national
farm groups operating in the three states.

They encouraged

membership in farm organizations without becoming active
partisans for any one group.

Nor did they attempt to hinder

the development, of any organization . 5 5

Many resettlement

projects had their own "farm bureaus," and STFU membership
was not uncommon among resettlement clients in eastern
Arkansas.
Dyess.

In 1940, for example, the STFU set up a local at

The FSA firmly refused to recognize it as a bargain

ing agent but allowed the union members themselves to remain

5 ^h. L. Mitchell to James G. Patton, September 11,
1941, ibid.. see also H. L. Mitchell to George S. Mitchell,
September 2, 1941, ibid.
5 5 H. L. Mitchell, Columbia Oral History Project inter
view, mimeographed copy, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union
Papers, Box 80, Folder 1465, university of North Carolina
Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
5 5 T. Roy Reid to C. B. Baldwin, October 25, 1940, R.
G. 96, National Archives.

on the project.5^

jjo further attempts were made to unionize

resettlement projects in the region.

Yet a policy of

neutrality did not guarantee the cooperation of all farm
groups.

In Region Six, opposition from farm groups came from

both sides of the political spectrum, the Southern Tenant
Farmers' Union on the left and the Farm Bureau on the right.
The newest farm organization in the region, the
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, originated in. protest against
AAA policies which favored landlords over tenants and share
croppers.^®

The STFU sought to awaken the nation's con

science to the evils of the Southern farm tenancy system
through strikes, marches, and protest demonstrations.

As a

result, union leaders interpreted the appointment of the
President's Special Committee on Farm Tenancy and the
Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission as union victories; more
important, they claimed credit for New Deal programs which
assisted low-income farmers . ^

9

In 1941, STFU secretary and

former president H. L. Mitchell told a Congressional committee
"That a government program to aid tenant farmers, share
croppers and other low income farmers was initiated is due in
part to the work of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union . . .

®7W. W. Alexander to T. Roy Reid, March 4, 1940, ibid.;
see E. B. Whitaker to H. E. Trulock, April 4, 1940, ibid.
®®See David Eugene Conrad, The Forgotten F_armers:
The Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana, 111.,
1965), 83-88.
®9Mitchell, Columbia Oral History interview.
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succeeded in making America conscious of its most pressing
problems .

1,60

But from the start, STFU leaders found themselves in
disagreement with the New Deal's basic approach to farm
tenancy.

When the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy

recommended privately owned family farms as the best means
for eliminating tenancy, the union's representative on the
committee, W. L. Blackstone, dissented in a minority report.
A program to encourage small homesteads, he said, was "an
economic anachronism, foredoomed to f a i l u r e . instead, he
urged the establishment of cooperative farm projects? no
doubt Blackstone had in mind Delta and Providence Farms, two
private resettlement projects being operated by Sherwood
Eddy in Bolivar and Holmes, counties,

Mississippi.^

For the

same reason, STFU was cold to the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
bill.

Although gratified that farm tenancy was receiving

some attention from the Federal government, the union charged
in 1935 that the bill pointed backward and not forward.

"It

was really thought of 70 years ago when men were talking of
'Forty acres and a mule.'"

The Bankhead-Jones bill would

6 ° S t a t e m e n t Q f h. L. Mitchell to the Committee Inves
tigating the Farm Security Administration, dated May 26, 1943,
R. G. 96, National Archives.

^ N a t i o n a l Resources Board, Farm Tenancy: Report of
the President's Committee (Washington, 1937), 22.
6 ^see Delta and Providence Farms Papers, University
of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

possibly, union leaders feared, lead to "a subsidized
peasantry in America.”

While mentioning cooperative farming,

the bill did "not lay sufficient stress upon this type of
farming which many far seeing Americans regard as the only
practical solution to our rural problems."
operative farming, " they asserted,

"Through co

"a new and altogether high

type of rural life may be developed in the South.

By drawing

groups of farmers together into a co-operative community they
may have at their disposal all of the resources of modern
civilization."^3
In reality, however, STFU leaders thought the New
Deal was good as far as it went; the problem was that it did
not go far enough.

The union was not opposed to a policy

favoring small farms, Mitchell later claimed, but he ques
tioned whether many tenants and croppers were qualified for
small farm ownership, since they had always been accustomed
to s u p e r v i s i o n . to Mitchell, the ideal solution would
have been for a group of farmers to rent a plantation,
divide half of the proceeds from the sale of the crops among
the tenant families, and, since the other half did not have
to go to a private owner, put it into a pool to pay the rent,

6 ^A statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to
the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy by the Executive
Council, Southern Tenant Farmers' Uhion [c. 1936], Socialist
Party of America Papers, Duke university Library, Durham,
North Carolina.

^Mitchell, Columbia Oral History interview.
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buy needed farm equipment and supplies, and eventually pur
chase the plantation outright.

The tenants themselves would

select a manager to supervise farm operations.

"We wanted

. . . a village economy where the workers lived in a village
and worked out on the farms with a certain small acreage of
land where each man could have his own garden and raise his
own food," Mitchell explained.

"We visualized something

similar to what they have in Europe where the workers all
live in one central village."65
In addition to ideological differences, the STFU was
critical of the local administration of the resettlement and
rural rehabilitation programs.

In a 1936 statement, union

leaders complained that the Resettlement Administration's
decentralized organization kept it from fulfilling its
obligations.

Too much authority had been given to local and

state committees, committees that helped decide who received
loans and other assistance.

"If the Resettlement Administra

tion is to adequately serve the people who need its services,
political and anti-social officials should be removed and
replaced by men who have a broad knowledge of the problems
involved and sympathy and interest in the people .

”66

in

Arkansas, the Southern Farm Leader charged, STFU,members had
been thrown off RA programs after they protested graft.

65

Ibid.

66A Statement Concerning Farm Tenancy Submitted to
the Governor's Commission on Farm Tenancy.
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According to the STFU paper, the Resettlement Administration
had made loans in Louisiana
. . . to people who do not need them and denied them
to needy croppers and tenants. Croppers and tenants
who do get loans are told what and where to buy and
very seldom see the cash. Not one Resettlement farmer
we know of has a copy of the Resettlement contract.
The field agents act as complete dictators.67
In 1940, the union's sixth annual convention adopted
a series of resolutions which summed up their criticisms of
the resettlement agencies.

The FDA's "greatest drawback,"

the delegates said, was "faulty local administration.”

The

convention went on record recommending (1 ) that "dirt
farmers" be put on local administrating committees;

(2 ) that

Congress appropriate larger sums of money to make the program
more effective;
set up;

(3) that more large cooperative projects be

(4) that special projects be set up to care for

migrant farm workers in Southern cotton regions;

(5) that

the FSA be created as a permanent agency independent of the
Department of Agriculture.

The Farm Security Administration,

they were saying, was not doing enough, was doing some things
wrong, and could do everything better . ® 8
In 1940, the STFU and the FSA began to move closer
together, and before long they found much common ground.

®^Southern Farm Leader. May. 1936, copy in Southern
Tenant Farmers' Union Papers, university of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
6 8 "proceedings of the Sixth Annual Convention,
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union," Socialist Party of America
Papers, Duke university Library, Durham, North Carolina.
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Charles M. Measles, Labor Relations director for Region Six,
sought to improve relations between the two organizations by
talcing part in the STFU's 1940 annual convention.

Speaking

to the delegates, Measles expressed pleasure that the STFU
favored larger appropriations for resettlement work and
promised the union sympathy and cooperation from his office.
"X believe that you are fighting for the same things we are,"
he told the delegates, "and I pledge you our full coopera
tion.

All we need is more money and a chance to h e l p . " ®

9

In a question and answer session, some delegates still showed
suspicion, but Measles was not easily ruffled.

What should

we do when local officials of the FSA fail to cooperate?
someone asked him.

Surprisingly, Measles admitted that some

project managers and other officials should be

changed.

7°

During the coming months, STFU-FSA relations con
tinued to improve.

Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard,

in a memorandum dated March 21, 1941, stated that the STFU
was a "group to be considered as a worthy effort to improve
the position of low income farm people and one . . . which
it would be entirely proper for your field people to have a
cordial relationship with."7-1- About the same time, Reid
wrote that the FSA was already doing everything the STFU was

69

Ibid.

70ibid.

7^Quoted in C. B. Baldwin to Ernest S. Morgan, July 2,
1941, Box 36, Folder 662, Southern Tenant Farmers' Union
Papers, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina.
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currently proposing .

73

Perhaps projects like Terrebonne and

Lake Dick were concessions in part to STFU demands for experi'
mentation with cooperative farming.

But Reid's statement was

made possible because the union itself seemed to be moderat
ing its demands somewhat.

In their eighth annual convention

(1942), the union delegates passed a resolution 'tthat the
STFU seek to preserve the family type farm a way of life, to
help provide cooperative services for purchasing goods,
marketing and preserving farm products, and to fully support
all programs designed to reestablish farm people on the
land . "

73

What brought the STFU and Region Six officials even

closer together, however, was the Farm Bureau's campaign
against the FSA.7^
VThe Farm Bureau was just as devoted as the Southern
Tenant Farmers' Union to promoting the interests of farmers—
but not the same farmers.

While some critics have charged

that the Farm Bureau did not represent farmers at all, its

7 3 T.

Roy Reid, Memorandum to C. B. Baldwin, October 4,
1941, R. G. 96, National Archives.
7 3 H.

L. Mitchell to C. B. Baldwin, January 16, 1942,

ibid.
7 ^See,

for example, "Farm Bureau Advocates Abolition
of Tenant Program," Tenant Farmer, I (July 15, 1941), 1;
Leonard G. Herron, "How Farm Security Administration Is
Helping Tenant Farmers, Sharecroppers, Farm Laborers,"
Tenant Farmer, I (August 15, 1941), 2.
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membership consisted mainly of large-scale, commercial
farmers, the kind of farmers who would benefit most by the
Bureau's concern with commodity prices and its unconcern with
rural welfare programs . ^

5

in the 1930's, the American Farm

Bureau Federation was a powerful conservative farm organiza
tion.

After the Depression struck, Farm Bureau leaders were

quick to define agricultural problems in terms of national
responsibility and to look to Washington for action.

"Unless

something is done for the American farmer, " warned AFBF
president Edward A. O'Neal in January, 1933, "we will have a
revolution in the country-side in twelve m o n t h s . " ^
Not surprisingly, the Farm Bureau rode an insidetrack
in the early New Deal.

Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.

Wallace consulted with all farm organizations during the
Hundred Days, but the Farm Bureau played a crucial role in
early New Deal agricultural policy by uniting farmers in
both the Midwest and the South behind the Agricultural Adjust
ment Act.

While Farm Bureau leaders deserved little credit

for helping to formulate agricultural policy, the AAA did
favor the interests of landlords and large farmers, which
exactly fit the Farm Bureau idea of whose interests national

McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau and
the New Deal; A Study of the Making of National Farm Policy.
1933-40 (Urbana. 111.. 1962), 22-29.
^

C
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r

i
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n

a

^®Senate Agricultural and Forestry Committee, Hear
ings, on the Agricultural Adjustment Relief Plan, 72th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1933, p. 15.

farm policy should favor.

But as the New Deal began respond

ing to the needs of farm tenants and small farm owners, the
Farm Bureau found less and less to be happy about.

When

President Roosevelt created the Resettlement Administration
in 1935? Farm Bureau leaders at first adopted an indifferent
attitude; they were equally unenthusiastic about the Bankhead
Jones bill of 1937.77
nor active support.

They offered neither active opposition
In Region Six, all farm organizations,

Reid wrote in 1940, had given support to the Farm Security
Administration.

’"The Farm Bureau has probably been less

active in its support of the activities of the Administration
than any of the other organizations .

”78

Within a matter of

weeks, the Farm Bureau launched a vicious attack against the
Farm Security Administration on both the national and local
level.
The Farm Bureau-Farm Security Administration conflict
was only part of a larger power struggle between the Farm
Bureau and the United States Department of Agriculture.
Essentially, the Department of Agriculture wanted to free
itself of dependence on the Extension Service for the local
administration of its action programs and to rely on an
independent, centralized system of administration.

In other

77Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), 97-101.
7 8 T. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 7, 1940, R. G.
96, National Archives.
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words, agencies like the Farm Security Administration and the
Soil Conservation Service could take federal action programs
directly to individual farmers, short-circuiting all inter
mediaries.

The Farm Bureau, on the other hand, fought to

have the Extension Service administer practically everything.
O'Neal, for example, favored giving the FSA's farm and home
management programs to the Extension Service and turning over
its loan activities to the more cautious Farm Credit Adminis
tration.

The Farm Bureau eventually mounted a sweeping

attack on all FSA programs and the way they were being
handled; but O'Neal concentrated his heaviest fire on the
resettlement program, the FSA's most vunerable spot.

In

reality, the Farm Security Administration's greatest crime
was being outside the Farm Bureau's sphere of influence.
Since Farm Bureau leaders could not control the FSA, they
determined to kill it.7^
The role of the Agricultural Extension Service and the
land grant colleges of Region Six injected an element of
irony into the Farm Bureau-Farm Security Administration fight,
an irony that was not lost on contemporaries.

Watching the

conflict develop, 0. E. Jones, editor of the Batesville
(Arkansas) Daily Guard and formerly regional Information
Advisor, could not hold back his dismay.

The Arkansas

7 ^Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the New Deal. 156-178;
J. C. Futrall to Raymond A. Pearson, April 2, 1938, R. G. 96,
National Archives.
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Extension Service, he noted, was dominated by the American
Farm Bureau Federation? Extension agents in Arkansas were
actively soliciting Farm Bureau memberships "to swell the
coffers of a private lobbying organization."

"The Farm

Bureau, on the one hand, is waging a fight to the death in
an effort to kill the Farm Security Administration, a branch
of the Department of Agriculture, with a campaign of vilifi
cation and misrepresentation; and the Extension Service, a
branch of the Department of Agriculture, is actively engaged
at the same time in trying to build the agency [the Farm
Bureau] that is slashing a dagger at the back of its sister
agency."

"I am loath," Jones added,

"to sit idly by and see

the Farm Bureau blitzkrieg the Farm Security Administration
out of existence .

1,80

In Region Six, perhaps the groundwork

for this conflict had been prepared in the early days of the
Resettlement Administration.
Since many RA programs overlapped agricultural exten
sion and home demonstration work, Reid sought the cooperation
of the region's Extension Services and land grant colleges,
which operated the Extension programs.8^

At first, there was

a natural alliance between the Resettlement Administration
and the region's farm leaders— an alliance that was

80

.
ibid.

O.,E. Jones to M. L. Wilson, March 26, 1942, ibid.

8^Raymond A. Pearson to Dan T. Gray, April 1, 1936,
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especially close in Arkansas.

In 1935 and 1936, the regional

office was largely staffed with men on leave from the College
of Agriculture at the University of Arkansas or from the
state's Extension Service.

Reid himself had served twelve

years as assistant director of the Extension Service in
Arkansas.

Indeed, a large proportion of personnel at every

level had some connection with either Fayetteville or Exten
sion work, or bothy many project managers, for example, were
former county agents with agricultural-college degrees.

To

bring the region's agricultural leadership into general
policy planning, Reid in early 1936 set up three state land
committees whose memberships included (among others) the dean
of the college of agriculture! and director of extension in
each state .

82

The committee's function was to approve reset

tlement areas and make general recommendations in regard to
the resettlement program, but it was also a way of securing
the endorsement of agricultural leaders on resettlement pro
jects.

As regional director, Reid no doubt hoped to make

use of his ties with the Extension Service, but he ran into
trouble where he probably least expected it— in Arkansas.
The Resettlement Administration got off to a bad
start with Dan T. Gray, Dean of the College of Agriculture
and Director of the Extension Service, when it established
the regional headquarters at.Little Rock rather than at

8 2 T. Roy Reid to R. G. Tugwell, February 11, 1936,
ibid.; see Dan T. Gray to W. W. Alexander, June 10, 1937,
ibid.
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Fayetteville.

In the spring of 1936, still feeling resent

ful and suspicious, Gray complained that "RA authorities
never did consult with authorities of the College of Agricul
ture before their policies were announced.
he continued,

..."

"The RA,"

"has simply announced what is to be done in

Arkansas and then come around in a very friendly way and
asked cooperation of those associated with the College of
Agriculture."

"The two organizations— ours and theirs— are,

as a matter of fact, just moving along side by side, without
any serious attempt at fundamental cooperation.
Specifically, Gray disagreed with the RA's selection
of resettlement areas.

Concentrate the resettlement program

in the hill country of northern Arkansas, he advised, thin
out farmers on poor lands, increase the size of farms, and
stress, livestock production.

Disagreeing, Reid argued that

northern Arkansas was too thickly settled, good farm land
was scarce and high priced, and much of the l^nd was sub
marginal.

He favored buying up submarginal land, moving

people off (not keeping them on it), and resettling them on
alluvial land in the river b o t t o m s . » i

do not 'think that

he is critical of our particular purchases," Reid wrote of
Gray,

"but that he is critical of the fact that we are

attempting to resettle farmers on family-size farms rather

8®Dan T. Gray to Raymond A. Pearson, April 20, 1936,
ibid.
®4t . Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, May 15, 1937, ibid.
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than on larger commercial farms."82*

But in 1937 and 1938,

the College of Agriculture became perhaps more unsympathetic
with resettlement activities, feeling that the program in
Arkansas was being carried on with a "lack of capable plan
ning and failure to utilize proven knowledge and experience."
They naturally felt they could provide the proper advice . 8 8
The Farm Bureau began its attack against the FSA in
1940.

After publishing an article critical of the Lake Dick

project, the Memphis Commercial Appeal 8

7

received a large

number of letters from Arkansas and Mississippi citizens
requesting that its reporters make surveys of other projects
and FSA programs in certain counties.

Regional director

A. D. Stewart watched and waited; then in early 1941, he
summed up what was happening in his regions
I am afraid that these letters and requested studies
are inspired by ".a certain organized” group that is
using this method of attack to offset an inspired
public confidence in connection with the Farm
Security Administration program in its extension of
help to low-income families. The most dangerous
attack that could be made would be to have presumably
disinterested citizens pick the weak spots in our
program and magnify them. We shall then watch every
step taken in this direction carefully and prepare to
meet the situation when it arises . 8 8

85t. Roy Reid to W. W. Alexander, June 11, 1937, ibid.;
Will W. Alexander to Reid, May 6 , 1937, ibid.
86

c. D. Kinsman to M. L. Wilson, July 20, 1937, ibid.

87commercial Appeal

(Memphis, Tennessee), July 5, 1940.

8 8 a. D. Stewart, Quarterly Report, January-March,
1941, R. G. 96, National Archives.
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Soon the Farm Bureau launched a barrage of criticism
in newspapers, through the mail, and in special meetings.
By early 1942, Stewart wrote that the Farm Bureau attack had
become his

11foremost"

problem .

89

Farm Bureau opposition, as

Stewart saw it, came principally from state Farm Bureau
officials, with very little criticism from county officials.
He reported receiving resolutions and letters from Farm
Bureau members in many counties indicating that they did not
concur in the FSA fight.

"It is quite evident," he wrote,

"that state farm bureau [sic] leaders did not consult county
bureau units before launching the attack on our program.
There is abundant evidence to show that farm bureau ranks
have broken at many points and that there is clearly much
resentment among bureau members over the position some of
their leaders have taken . "

90

But in this struggle, the FSA

could take little comfort in the knowledge that its opposi
tion was divided.
The Farm Bureau conducted its campaign against the FSA
on more than one level.

In the newspapers of the region, the

Farm Bureau's most common charges were excessive administra
tive costs, misuse of funds, and poor management.

Perhaps a

typical exchange took place in Jackson, Mississippi, papers
in 1942.

On March 26, Mississippi director Dallas C.

8 9 A. D. Stewart, Quarterly Report, January-March,
1942, ibid.

90ibid.
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Vandevere reported that 25,397 families in the state with
PSA loans had increased their net income from $328 before
becoming clients to $571 at the end of 1941— an increase of
seventy-four per cent.

During the same period, they raised

their net worth (all assets from furniture and clothes to
q*i

farm equipment) from $443 to $567.

Vandevere's report drew

immediate fire from the Farm Bureau.

His figures were

accurate, a Farm Bureau news release admitted, but misleading.
The net income increase for FSA families was indeed seventyfour per cent, but all farm income in Mississippi had
increased eighty per cent during the same period.
FSA client kept 25,000 farmers from getting

6%

"Being an

additional

increase in farm income," the Farm Bureau charged.

Vande-

vere's claim of a gain in new worth was equally misleading,
since the FSA had made an average loan of $942 t<5 each
client) "it took $942 of FSA money to increase the net worth
of clients by $124."

For good measure, the Farm Bureau also

criticized the high number of employees in Mississippi,
excessive administrative costs, the misuse of grants, collec
tive farming projects, and government policies to acquire
"as much land as possible.

go

It was Vandevere's turn again, and he replied promptly.
The Mississippi Farm Bureau was out "to discredit the work
being done by low income farmers under FSA guidance,"

91jackson Daily News. March 26, 1942.
92jackson Daily News, March 30, 1942.
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)

Vandevere said.

"Like all of the accusations made by the

Farm Bureau, the recent outburst is another exhibition of
statistical gymnastics and comparison of unrelated facts and
figures."

When discussing income, he contended, the FSA.

referred to net increases in income, while the Farm Bureau
used gross increases.

Actually, he said, the increase in

gross cash income was six per cent, not eighty per cent.
What about charges of over-staffing and excessive adminis
trative costs?

Consider Coahoma County, Mississippi, for

example, Vandevere said.

There, the FSA had three field

workers, two clerks, and one person on temporary assignment,
a force of six which supervised 128 borrowers.

In Missis

sippi, Vandevere said, it cost taxpayers seventy-two dollars
a year per family to administer the F S A programs including
all losses and expenses.
On its lowest level, the Farm Bureau attack was
unequaled for bitterness and vvituperation.

In July, 1942,

for example, the Tate County Farm Bureau, at Senatobia,
Mississippi, adopted a series of resolutions critical of
"civilian agencies of alphabetical fame, now being maintained
at the expense of the American taxpayer.

. . ."

According

to the resolution, such alphabetical agencies "sponsor and
support many practices, projects and programs which are
economically unsound, socialistic and communistic in their
tendency, wholly un-American and contrary to the principles

93jackson Clarion-Ledcrer, April 3, 1942.
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of our form of government, which must be discontinued and
the agencies abolished."

The Farm Security Administration,

"with the cooperation of their socialistic friends," was
attempting to overthrow the legitimate American farmer and
was using "approximately forty per cent of their appropria
tions for administrative c o s t s . T h e

next month, at a

Farm Bureau meeting at Greenville, Mississippi, a speaker
insinuated that the FSA was opposed to private ownership of
land and advocated Government ownership of all land,

if

this was what we were fighting World War II for, the speaker
was saying, there was no point in the United States winning
the war.

This kind of attack was more difficult to deal with

because of its unthinking and unreasoning quality.9^

More

suggestive and spectacular, it dealt less with hard facts
and figures and, in its most extreme form, was more common
in private meetings than in the public press.
Farm Bureau speakers swarmed all over the states of
Region Six criticizing the FSA in meetings for local Farm
Bureau personnel and county agents.

On May

8

, 1942, Milton

Tainter, Louisiana Farm Bureau secretary, spoke to a group
of county agents and Farm Bureau officials at Minden,
Louisiana.

A. E. Robinson, district rural rehabilitation

-------------------------------

t

9 4Theodore G. Bilbo to C. B. Baldwin, July 3, 1942,
R. G. 96, National Archives.
9 5 J.

Lewis Henderson to Jack H. Bryan, August 20,
1942, ibid. ? Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Mississippi),
August 2, 1942.
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supervisor in northern Louisiana, attended the meeting to
gain first-hand information regarding Farm Bureau activi
ties.

His report provides some insight into the nature of

such meetings and an example of how the FSA. reacted.
Recognizing Robinson as a FSA employee, Tainter
explained at the outset that he was not directing his remarks
at "any individual or any agency," and specifically not at
the Farm Security Administration.

Judging from Robinson's

report, Tainter seemed to make two main points:

Government

agencies were helping low-income farmers while neglecting
large farmers, and the Extension Service should run all
government farm programs, anyway.

He condemned "certain

governmental agencies" for placing too much emphasis on sub
sistence farming "to the advantage of the tenant farmers and
at the expense of the large landowner farmers."

Tainter dis

paraged FSA efforts to aid low-income farm families, a
category which, he explained was "made up of seventy-five
per cent negroes [sic ] and twenty-five per cent fairly lowclass white people."

He objected to "giving such people an

advantage that was being denied to the average farmer."
Besides, Tainter added, this time really punching below the
belt, the Farm Security Administration program was "bringing
about certain conditions in which iiegroes in Louisiana were
assuming the attitude that the government was endorsing a
program whereby they would receive equal rights."

Tainter

went on to attack what he called "bureautocracy."

The
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Department of Agriculture, he charged, was dictating all
agricultural work in Washington and eliminating local con
trol of agricultural programs.

He contended that county and

home demonstration agents should handle government programs
at the local level.

At one point, the meeting chairman

recognized a lady— Robinson missed her name— who stated that
"it was time for us to wake up to the fact that our govern
ment was turning socialistic."

She put it better than he

could have, Tainter remarked when she sat down.

He had

supported President Roosevelt for three consecutive terms,
but now, he suggested, the President was too busy with the
war and leaving domestic affairs to Mrs. Roosevelt.
After the meeting adjourned, Robinson and Tainter met
for lunch.

Robinson tried to clear up certain errors that

Tainter had made earlier or to set him straight on FSA pro
grams and policies.

But again, Tainter told Robinson "that

/

he hoped we [FSA officials] would not assume that his remarks
were addressed specifically toward our organization."

The

purpose of this tactic may have been to throw the opposition
off guard or simply to remain on good terms with local FSA
personnel.

In March, 1942, speaking to the Lafourche Farm

Bureau ht Thibodaux, Louisiana, Tainter charged that the Farm
Security Administration and the Department of Agriculture
were permeated with men who leaned to the left.

With Terre-

96a . E. Robinson to E. C. Mclnnis, May 12, 1941, R. G.
96, National Archives.
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bonne project manager George Harmount sitting in the audi
ence, Tainter explained that he did not mean any FSA men in
the field; officials in Washington were the ones leaning to
the left.

Nor did he have any criticism, Tainter made clear,

of the Terrebonne project or the way it was being handled.
"You can take this for what it was worth, " Harmount wrote
Whitaker,

"but I think he did not dare, with me being there,

to try to start anything. . . ."^7
Regional director Stewart managed to find some good
results coming out of the Farm Bureau controversy.

It was

"gratifying," he wrote in 1942, "to observe that Farm Security
has many supporters which he did not. know about before? a
large number of editors, civic clubs, preachers, educators,
organizations, and individuals have openly expressed their
support of the Farm Security Administration."

Other groups

had sided with the Farm Bureau against the FSA, he admitted,
but it was a far smaller number.
added,

"On the whole," Stewart

"the controversy has given us the opportunity to

acquaint many people with the FSA program who had not
stood it before.

under

Hundreds of unsolicited letters have been

received from people in all walks of life, expressing their
wholehearted support and endorsement of the FSA.

Also, when

the Farm Bureau criticized specific projects, FSA clients
"have enthusiastically repudiated statements attributed to
them and conditions reportedly existing."

At Biscoe Farms

97q . dx Harmount to E. B. Whitaker, March 21, 1942,
ibid.

in Arkansas, the families themselves issued statements
answering the attacks.

"A strong public reaction has de

veloped against the Farm Bureau," Stewart asserted,
of its attack on the FSA.

"because

This reaction is general, except

possibly among certain of the large farm operators who depend
on tenant as day l a b o r . A t

best, however, these were only

short-term gains for the FSA.
Before World War II, the Resettlement Administration
and the Farm Security Administration enjoyed a friendly
environment in Region Six.

With a program as controversial

as rural resettlement, both agencies sought to minimize con
flict through good public relations.

In Louisiana, the

Resettlement Administration had to play consensus politics,
seeking friendships with two rival factions but becoming the
tool of neither.

The Information Division sought to win

support by stressing resettlement's positive side and, if
necessary, by suppressing the negative.

When running into

opposition, regional officials seemed to play it by ear;
they answered the Police Jury's charges at Transylvania,
tried to divide the opposition in the case of the Mississippi
bankers, or gave ground on the race question.

Typically,

the resettlement agencies were willing to challenge Southern
traditions on race, but only if no objections were raised.
But by the start of World War II, Farm Bureau opposition and

98a .
1942, ibid.

d

. Stewart, Quarterly Report, January-March,
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congressional disapproval had begun eroding PSA support at
the local level and eventually succeeded in killing the PSA
in 1946.
The FSA's ultimate fate was not decided in Region Six.
But the opposition of the two most important farm organiza
tions in the region does provide insight into the nature of
the resettlement agencies.

The Farm Bureau criticized the

P S A from a conservative point of view almost diametrically
opposite to the Southern Tenant Farmers' U n i o n 1s socialistic
viewpoint.

To the Farm Bureau, for example, the PSA was

spending too much money; the STFU argued it was not spending
enough.

The Farm Bureau wanted the Extension Service to

exercise more influence in FSA programs; the STFU thought
the large farmer-dominated Extension Service already occu
pied too many positions of influence.

The Farm Bureau

opposed the FSA's "impractical socialized farming projects,"
perhaps the most notorious of the FSA's crimes; the STFU
hoped to see more such projects established.

In every

instance, the FSA's position was in the middle of two
extremes.

Regional officials, for example, were never

enthusiastic about cooperative farming, they had always
stressed the individualistic family farm, and they had been
gradually phasing out the cooperative projects.

This doubles

the irony of the Farm Bureau-Farm Security Administration
struggle.

The Farm Bureau attack came when the resettlement

program was becoming somewhat more conservative than it had
been a few years before, and the STFU came to the defense of
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an agency that was far less radical than they would have
preferred.

Neither left-wing nor right-wing farm organiza

tions wholly endorsed what the PSA was doing, and at various
times both had actively opposed it.

Perhaps the opposition

and dissatisfaction of both liberal and conservative groups
suggests that the Resettlement and Farm Security programs
were rather moderate in nature after all.

CONCLUSION
"The fight over the abolition of the Farm Security
)

Administration," writes Paul Conkin, "was one of the most
bitter domestic issues during World War I I .
the FSA had little chance of winning.

”1

It was a fight

From 1937 on, a con

gressional coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans
engaged in a running battle with the Administration over
almost all New Deal programs.

After Pearl Harbor, President

Roosevelt was unwilling to take strong stands on domestic
issues and risk alienating congressional support for vital
wartime programs.

As a result, the conservative bloc seized

the oppostunity to dismantle as much as possible of the New
Deal.

In addition, the Resettlement Administration and its

successor, the Farm Security Administration, had antagonized
a coterie of powerful opponents.

Southern landlords and

large farm corporations relied on the labor of the very
groups the FSA befriended:
migrant farm workers.

tenants, sharecroppers, and

As the FSA took them under its wing,

the large farm interests began to worry about losing their
cheap labor supply.

For similar reasons, private processors

•*-Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World:
Community Program (Ithaca. N. Y . , 1959), 220.
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and retailers felt threatened when the FSA made loans to
farm cooperatives.

Unfortunately, the landlords, large farm

corporations, and middle men had powerful backers in Con
gress, while the people the FSA helped most usually did not
even vote.

The FSA's most dangerous and determined enemy,

however, was the American Farm Bureau Federation.

With con

gressional assistance, the Farm Bureau led the attack on the
FSA that eventually killed it.
The battleground of the struggle was the committee
hearing rooms on Capitol Hill.

At the House Appropriation

Committee hearings of 1941, the Farm Bureau opened an
ambitious campaign to remake the entire U. S. Department of
Agriculture in its own image, but achieved little except to
force small reductions in appropriations and to keep FSA
personnel out of Civil Service.

Afterward, Farm Bureau

president Edward A. O'Neal decided to zero in on a more
vulnerable objectives

the Farm Security Administration.

In

early 1942, he appeared before the Byrd Committee— officially
known as the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential
Federal Expenditures.

Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia and

other anti-New Deal congressmen were raising the cry of
economy as an excuse for demolishing New Deal agencies; and
the Farm Security Administration was one of their main
targets.

A shrewd showman, O'Neal began his testimony with

the revelation that FSA supervisors regarded the poll tax as
a proper expense in an individual client's farm and home

management plans.

Having gained the committee's full atten

tion, O'Neal outlined the Farm Bureau case against the FSA.
Most Farm Security programs were no longer necessary, he
claimed, and the rest should be turned over to other agencies.
He went on to make a series of sweeping charges:

the FSA

established quotas of clients in order to spend all funds
appropriated and to maintain full personnel employment,
"solicited" clients to meet quotas, burdened clients with
L

more loans than they could repay, established "socialistic
and impractical farming projects,” made emergency grants to
enable repayment of loans and conceal the record of failure,
used renewal notes and variable payment plans to disguise
low payment on loans, employed pressure groups to maintain
congressional appropriations, wasted funds in excessively
high administrative costs, and exercised rigid control of
business and farm plans of clients.

After the Byrd Committee

hearings, Congress cut off all funds fpr collective farms
like Lake Dick and Terrebonne and requested the rapid liqui
dation of all resettlement projects.

Later in 1942 and in

1943, the Farm Bureau repeated substantially the same
charges before the House and Senate committees on appropria
tions . 2

— See ibid., 223, 224? Grant McConnell, The Decline of
Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), 97-111;
Sidney Baldwin. Poverty and Politics; The Rise and Decline
of the Farm Security Administration (Chapel Hill, 1968),
342-52.

The Farm Security Administration fought its Armageddon
in 1943 and 1944 at the Cooley Committee hearings.

For two

years, Representative Harold D. Cooley, Democrat of North
Carolina, had sought a resolution calling for an investiga
tion of FSA activities; the House finally passed it in March,
1943, setting up a Select Committee of the House Committee^
on Agriculture.

The Cooley Committee offered an open forum

for criticism of FSA programs; and after taking testimony
for more than a year, it published two fat volumes

(four

parts) of Hearing's on the Farm Security Administration.^
The Farm Bureau again marched out its familiar repertoire of
accusations, but this time gave them a new emphasis.

From

past experience, Farm Bureau leaders had learned what issue
would have maximum effects

the community program.

The

resettlement projects were costly, unsuccessful, and worst
of all, similar to the collective farms of Soviet Russia.
To the Farm Bureau, the resettlement program was the best
proof that the FSA was a socialistic effort to destroy tradi
tional land policy in the United States.
a few projects

The FSA had leased

(Terrebonne, for example) to cooperative

associations on ninety-nine year leases, and these leases
were supposedly evidence of the FSA's rejection of fee simple
ownership.

The rural poverty programs, Farm Bureau leaders

^Select Committee of the House Committee on Agricul
ture, Hearings on the Farm Security Administration. 78th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1943-1944.
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urged, should be placed in a new agency in order to "save
the low income farmer from political exploitation and save
American agriculture from collectivism and Government land
lordism."^

In defending itself, PSA officials often came

close to disavowing the entire resettlement program with the
explanation that it was only managing projects initiated by
other agencies.
The resettlement projects proved to be the FSA's
greatest embarrassment, despite the fact that they were a
very small part of the total work of the agency,

unfortu

nately, the resettlement program, never a congressional
favorite, lacked definite legislative authority for its
existence.

The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 had

given the FSA authority to complete existing projects, but
it could not start new ones.

The FSA, in fact, did not have

authority to purchase land under the Bankhead-Jones Act.

As

early as 1938, Congress limited the use of funds in the
resettlement program to "liquidation and management.”
Relying on executive orders, however, the Farm Security
Administration continued to expand some of the projects, but
did not begin liquidating the program.^

In 1939, Congress

refused to allot any more funds for the completion of com
munity projects.

4

Until this time, Region Six director T.

Ibid., 802.

^Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 220.
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Roy Reid was still looking for land to purchase for reset
tlement purposes.

"Though the large number of resettlement

projects have been now largely completed and are now offering
challenging problems of management," wrote Reid in early
1940, "the development work still continues on some projects
and new land is yet being added to develop other projects.
After 1940, the FSA could not make loans to new cooperative
associations, an essential step in the development of almost
every resettlement community.

When America entered thewar,

the regional office began acquiring still more land

ina new

housing program for defense workers.
In May, 1944, the Cooley Committee found the FSA
guilty of ignoring the Bankhead-Jones Act and defying the
will of Congress.

The FSA, the committee further charged,

was
. . . financing communistic resettlement projects,
where the families could never own homes, or be
paid for all that they made or for all the time
they worked, and was supervising its borrowers to
the extent of telling the borrower how to raise
his children, how to plan
his home life and, it is
strongly suspected in some cases, how to v o t e . 7
As a result of the Cooley Committee's findings, Congress
reduced the Farm Security Administration to a powerless
organization without funds.

Although the FSA lived on for

6 t. Roy Reid, Annual Report, Region VI, December 31,
1940, Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home Adminis
tration, National Archives.

. 7 j . s.. House of Representatives, Activitieis of the
Farm Security Administration. Report No. 1430, 78th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1944, pp. 1, 2.
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two more years, its primary task was the liquidation of the
resettlement projects.

In 1946, Congress created a new

agency, the Farmers Home Administration, which absorbed both
the FSA and the Farm Credit Administration.

The Farmers

Home Administration carried on the rural rehabilitation and
tenant purchase programs but rushed the liquidation of any
resettlement units the FSA had not already sold.®
The controversies of World War II should not obscure
the real nature of the New Deal resettlement program.

The

Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security Administra
tion were never as radical as the Farm Bureau and other
critics pictured them.

Yet New Deal agricultural policy did

break sharply with the past.

Before the 1930's, federal aid

to agriculture had consisted mainly of grants-in-aid for
agricultural education and long-term credits.

But the New

Deal set up action programs which carried the influence of
the Federal government down into every rural county in the
nation.

Rexford G. Tugwell hoped to devote the Resettlement

Administration to the broad problems of rural poverty and,
most important, land reform.

Never before had the Federal

government bought up submarginal land, converted it to other
uses than crop production, and resettled the families living
there on better land.

Although Tugwell soon left government

service, the Farm Security Administration went on to experi
ment with cooperative farms, long-term leases (as opposed to

8

Conkin, Tomorrow a New World. 227, 229.
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fee simple ownership), medical care cooperatives, and migrant
labor camps.

Even the Agricultural Adjustment Administra

tion plunged into the unchartedecseasis of crop destruction
and acreage allotment— expedients which old agrarians accepted
with reluctance.

But if New Deal methods were new, what about

New Deal objectives?
The Farm Security Administration, the most important
and longest lived of the New Deal resettlement agencies,
represented a conservative attempt to deal with the problems
of farm tenancy.

The FSA based its overall program squarely

on the traditional agrarian principle of owner-operated
family-size farms.

The ideological heritage of the FSA,

Sidney Baldwin has recently written, gave it "a sense of dis
advantage, an optimistic reformist zeal, a nostalgic yearning
for restoration of traditional institutions, such as sub
sistence agriculture and the family farm.”®

Above all,

Region Six officials were not revolutionaries, and the reforms
they pushed did not amount to a revolution.

They believed

the FSA program was fully in accord with American rural
traditions.

Given the background of the regional leadership

(Southern birth, agricultural education, and Extension
Service experience), it is hard to imagine them caught up in
a vision of a "new world" that would eliminate the family
farm.

"The funds available to the RA, " wrote regional

director Reid, for example, in 1936, "are sufficient only to

^Baldwin, Poverty and Politics, 268.
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provide a demonstration of the possibilities of rural reset
tlement.

But there is no reason why its methods should not

be embodied in a permanent, family-sized owner-operated farm
program of the government."

"I know of no better means of

reconstructing our agriculture on a thoroughly sound and
permanently desireable basis," he added, "than to make as
its foundation the family-size owner-operated farm."-*-®

The

people who became clients of the resettlement program could
not have agreed more.

On the whole, the resettlement program

was designed for people who had always made their own way and
who would not need help except for the Depression.

They were

the kind of people who would be most concerned with owning
their own little plots and homes.
Thus the central purpose of the New Deal community
program in Region Six was farm ownership for tenants, share
croppers, and submarginal farmers who had no other chance to
escape the plight of Depression.

Whether started under the

Subsistence Homesteads Division, the FERA, or the RA, almost
all resettlement projects in the region operated on a familyfarm basis.

The family-farm projects were not only more

numerous, but they cost more money and helped more tenant
families than the region's three cooperative farms.

For

in

Daily Graphic (Pine Bluff), August 30, 1936. The
last sentence is identical to one Secretary of Agriculture
Henry A. Wallace wrote in 1935, but it still expressed what
Reid felt about the family farm. See Wallace, "Wallace
Points to the Danger of Tenancy.11 New York Times Magazine.
LXXXIV (March 31, 1935), 21.
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example, the Resettlement Administration and the Farm
Security Administration invested $2,629,567.82 in Terrebonne,
Lake Dick, and Marcella, the only cooperative farming com
munities in the region, but poured $13,719,818.70 into
twenty-three family farm projects.

The regional office

resettled about 2,602 families on the individual farm pro
jects, while the cooperatives involved only about 207 fami
lies.

Beyond the community projects, the FSA's tenant

purchase and rural rehabilitation programs, which were also
aimed at individual farm ownership, expended an additional
$120,000,000 in Region Six.1^

The cooperative plantation

proj ects like Terrebonne were new and startling.

But what

seems more important about the New Deal community projects
as a whole is that the Federal government for the first time
was operating a program to give direct aid to tenant farmers
and sharecroppers.
tradition.

This fact also represented a break from

The community program was a radical means to

achieve a conservative and traditional goal.
If the New Deal resettlement agencies sought to

■^Computed from House Agricultural Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural
Department Appropriation Bill for 1947. 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1946, 1405, 1411-1413. These figures do not include funds
spent for Dyess Colony or the Mississippi subsistence home
steads, all of which should be added to the $13,000,000.00
•*-2 U. S. Department of Agriculture,. Farmers Home
Administration.. Report of the.Administrator of the Farmers
Home Administration. 1946-1947 (Washington, 1947), Appendix
Tables II, IV.

restore the family farm, how well did they do it?

More

important, how successfully did they alleviate the suffering
of tenants and croppers?

Obviously, the New Deal did not

spark a revival of family-size farms.

Tugwell was correct

when he pointed out the anachronism of the family farm in an
age of technology and large-scale, commercial agriculture.
Nothing could have brought back the family farm.

In this

sense, the resettlement program was not merely conservative;
it was a bit reactionary.

As for farm tenancy, the number of

Southern tenant farmers dropped dramatically during World
War II and afterward.

In Region Six, the average rate of

tenancy fell from a high of 67.2 per cent in 1930 to 59.6 in
1940, 51.0 in 1945, and 42.9 in 1950, and 26.4 in 1959.13
But most of the families who left tenancy became farm
laborers, an even lower status than tenancy, not farm owners?
or they left the land entirely during the war and went into
the cities and towns.

Even so, the New Deal could take

credit for only a small part of what actual improvement did
take place.

The resettlement projects, tenant purchase, and

rural rehabilitation programs were simply not large enough
in themselves to produce a change of great magnitude.

In

Region Six, the resettlement program involved only about
2,800 families in all three states, although more

s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1942 (Washington.- 1952), 709; Statistical
Abstract of the United States. 1952 (Washington, 1952), 582?
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1962 (Washington,
1962), 619.
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participated in the tenant purchase and rural rehabilitation
programs.

The RA and FSA did not measure up to the problem

of farm tenancy, much less to the broader problem of rural
poverty.

Yet neither agency ever intended to do more than

assist a relatively small number of the beqt qualified
tenant families.
Today, few people remember the excitement of Dyess
Colony in 1934, or the optimism of Plum Bayou in 1936, or
even the radical spirit of Terrebonne in 1939.

But at a

crucial time in American history, such resettlement projects
brought hope into the lives of a few members of an unfor
tunate class of people.

Perhaps the New Deal did not do

enough to combat rural poverty, but it did more than had
ever been done before.

At least, the New Deal tried to help.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
No adequate study of the New Deal resettlement program
could be written without the records in the National Archives.
The most important collection of correspondence, memoranda,
and reports is Record Group 96, Records of the Farmers Home
Administration, which contains 2,443 cubic feet of material
on the Division of Subsistence Homesteads, the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, the Resettlement Administra
tion, and the Farm Security Administration.

Stanley W.

Brown and Virgil E . Baugh (comps.) , Preliminary Inventory of
the Records of the Farmers Home Administration, National
Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration,
Publication No. 118 (Washington, 1959) is the best available
guide to this all-important record group.

Unfortunately,

Region Six is the only one of the twelve regions with no
records for either the regional director's office or the
Resettlement Division.

Despite this disappointment, National

Archives records relating to Region Six are still so vast
that one person could literally spend weeks looking through
them all.

What was lost in the destruction of these records,

however, can be glimpsed in Works Projects Administration,
Survey of Federal Archives, Inventory of Federal Archives in
the States, Series IX, The Department of Agriculture, No. 4,
330
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Arkansas

(New Orleans, 1938-1939).

Four other record groups in the National Archives con
tain indispensable, but relatively small quantities of,
records on Region Six activities.

Since the Resettlement

Administration became part of the Department of Agriculture
in 1937, Record Group 16, Records of the Office of the Secre
tary of Agriculture, contains material relating to the Region
Six resettlement program.

Record Group 48, Records of the

Office of the Secretary of the Interior, is disappointing on
the early subsistence homesteads program in Mississippi.
Record Group 69, Records of the Work Projects Administration,
includes the records of the Works Progress Administration,
the Civil Works Administration, and the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration.

The WPA records are an important

source of material on W. R. Dyess and the >;ural rehabilita
tion program in Arkansas.

Record Group 207, Records of the

Housing and Home Finance Agency, contains material concerning
the last years of the Mississippi subsistence homesteads and
their liquidation.
In addition, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at
Hyde Park, New York, contains much correspondence relating
to the Region Six resettlement program in the President's
official File and the Harry L. Hopkins Papers.

The Southern

Tenant Farmers1 Union Papers in the Southern Historical Col
lection, university of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill,
includes several folders of material relating to Dyess Colony
and other resettlement activities.

The Socialist Party of
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America Papers in the Duke University Library at Durham,
North Carolina, contain correspondence concerning Norman
Thomas' interest in Arkansas sharecroppers and STFU activi
ties in Arkansas.
Government documents provide a convenient source of
descriptive and statistical information on the resettlement
program.

The Resettlement Administration, Interim Report

(Washington, 1936) is a polished piece of work covering the
agency's earliest activities.

Equally well done, the RA's

First Annual Report (Washington, 1936) is valuable for its
comprehensive summary of every aspect of resettlement work,
showing what has been done to date in elaborate statistical
tables.

The Farm Security Administration's Annual Reports

(Washington, 1937-1946) never measured up to the RA's high
standards.

Descriptive material is sketchy and sometimes

statistical data are non-existent.

The annual reports of

the Farmers Home Administration contain the ultimate repay
ment figures in FSA loan programs, but they are largely
silent on the liquidation of the resettlement projects.

Of

some value for the final disposition of the projects are the
annual reports of the United States National Housing Agency
(1945-1947) and its successor, the United States Housing and
Home Finance Agency (1947-1953).
The Division of Subsistence Homesteads, the Resettle
ment Administration, and the Farm Security Administration
all published hundreds of booklets, pamphlets, reports, bulle
tins, and circulars for the use of local supervisors, client
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families, and the general public.

This material often pre

sents a romanticized view of resettlement projects, but it
does convey the mood that permeated the program's early
years.

There are several bibliographies covering most such

material.

The most useful one in Saul M. Katz and Joseph W.

Eaton, Research Guide on Cooperative Group Farming (New York,
1942).

The editors' use of the libraries of Columbia Uni

versity, the University of Chicago, the Rural Settlement
Institute of Chicago,aand the New York Public Library, along
with its relatively late date, make it the most comprehensive
of all bibliographies published within the FSA's lifetime.
In addition, the listings of government publications,and
Department of Agriculture and WPA research monographs give
the Katz and Eaton guide special value.

Two other biblio

graphical aids are Katherine. McNamara, Bibliography of
Planning, 1928-1935

(Cambridge, Mass., 1936); and Helen E.

Heunefrund, Part-time Farming in the United States. U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agriculture Economics,
Agricultural Economics Bibliography No. 77
1939).

(Washington,

The bibliographies 1in National Resource Board, Farm

Tenancy:

Report of the President1s Committee

(Washington,

1937); and U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farmers in a
Changing World:

The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940 (Washing

ton, 1940) include selected government publications and
contemporary magazine articles.
The many congressional committee hearings, reports,
and documents supply much cold, hard factual information on
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the resettlement projects.

The Cooley Committee published

almost 2,000 pages of testimony and statistical data on the
FSA:

Select Committee of the House Committee on Agriculture,

Hearings on the Farm Security Administration, 78th Cong., 1st.
Sess., 1943-1944.

Part Three contains a valuable summary of

the resettlement projects, although omitting most subsistence
homesteads and FERA communities.

The committee summarized

its findings and recommendations in U. S. House of Repre
sentatives, Activities of the Farm Security Administration,
Report No. 1430, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1944.

The Resettle

ment Administration prepared an elaborate statistical
analysis of its programs for Congress while almost all its
resettlement projects were still in the planning stage:

U.

S . Senate, Resettlement Administration Program, Senate Docu
ment No. 213, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1936.

The annual hear

ings of the Senate and House Agricultural Subcommittees of
the Committees on Apprppriations for 1941 through 1947
convey the headlong haste with which the FSA resettlement
program was dismantled.

Especially useful for demonstrating

congressional determination to scrap the resettlement pro
gram are U. S. Senate, Agricultural Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural
Department Appropriation Bill for 1943, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1942; and the Senate Agricultural Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural
Department Appropriation Bill for 1944, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1943.

The Senate Agricultural Subcommittee1s Hearings on the

Agricultural Department Appropriation Bill for 1946, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, contains a specific attack on the
Terrebonne project.

The House Agricultural Committee of the

Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Agricultural
Department Appropriation Bill for 1947, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1946, contains the last published figures on the liquidation
of almost all resettlement projects, including their total
cost, the average unit sales price, operating and maintenance
expenses, and income.

Many contemporary critics accused the

FSA of juggling figures in order to show resettlement pro
jects operating at a profit.

This is an exaggeration, but

the tables of FSA figures in appropriations committee hear
ings are misleading if given only a cursory glance, although
the information is there.

The Congressional Record shows the

growing displeasure with FSA resettlement activities.
Three other public documents deserve mention.

John

B. Holt, Analysis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting
Families for Colonization Projects, Social Research Report
No. 1, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Security Admin
istration, and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics
(Washington, 1937) is an excellent study of the family
selection programs of all resettlement agencies, with a
special look at Dyess Colony.

Arkansas Emergency Relief

Administration, A Review of Work Relief Activities in
Arkansas. April 1st. 1934. to July 1st. 1935

(Little Rock,

1935) contains minute detail oh the development of Dyess
Colony.

A similar work but with less detail is Arkansas
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Emergency Relief Administration, Traveling Recovery Road:
The story of Relief, Work-Relief, and Rehabilitation in
Arkansas. August 30, 1932. to November 15, 1936

(Little Rock,

1936).
An invaluable source of information on the local work
of the resettlement agencies is the newspapers of the region,
both small-town weeklies and large-city dailies.

Newspapers

not only reflected local attitudes toward resettlement, but
they published information about land purchase, family
selection, project development, and in some cases operation,
although most papers lost interest in local projects once
the new wore off and the clients settled down to everyday
living.

Even the most humble weeklies provide indispensable

information, since such papers often served as a kind of
"official journal" for the announcements of county and parish
FSA supervisors.

Front-page coverage was the rule.

One

example of unusually close cooperation between local project
officials and a local paper is the McComb Enterprise
sippi) in 1934 and 1935.

(Missis

The editor of the paper, J. 0.

Emmerich, was also the project manager of McComb Homesteads,
and he gave the project a big play.
Houma Courier

Another example is the

(Louisiana), which followed every move made at

the Terrebonne projects from 1937 to 1940.
Beacon-News

The Richland

(Rayville, Louisiana) showed interest in FSA

activities all over the state, but especially at nearby Crew
Lake.
Journal

The Lake Providence Banner Democrat and the Madison
(Tallulah) were strong boosters of both the
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Transylvania and Mounds projects in northeast Louisiana.
The Caldwell Watchman (Columbia) ran a series of short
articles written by Joyce Mullins, Caldwell Parish home
management supervisor, under the general heading "A Few Facts
About Resettlement."

Both the Osceola Times and the Blythe-

ville Courier N e w s , the two leading newspapers of Mississippi
County, Arkansas, gave excellent coverage on the development
of Dyess Colony, but they both seemed to ignore the colony's
troubles after 1938.
The Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock) is the most
valuable single papef for news about resettlement in Region
Six.

It was located in the same city as the regional head

quarters and always carried any news release concerning
Arkansas resettlement activities or any release of regionwide importance.

The Gazette. like other large-city dailies

of the region, offers special advantages not available in
the rural weeklies.

Its reporters visited resettlement pro

jects and interviewed officials and clients, and the numerous
feature articles they wrote are an important source of
detailed first-hand information on such projects as Dyess
Colony, Lake Dick, Plum Bayou, and Lakeview.

Resettlement

projects were news, at least when they were new or when
troubled with any suggestion of discontent or scandal.
were also the source of much human interest material.

They
The

New Orleans Times-Picavune published several long stories on
the Terrebonne project, as did the Item-Tribune.

The Monroe

Mornincr News gave the Crew Lake project favorable treatment.
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The Pine Bluff Daily Graphic, unofficial spokesman of south
east Arkansas, was in an excellent position to cover reset
tlement activities, since two large projects, Plum Bayou and
Lake Dick, were located just across the Arkansas River.
Jackson Clarion-Ledger and the Daily News

The

(Mississippi) are

important papers, but they had less resettlement activity to
cover.

The Memphis Commerical Appeal and especially the

Press-Scimitar

(Tennessee), both of which circulated widely

in eastern Arkansas, reported news from Dyess, Plum Bayou,
and elsewhere, and generally favored resettlement as a means
of helping farm tenants.
In the past decade, students of the New Deal have
begun to give the resettlement program the attention it
deserves.

Most recently, Sidney Baldwin, in Poverty and

Politics;

The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Adminis

tration (Chapel Hill, 1968), has written an excellent
administrative history of the FSA and its predecessors.

A

political scientist, Baldwin is preoccupied with institutional
survival, goal formation, goal succession, and other such
concepts, but he has contributed insights that historians
might have overlooked.

The most valuable book on the reset

tlement program itself remains Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow ja
New World;
1959).

The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N. Y . ,

Conkin traces the origins of the back-to-the-land

movement of the Depression, discusses the subsistence home
steads program, the FERA communities, and the RA and FSA
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projects, giving five communities separate treatment.

He

stresses the discontinuity of the resettlement program from
previous experience.

What he has to say about Region Six

projects, of course, is meager.

An early but still valuable

study is Joseph W. Eaton, Exploring1 Tomorrow1s Agriculture
(New York, 1943).

Written under the auspices of the Rural

Settlement Institute, Eaton had access to certain FSA files
in Washington, interviewed FSA officials, and visited several
projects in early 1941.

He attempted specifically to explain

the theory and practice of what he called the "cooperative
group farms"

(like Terrebonne and Lake Dick), which he

believed to be the wave of the future; but much of what he
says about project development, organization, and operation
applies to all FSA communities.
The scope of other secondary works on the community
program is more limited.

Casa Grande Valley Farms, an

Arizona cooperative farming projects, is the subject of
Edward Banfield, Government Project (Glencoe, 111., 1951).
Russell Lord and Paul H. Johnstone

(eds.), A Place on E arths .

A Critical Appraisal of Subsistence Homesteads. Bureau of
Agricultural Economics

(Washington, 1942) contains soci

ological case studies on thirteen individual subsistence
homestead communities.

Paul W. Wager, One Foot on the Soils

A Study of Subsistence Homesteads in Alabama (University,
Ala., 1945) is limited to five communities in the Birmingham
area.

Despite the title, Wager deals with FSA projects.

How Greenbelt, Maryland, one of the famous Tugwelltowns,
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appeared to an early settler is told in George A. Warner,
Greenbelt:

The Cooperative Community (New York, 1954).

A

similar work is Raymond P. Duggan, A Federal Resettlement
Project— Granger Homesteads, School of Social Work, Monography No. 1, Catholic University of America
1937).

Paul K. Conkin,

(Washington,

"It all Happened in Pine Mountain

Valley," Georgia Historical Quarterly. XLVII

(March, 1963),

1-42, deals with an FERA community.
A number of new studies provide help in evaluating
the community program in relation to overall New Deal agricul
tural policies.

Christiana MacFadyen Campbell, The Farm

Bureau and the New Deal:
Farm Policy, 1933-1940

A Study of the Making of National

(Urbana, 111., 1962) follows the

rising conflict between New Deal agencies and the American
Farm Bureau Federation but stops before the latter's assault
on the FSA.

A book that focuses on Arkansas farm tenancy

troubles is David Eugene Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers;

The

Story of Sharecroppers in the New Deal (Urbana, 111., 1965).
Conrad does not go into the New Deal resettlement program.
Richard s . Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics
in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia, Mo., 1966) discusses
important farm leaders and thinkers in the New Deal including
M. L. Wilson and Rexford G. Tugwell.

Another significant

study is Dean Albertson, Roosevelt1s Farmer:
Wickard in the New Deal

(New York, 1961).

Edward L. and

Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace:
Years, 1910-1940

Claude R.

The Agrarian

(Ames, Iowa, 1969), focuses largely on the
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New Deal years.

Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston,

1947) is an older work that tries to put the community pro
gram in perspective.

The struggle over the FSA in World War

II is recotinted in Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian
Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953).
Griswold, Farming and Democracy

Alfred W.

(New Haven, 1952) traces the

history of the agrarian myth that the back-to-the-landers
held.

See also Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, Seeds of

Southern Changes

The Life of Will Alexander (Chicago, 1962);

and Bernard Sternsher, Rexford G. Tugwell and the New Deal
(New Brunswick, N. J., 1964).
As a rule, general works on the New Deal treat the
Resettlement and Farm Security Administrations in cursory
fashion.

But Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roose

velt. Vol. II:

The Coming of the New Deal

(Boston, 1958),

includes an exceptionally full account of the early subsis
tence homesteads program and the Resettlement Administration's
activities.

Schlesinger's fourth volume, if it appears,

should devote additional attention to the Farm Security
Administration.

Paul Conkin, The New Deal

(New York, 1967)

works a few comments on the community program into his New
Left critique.

William E. Leuchtenburg. Franklin D. Roose

velt and the New Deal (New York, 1963) gives the resettle
ment program its due.

Frank Freidel's Franklin D. Roosevelt;

The Triumph (Boston, 1956) discusses Roosevelt's speeches on
agriculture during the 1932 campaign.

Georgg B. Tindall's

magnum opus, The Emergence of the New South. 1913-1945

(Baton
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Rouge, 1967) contains a good summary of Arkansas tenant
troubles and the New Deal's response.
Among the collections of primary sources in print,
most supply only incidental material on the resettlement
program.

Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and

Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt

(13 vols.; New York, 1938-

1950) contains executive orders, speeches, and other offi
cial material relating to the resettlement agencies.

Edgar

B . Nixon (comp.), Franklin D . Roosevelt and Conservation
(2 vols.; Hyde Park, 1957) does not provide much help on the
New Deal's resettlement work.

The published memoirs of New

Deal insiders also gives minimal help.
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes

Harold L. Ickes, The

(3 vols.; New York, 1953-

1954) makes clear what he thought about the subsistence home
steads program on a trip through Tupelo, Mississippi.

Rexford

G. Tugwell. The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, N. Y.,
1957) gives insight into the development of the entire
Resettlement Administration program.
Seven Years

Raymond Mo ley, After

(New York, 1939); and Eleanor Roosevelt, This I

Remember (New York, 1940) are of little value so far as the
RA and FSA are concerned.
The periodical literature on the New Deal is volumi
nous.

Of the literally hundreds of contemporary articles on

the community program, few deal specifically with Region Six
activities.

The most helpful, however, are Will W. Alexander,

"Rural Resettlement." Southern Review. I (Winter, 1936),
528-39; Oscar Ameringer,

"No Thoroughfare to Utopia,"

Reader's Dicrest, XXXVII
Ezekiel,

(July, 1940), 13-16; Mordecai

"Schisms in Agricultural Policy," Journal of Farm

Economics, XXIV (May, 1942), 4-63-76; "FHA [FSA] Helps Con
struction," Construction News, V
Richard Heilman,
Magazine. CLXXXII

(September 28, 1938), 5, 6;

"The Farmers Try Group Medicine," Harper1s
(December, 1940), 72-80; Charles P . Loomis

and Dwight Davidson, Jr., "Sociometrics and the Study of New
Rural Communities," Sociometrv. II
Rena B. Maycock,

(January, 1939), 56-76;

"Home Economic Work in the Resettlement

Administration," Journal of Home Economics. XXVIII
1936), 560-62; Horace G. Porter,

(October,

"New Farms in the Missis

sippi Delta," Louisiana Rural Economist, II
5-7; "Rural Industrial Community Projects:

(April, 1940),
Woodlake, Texas,

Osceola, Arkansas, and Red House, West Virginia," Architec
tural Record, LXXVI I (January, 1935), 14-16; Oren Stephens,
"FSA Fights for Its Life," Harper1s Magazine. ELXXXVI
1943), 479-87; Oren Stephens,

"Revolt on the Delta:

(April,
What

Happened to the Sharecroppers' Union," Harper's Magazine,
CLXXXIII

(November, 1941), 656-64; Rexford G. Tugwell,

"Co

operation and Resettlement," Current History, XLV (February,
1937), 71-76; George S. Wehrwein,

"An Appraisal of Resettle

ment," Journal of Farm Economics, XIX (February, 1937), 190202; Lawrence Westbrook,

"The Pr&gram of the Rural Rehabili

tation Division of the FERA," Journal of Farm Economics.
XVII (February, 1935), 98-100; Clarence A. Wiley,

"Settlement

and Unsettlement in the Resettlement Administration, " Law
and Contemporary Problems. IV (October, 1937), 456-72;
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M. L. Wilson,

"The Place of Subsistence Homesteads in Our

National Economy," Journal of Farm Economics," XVI

(January,

1934), 73-84.
The most useful bibliographical guide to more recent
articles is William J. Stewart (comp.), The Era of Franklin
D . Roosevelt:

A Selected Bibliography of Periodical and

Dissertation Literature. 1945-1966

(Hyde Park. N. Y . , 1967).

Again, Region Six is a research vacuum.
exception is Louis J. Rodriguez,

The most obvious

"The Terrebonne Project:

Ideological Revolution or Economic Expediency?" Louisiana
Studies, VI

(Fall, 1967), 267-77.

M. S. Vankataramani,

"Norman Thomas, Arkansas Sharecroppers, and the Roosevelt
Agriculture Policies, 1933-1937," Mississippi Valley His
torical Review, XLVII

(September, 1960), 225-46, is excellent?

but Conrad, in The Forgotten Farmers. has treated the subjects— ,
far more thoroughly.
Tenant Farmers:
History. VII

See also Jerold Auerbach, "Southern

Socialist Critics of the New Deal," Labor

(Winter, 1966), 3-18.

interest in Louis Cantor,
ment:

A recent article of

"A Prologue to the Protest Move

The Missouri Sharecropper Roadside Demonstration of

1939." Journal of American History. LV (March, 1969), 804-22.
See also Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Resettlement Idea, " Agri
cultural History. XXXIII

(October, 1959), 159-64.

The South's farm tenancy system has long been a popular
subject with farm economists, sociologists, and historians,
but never more so than during the 1930's.

A basic study of

the problem is Rupert Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Culture
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(Chapel Hill, 1929).

Charles S. Johnson, Edwin R. Embree,

and Will Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel
Hill, 1935) dramatically called attention to the problem
while taking some shots at the AAA's effects on tenants.
Charles S. Johnson goes into more detail in The Shadow of
the Plantation (Chicago, 1934).

W. A. Turner, A Graphic

Survey of Farm Tenure,.U. S. Department of Agriculture, Misc.
Publ. No. 261
tical data.

(Washington, 1936) is valuable for its statis
Another government-sponsored summary is National

Resources Board, Farm Tenancy:
Committee

(Washington, 1937).

Report of the President1s
Neither Carl C. Taylor, Helen

W. Wheeler, and E. L. Kirkpatrick, Disadvantaged Classes in
American Agriculture, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau
of Agricultural Economics, Social Service Report No. 8
(Washington, 1938); nor T. J. Woof ter, Jr., et a l ., Landlord
and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation. W P A Research Monography,
V

(Washington, 1936) should be overlooked.

studies focus on the states of Region Six:

Several small
Donald C.

Alexander, The Arkansas Plantation. 1920-1942

(New Haven,

1943); Arkansas State Policy Committee, Agricultural Labor
Problems in Arkansas. Published Paper No. 1 (n.p., October 31,
1936); H. W. Blalock, "Plantation Operations of Landlords and
Tenants in Arkansas," University of Arkansas, College of Agri
culture, Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 339
(Fayetteville, 1938); J. G. McNeely, Glen T. Barton, and
Trimble R. Hedges,

"Land Tenure in Arkansas," University of,

Arkansas, College’of Agriculture, Agricultural Experiment'..
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Station Bulletin Nol 438 (Fayetteville, 1934); Ralph J.
Ramsey and Harold Hoffsomer, Farm Tenancy in Louisiana. U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics
(Washington, 1941) .
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